I did not have a try. It’s theoretical based on protons policy.
It seems a bit cumbersome. The other person gets removed from the account and gets a free 30 days trial Proton Unlimited. This kind of lock the person to not get BF deals. Nevertheless it may work well for the primary account holder to renew the Duo account again with a BF deal.
I’d love to actually see Proton giving those deals without having to go around those “gymminastics”.
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Interesting. I’d be intrigued with their response if anyone was up to reach out privately via email or socials. Perhaps then they’d disclose the team menderes or company history.
(emphasis all mine)
Of course, they say that in the intro. Read the fine print:
For users (of computers and other electronic devices), the new Covert Surveillance of Data Act grants law enforcement agencies the authority, upon a special permit (in each specific case) from a competent Swedish court, to
secretly install software or hardware on suspect users' devices or devices which the suspect in special cases have or will most likely contact. This implies that law enforcement agencies may access a suspect user’s information before it is encrypted by VPN-services …
Pretty much states that the FRA can pwn their servers if they deem the suspect is most likely to contact it.
They also wash their hands off of their own assertions.
Note that
the summary is not exhaustiveand itssole purpose is to provide you, as a user, with a certain overall, general understandingof the new law and an understanding of why Mullvad VPN is not subject to the new law. Thesummary is not intended to constitute, and must not be used as, professional legal advicein any respect. All use of the content is at theuser's own risk.
In other words, do your own research.
Yeah, I know. You expect them to say otherwise? (: My point is, the law grants FRA an astonishingly wide-berth.
As I understand it, it says they can (covertly) install software or hardware on a user devices, not on their server. I guess they could MITM communications.
But I am not sure if this is really important for non-Swedish users.
It’s a bit oddly written, but this is a class IANAL warning.
It is clearly spelt out that FRA can do so on “devices a suspect will most likely contact”. This covers, as far as my reading comprehension goes, a VPN provider’s software & hardware, if you’re the suspect “contacting” it over WireGuard, say.
And secretly, at that… which I take it to mean any Swedish provider, if they’re owned by the FRA, they cannot be transparent about it.
Yeah, my point is, if it were me, I’d rather take 3p expert opinion on it and not a business’ that wants to save face.
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If anything all of this points to a conclusion which we already point to, if you want anonymity, use tor.
This ignores the fact that the proportionality principle exists. It would not be proportional to compromise an entire Mullvad server or more likely a set of Mullvad servers to target a single user. Moreover it would, strictly technically, be significantly more difficult than simply targeting the users endpoint devices.
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Prop what? I’d be very surprised if this bothers the FRA at all, assuming it applies (I presume it wouldn’t given the Act or rather Mullvad’s reading of the Act very explicitly makes it clear that the devices a suspect “contacts” are fair game).
If you’re any familiar with the FRA you know the providers are getting owned if the FRA wants them owned.
Think you misread. Per my reading, the Act seems to grant the law enforcement the power to “install hardware & software” on provider’s equipments … secretly. This isn’t “strictly more difficult” (as the provider has to comply); rather a super straightforward, super secret compromise.
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Yes, they do. Mullvad cannot be forced to do secret logging. Period. Even IF Police wanted to compromise their servers, good luck doing that with Mullvad. They are extremely careful and check all their hardware on arrival.
Keep this thread on-topic, please:
“Cheaper VPN service recommendations?”