Wire (Instant Messenger)

[jonah (Jonah Aragon)]

I’m opening a new thread on Wire because the previous thread combined Wire and Threema into one post

@f0r_fr33d0m

I certainly haven’t done an in-depth analysis of both services, but from what can be seen of them, they could be good recommendations to consider as instant messaging services.
(Websites: Wire

[jonah (Jonah Aragon)]

Delisting Wire From Privacy Guides

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(Replies from previous post)

@jonah

As far as Wire, there are a number of reasons for this which you can read here: Delisting Wire from PrivacyTools.io

@f0r_fr33d0m

@jonah
I can understand Wire’s case, although with respect to their legislation, it is better than the alternatives you recommend (Server location: Signal=USA. Applicable legislation in decentralised cases: Session=Australia, Element=UK… while the legislation applicable to Wire is that of the European Union (better than that of the other services)), but well, I can understand it.

[dngray (Daniel Gray)]

Regarding Wire, pretty sure this is still true:

Secure Messaging App Wire Stores Everyone You've Ever Contacted in Plain Text

[jerm]

Encrypted services Apple, Proton and Wire helped Spanish police identify...

Provided email (protonmail) related to Proton Mail Discloses User Data Leading to Arrest in Spain

Upon a formally correct request by the Swiss authorities, Wire provided basic account information about a user.

https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/opinion/wire/

Wire does not attempt to hide metadata, other than the central server promising not to log very much information

[jerm]

Breaking Cryptography in the Wild: The Loose Ends of the Wire App

Wire currently supports two E2E protocols: Proteus, based on Signal’s Double Ratchet protocol and which is used by default, and MLS, the newly standardized IETF “Messaging Layer Security protocol”, which is still in active development. We show that a combination of protocol-level and application-level vulnerabilities significantly undermine the confidentiality and authentication guarantees of Proteus E2E channels. These vulnerabilities allow a malicious server to tamper with message order, r…

[jerm]

Leaks also Push notification (FCM) metadata as shown in this research conducted on various messengers.

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.10589