Please add hardware recomendation section (all categories)

I’d like to have a hardware section so that i can aim to buy that hardware as much as possible
right now, hardware on the site is limited to pixel phones and security keys but i’d like a few more:

  • laptos (right now , the best i could fiind is the librem 14 laptop with the boot usb)
  • desktops
  • peripherals? (sounds insane, but a friend got a chineese usb keyboard that had a mic in it (we know because there was a light pattern based on sound, yelling lit up the keyboard))
  • iOS vs android and mac vs linux
  • smart TVs (or lack there of)
  • smart watches
  • routers
  • wireless headphones

along side those, a group of tags for “open hardware”, “open firmware”, and “open softrware”

Thanks for the ideas, we’re currently working on a hardware page: Add hardware section by mfwmyfacewhen · Pull Request #1939 · privacyguides/privacyguides.org · GitHub

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Some preliminary testing has been done on Investigate router platforms · Issue #1864 · privacyguides/privacyguides.org · GitHub

It’s unlikely we would do those other categories as there’s nothing particularly “privacy centric” about those things, or there simply are no good options, (smart tvs, smart watches) or all options are good (desktops)

Yes, there are no good options yet, but there are some early-stage things like watch from Raspberry Pi, or you can make smart tv from normal TV, and connect it to Raspberry Pi 4 which can handle 4K, you can mount to it a mouse, a keyboard, and it’s open-source.

Maybe you could even run Pi hole (VPN, that can also block ads).

So smart tv :white_check_mark: (depends if you would want it)
Watch not so much, maybe in later stage of development.

Also I heard good things, about AMD being open-source, and having a good relationship with community, so they are more compatible with Linux operating systems = getting CPU & GPU from AMD could help privacy wise (maybe, I don’t understand the code, so…)

Just some random stuff that might be worth noting.

Juice jacking
The wiki mention that(Juice jacking - Wikipedia):

To date there have been no credible reported cases of juice jacking outside of research efforts.

Microphone/Camera
I know iPads and MacBook feature a hardware microphone disconnect feature. Not sure if other similar laptops implement this. It basically disconnects the microphone on hardware level when you turn off the device.
Also, any modern device have the LED indicator wired in series with the camera. Some laptop manufactures like apple don’t recommend the use of cover for the camera as it could damage the display. Instead,

As an alternative to a camera cover, use the camera indicator light to determine if your camera is active, and decide which apps can use your camera in System Preferences.

If you don’t trust the camera in your device, you can not trust the device either.

Overall Faraday bags, dead man switches, anti-interdiction seems pointless. These have extremely niche use cases and effectiveness may be limited by the advancement of technology.

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Juice Jacking: The Wall of Sheep at DEFCON have done it in the past, however that was back when phones would just dump data on whatever was connected to it. Nowadays phones ask permission to “trust” the device first. I do think it might still be worth mentioning though since it’s still possible for a user to accidentally press “trust” instinctively and give access to the charging station.

Microphone/Camera: That’s cool, I added that to the paragraph and removed the video, didn’t realize that problem got fixed. Yes those bulky camera covers are awful, that’s why I said sticky note instead. Thinking about it more though, I think it’s a bad idea to tell people to put sticky notes over cameras as this will obviously interfere with Face ID, presence detection, automatic brightness, etc and they can easily fall off/be too see through to be effective so I’ll remove that as well.

Faraday Bags: Agree with you here, there are too many scam products and ways you can mess up to make this a reliable solution.

Dead Man Switches: I think these can be useful, especially the ones that come built in with your OS and detect your presence. The cable can be useful if you want that functionality but your OS doesn’t support presence detection.

Anti-Interdiction: I agree this is very niche. Purism’s anti-interdiction is personalized per customer, I’d have to look into it more to see what they actually do and how effective it actually is. I do wonder if that was your threat model, you might be better off just going to a physical store and buying a machine off the shelf rather than ordering one to your address. The nail polish thing I’m iffy about, it doesn’t seem precise and I think it could be easy for someone who is paranoid to look at it and think the pattern changed.

Lots of good points, I’ll revise and reevaluate :+1:

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Yea, it seems some windows laptop includes human detection feature. macOS also seems to have a similar feature called “autolock” that uses an Apple Watch to detect presence. Might worth linking to these resources in the page. macOS does not have a similar feature

Regarding the warning about face authentication,
I think it is best to not mention Pixel 4 as an example for a secure facial recognition system as it is an EOL device. Instead, it is best to use Face ID as an example as it is the most secure facial authentication system AFAIK.

More about Face ID security

I think these statements hold true for any biometrics system implemented with similar technology.

The probability that a random person in the population could unlock a user’s iPhone or iPad is less than 1 in 1,000,000 with Face ID — including when Face ID with a mask is turned on. For a user’s iPhone, iPad, and Mac models with Touch ID and those paired with a Magic Keyboard, it’s less than 1 in 50,000. This probability increases with multiple enrolled fingerprints (up to 1 in 10,000 with five fingerprints) or appearances (up to 1 in 500,000 with two appearances). For additional protection, both Face ID and Touch ID allow only five unsuccessful match attempts before a passcode or password is required to obtain access to the user’s device or account. With Face ID, the probability of a false match is higher for:

Twins and siblings who look like the user

Children under the age of 13 (because their distinct facial features may not have fully developed)

The probability is further increased in these two cases when Face ID with a mask is used. If a user is concerned about a false match, Apple recommends using a passcode to authenticate.

Source