I think the value here comes down to what threat model and operational goals you are optimizing for.
The article author’s primary focus is about reducing cognitive load and maintenance (“If it’s complicated, it’s a chore”) while building a resilient appliance. In that specific regard, MicroOS + Podman Quadlets is an interesting “low-ops” stack. It leverages native kernel primitives (namespaces, cgroups, AppArmor/SELinux) and read-only roots to provide excellent defense against remote network exploits, without the administration overhead of complex orchestration layers.
However, your reply perfectly elevates the discussion from low-ops resilience to high-assurance engineering. If someone is trying to solve for physical-tampering threats or hosting completely untrusted multi-tenant code, MicroOS doesn’t provide those strict cryptographic guarantees out of the box. Pointing the community toward Clevis/Tang, gVisor, and UKI + dm-verity gives anyone looking for true, enterprise-grade hardening a great architectural roadmap.