Telegram is not backdoored, it’s front-doored.
The clients do not support end-to-end encryption for groups. Those chats automatically leak to the server, which is exactly the same effect a backdoor in Signal would have.
The desktop clients do not support end-to-end encryption, which means 100% of desktop chats leak to the server, which is exactly the same effect a backdoor in Signal would have.
The 1:1 chats on telegram phone conversations by default leak all messages to Telegram server, which has the exact same effect a backdoor in Signal would have.
The 1:1 chats on Telegram can be end-to-end encrypted if the user enables secret chats. This leaks intent to hide from Telegram as a company.
The 1:1 end-to-end encrypted secret chats on Telegram can not be continued on desktop, which tires out the user, who eventually gives up, and reverts back to non-secret chats. This is an ingenious backdoor, because you can blame it on the user. It’s your fault for not protecting your messages. When you drop the use of E2EE secret chats, your messages leak to the server, which has the exact same effect a backdoor in Signal would have.
Telegram is open about all of this so it’s not backdoored. It’s front doored.
This serves another purpose: No security researcher can write a paper about a backdoor in Telegram’s encryption, because the fine-print already reveals all of this. It’s so obvious to experts, it’s like writing a physics paper about water being wet.
The last part of this front door is marketing. Telegram and its cult following have been misleading the users about Telegram being “heavily encrypted”, and they have misled the system to be E2EE by saying it has MTProto E2EE protocol, and that all chats use MTProto.
The fine print is, BOTH THE END-TO-END ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL, AND THE CLIENT-SERVER ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL ARE CALLED MTProto.