It seems that this vulnerability requires use of the ASUS mobile app
You only need to have had your ASUS router paired to the ASUS router app once, in its entire lifetime (barring factory resets). Even if you have deleted the app for a year, this exploit still works.
It seems that this vulnerability requires … and to allow remote access of the router
Sorry, where did you see/infer this information? Based on MrBruh’sreport, I believe that you only need LAN access to your router.
In that case, as I illustrated, LAN access is not a high security bar. An Android app with e.g. a hidden malicious process has LAN access[1], and a browser webpage can also request for local network access (LNA). From there, the attack can be attempted.
Anyway, this whole vulnerability chain was just to give an example of the poor security posture of ASUS routers, and, more generally, that of SOHO routers.
If you’re comfortable with SOHO routers still, then hey good for ya. But I personally think that’s not something I want for my home.
Unless you have used RethinkDNS to cut off WiFi access to that app, use GrapheneOS and did not grant that app network access permissions, etc. ↩︎
Power draw is the part I keep coming back to when weighing options. For a home setup, an OptiPlex plus a 24-port switch at 30-50W adds up over a year compared to a small 2.5G switch under 15W, so it really depends on whether you actually need 10G and the management features. The point about buying hardware designed for open firmware makes sense too, since flashing something unsupported sounds like more trouble than it’s worth. Bandwidth and VPN overhead would be my main concern before committing to a Banana Pi.
It probably depends on country/market and connection type. I am only seeing routers and no pure modems/bridges sold by ISP. The only separate ones I could find were DrayTek Vigor, which are as or even more expensive than just taking the vendor router.
Not too deep into this, but FRITZ!Box for example can delegate IPv6 sub-prefixes to the inner router IIRC.
As said, on the edge you might need some kind of vendor router and hope for a bridge mode. Though I agree, it makes sense to shield your inner network from a box you can’t control.
Take your time. Flint3 has no official OpenWrt builds yet
Your ISP forces you to use a proprietary motem + router combo, by doing some devious cryptography.
It has no bridge mode, or it just can’t handle the bandwidth you paid for satisfactorily.
Even then, I believe there are ways to get around it, but it might take a bit more tinkering.
Iirc in a recent Gamers Nexus video featuring Wendall from Level1Techs, they briefly mentioned about how one of their acquaintance/friend was dissatisfied with the router AT&T forced them to use. But, this person managed to open up the router and extract the private certificate it uses to prove authenticity.
After which, they used this private certificate in a homebrew router, effectively spoofing the ISP’s router.
I don’t know mucu about this process. But, just putting it out there for anyone who might be in such a situation, so they can research more themselves and see if its worth the effort to them.
I have it set up as an Access Point, i.e., its role is to be connected to a wired network via Ethernet and broadcast a wireless network without it needing to act as a NAT, firewall, DHCP server (normal “router” stuff), DNS filter, WireGuard server etc.
I said “dumb” because the product itself is quite feature-rich but I only use it for its antennae to broadcast WiFi and that’s it (maybe as a switch because it has lots of ports). It’s not as critical from a security perspective than the device facing off to the internet.