This is a wild claim and should be backed with some evidence or description how to reproduce.
Apparently Session is improving its game wrt forward secrecy Session messenger adds PFS, PQE, and other improvements so making the switch might be harder than waiting.
The new Counter Galois Onion protocol brings forward secrecy to all Tor-connections via CGO protocol: Tor switches to new Counter Galois Onion relay encryption algorithm
Anyway, here’s a simple comparison table
| Program | Group Chats | Forward Secrecy | Anonymity | Post-quantum security | Shines in | Issues |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SimpleX | Yes | Yes | No (Server knows your IP) | Yes | UX | Lies by omission by claiming it has no identifiers as the server by default knows your IP address. Service provider and VPS host companies can by default end-to-end correlate users’ comms metadata without the user knowing. No indicator to show Tor is enabled so proxy setting misconfiguration can accidentally deanonymize you. |
| Session | Yes | Planned | Onion Routing over Lokinet | Planned | UX | Lokinet network is worse than Tor for anonymity |
| Cwtch | Experimental | CGO | Tor Onion Services | No | UX, multiple user profiles integrated | |
| Quiet | Yes | CGO | Tor Onion Services | No | UX | |
| OnionShare | No | CGO | Tor Onion Services | No | Adversarial journalist’s Swiss army knife | No group chats |
| Ricochet Refresh | No | CGO | Tor Onion Services | No | Dead simple UX | No group chats |
| Briar | Yes | CGO | No (account leaks bluetooth MAC). Still, relies mainly on Tor Onion Services for ciphertext transfer | No | Overlay services like Forums and Blogs | Bluetooth MAC leaks |
| TFC | Yes | CGO + Hash Ratchet | Tor Onion Services | PSK yes, X448 no | Endpoint security, minimalistic code-base | Clunky UX, difficult to use |
All of these are fine security wise on paper. Full disclosure, TFC is my work.
Of these, Cwtch and Quiet are worth checking out first. They seem to focus on the UX the most. Quiet is a new-comer and looks like a decent slack clone.