# Wire (Instant Messenger) **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/wire-instant-messenger/14624 **Category:** Tool Suggestions **Tags:** rejected **Created:** 2023-10-24T04:14:00Z **Posts:** 11 ## Post 1 by @jonah — 2023-10-24T04:14:00Z I’m opening a new thread on Wire because the previous thread combined Wire and Threema into one post :sob: > [@Threema (Instant Messenger)](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/threema-instant-messenger/1679/1): > > I certainly haven’t done an in-depth analysis of both services, but from what can be seen of them, they could be good recommendations to consider as instant messaging services. > (Websites: [Wire](https://wire.com/) --- ## Post 2 by @jonah — 2023-10-24T04:14:29Z > **[Delisting Wire From Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2019/11/19/delisting-wire/)** > > Wire has been removed from Privacy Guides' recommendations following their acquisition by a US holding company and VC investments. * * * (Replies from previous post) > [@Threema (Instant Messenger)](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/threema-instant-messenger/1679/2): > > As far as Wire, there are a number of reasons for this which you can read here: [Delisting Wire from PrivacyTools.io](https://web.archive.org/web/20201128215737/https://blog.privacytools.io/delisting-wire/) > [@Threema (Instant Messenger)](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/threema-instant-messenger/1679/4): > > @jonah > I can understand Wire’s case, although with respect to their legislation, it is better than the alternatives you recommend (Server location: Signal=USA. Applicable legislation in decentralised cases: Session=Australia, Element=UK… while the legislation applicable to Wire is that of the European Union (better than that of the other services)), but well, I can understand it. --- ## Post 3 by @dngray — 2023-02-22T03:36:28Z Regarding Wire, pretty sure this is still true: > **[Secure Messaging App Wire Stores Everyone You've Ever Contacted in Plain Text](https://www.vice.com/en/article/secure-messaging-app-wire-stores-everyone-youve-ever-contacted-in-plain-text/)** > > The decision is seemingly a trade-off for usability across multiple devices. --- ## Post 6 by @jerm — 2024-05-14T12:50:30Z > **[Encrypted services Apple, Proton and Wire helped Spanish police identify...](https://techcrunch.com/2024/05/08/encrypted-services-apple-proton-and-wire-helped-spanish-police-identify-activist/)** > > Spanish police requested information from Apple, and encrypted services Proton and Wire, about a pro-Catalan independence activist. Provided email (protonmail) related to [Proton Mail Discloses User Data Leading to Arrest in Spain](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/proton-mail-discloses-user-data-leading-to-arrest-in-spain/18191) > Upon a formally correct request by the Swiss authorities, Wire provided basic account information about a user. > **[Wire | Cryptography, Security, and Privacy (CrySP) | University of Waterloo](https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/opinion/wire/)** > Wire does not attempt to hide metadata, other than the central server promising not to log very much information --- ## Post 7 by @jerm — 2024-08-05T10:52:22Z > [@Breaking Cryptography in the Wild: The Loose Ends of the Wire App](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/breaking-cryptography-in-the-wild-the-loose-ends-of-the-wire-app/19878): > > [https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/673362/Tsouloupas\_Andreas.pdf](https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/673362/Tsouloupas_Andreas.pdf) Wire currently supports two E2E protocols: Proteus, based on Signal’s Double Ratchet protocol and which is used by default, and MLS, the newly standardized IETF “Messaging Layer Security protocol”, which is still in active development. We show that a combination of protocol-level and application-level vulnerabilities significantly undermine the confidentiality and authentication guarantees of P… --- ## Post 8 by @jerm — 2024-08-25T12:37:01Z Leaks also Push notification (FCM) metadata as shown in this research conducted on various messengers. [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.10589](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.10589) ![image](//forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/2X/e/e52f12686ac225cdb2f4a13a23c5e6b6eaca97f2.png) ![image](//forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/2X/a/ab5617d1af267928262da6bcf20870f1ca560881.png) --- ## Post 9 by @anonymous415 — 2025-09-06T21:21:17Z > **[Deleting a file in Wire doesn’t remove it from servers — and other findings -...](https://offsec.almond.consulting/deleting-file-wire-doesnt-remove-it.html)** --- ## Post 10 by @Pedja — 2026-04-29T23:08:29Z A German Bundestag MP fell for a phishing attack on Signal, so now they’re urgently switching to Wire. :roll_eyes: [https://www.heise.de/en/news/Digital-Sovereignty-Wire-to-Replace-Signal-as-Standard-in-the-Bundestag-11275755.html](https://www.heise.de/en/news/Digital-Sovereignty-Wire-to-Replace-Signal-as-Standard-in-the-Bundestag-11275755.html) --- ## Post 11 by @yes — 2026-05-01T20:02:45Z These dumbfucks man.. Do they not realise that phishing attacks can happen regardless of the platform? Platforms can and should implement preventive measures against phishing attempts, but these can’t prevent everything.