The Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security

For those who prefer a video format, there are two videos by The Hated One on both digital and physical aspects of attending a protest, and both are covered in a lot of detail.

The goal is extreme anonymity, with no compromises allowed.

Digital:

Physical:

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The threat model is:
Achieving privacy-thus-plausible deniability that you did !not attend a protest, having left your phone at home, some hours after liking a post on insta (or *literally anything) about the protest. Sandboxing.

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speaking of videos… @jordan

By definition, protestors are vulnerable (almost always regardless of where they are), whether or not they know how “model threats”.

The law enforcement won’t hesitate to throw the book at you, if you happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, which has a high chance of happening if you’re at protests (think: the US Capitol riots) that unexpectedly (out of your control!) go high-octane. Can’t model that.

In short, regardless of threat models, imo folks reading such guides would rather be safe than sorry.

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That would be anonymity technically, not privacy. Anyhow, its not a black and white, its on a spectrum. For some it might be fine to be known that you were at at protest, but not everything thats on your phone?

Lots of different models for lots of different people.

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IMO it would make much better sense try not to get caught, rather than plausible deniability.

This guide (so far) do little to help on that end.

Welcome to PG and your website seems very informative, will have a look in a bit. :+1:


Just took a brief look, I really like your idea of incorporating different protest stages and roles in your checklists, I think it is a very good approach as the tasks and risks associated in each stage and role varies a lot.

However, to keep this thread on track, I will be focusing on part of “security essentials” and “prepare for a protest”, as PG’s guideline seems targeting casual protesters that participate mostly peaceful and well organised protests, not activists, meaning “protest planning”, “R&R”, “scouting”, “logistic support”, etc. are out of scope. Many of the ideas below are also relevant to the PG Protester guide so hope PG Team will also consider.

(A) Security Essentials

  • Baseline security: Assuming it is for casual protesters, I would suggest adding
    (i) (Browser) Always use forgetful / incognito browsing,
    (ii) (Browser) Avoid using Browsers’ built-in autologin / autofill / password manager features
    (iii) (Signal) Get a secondary account using burner numbers for protesting related matters, with all security and privacy enhancements settings esp. hiding phone numbers and username enabled.
    (iv) (In general) Do not keep protest related materials on your devices.
    (v) (In general) Do not use real social media accounts to browse, share, like or publish protest related contents.
    (vi) (In general) Only use browser with VPN turned on to log in secondary social media accounts mentioned in (v) and always log off immediately after use.
    (vii) Do not install / keep unnecessary applications on your devices
    (viii) (In general) Incorporate other PG recommendations.

  • Enhanced security: Assuming it is for Entry Level Activists (Experienced people know what to do already), I would suggest
    (ix) VPN, 2FA, sign in with Google, Click bait should be moved to baseline security
    (x) Change “Install a VPN” to “Always on VPN”
    (xi) (In General) Add APP profile compartmentalization for protest related apps and usages
    (xii) (Phones) Add Apple iphone with lockdown mode enabled / pixel with GOS with duress password/ PIN enabled (please do point out additional risks discussed in this thread)
    (xiii) (Computers) Add For all protest related files, keep them in an encrypted drive, and only use portable apps which stored in the encrypted drive to open.
    (xiv) (Computers) Add Disable file history, set up Ram Drive as as OS Temp Folder
    (xv) (Computers) Add computer security hardening
    (xvi) (Computers) Add Software Firewall section
    (xvii) (Computers) Add Home Router section
    (xviii) (Phones) Add Phone number rotation and phone number compartmentalisation section (preferably activism related numbers should be a number outside your country)

I personally don’t think TOR is commonly required here unless the community coordinate through dark web, or they need to obtain / distribute intel or “material” through dark web.

(B) Prepare for a Protest

  • Add Sections
    (i) “Don’t Get Caught” Section, keep checking with news and be vigilant, leave protest zone ASAP if you feel something not right or too risky
    (ii) “Work not Talk” Section i.e. Do not talk unless necessary, and DO NOT EVER share any personal information, not even remotely personal
    (iii) “Bring your trash with you” section i.e. whatever food or drinks you consumed, take the packaging or bottle with you and bin it after you are far away from protest zone.

  • Secure your phone (baseline): I assume it is for casual protesters, I would suggest
    (iv) Signal is terrible for real time protest coordination and info update as it lacks channel feature, and prob. protesters will create their own map type info platform for info sharing. Moreover, they usually have no control over communication platform.
    (v) Some recommendation seems over kill for peaceful and well organised protests. For heated protests (e.g. On highly controversial e.g. Pro/Anti Palestine, BLM) , they should use enhanced section just like activists.
    (vi) Add disable NFC, BT, AirDrop, Nearby share
    (vii) Add remove emergency contact (if applicable)
    (viii) Change Disable SIgnal Notification to Hide notifications from lock screen.
    (ix) Add keep screen locked whenever not using the phone

  • Secure your phone (enhanced)
    (x) Move Signal configuration checklist, Disable voice assistant, Backup your phone to Security Essentials - Baseline security
    (xi) Add use a Protest Only burner SIM and burner phone
    (xii) Add Set phone to vibrate mode
    (xiii) Add use walkie talkie apps rather than actual walkie talkie
    (xiv) Add “Delegated emergency digital power of attorney” i.e. delegate someone you can trust to kick all loged in sessions from all your accounts if you fail to report in after certain time.

  • Other protest safety tips
    (xv) For Plan your trip with surveillance in mind, add avoid direct commute from and to protest zone
    (xvi) Add bring extra outfit and pre-plan safe changing locations before and after protest, dispose them if necessary
    (xvii) Add beware of covert cops


It became much longer than I originally thought, hope you don’t mind.

Being an Activist / Journalist, it is more important to protect the Team / Asset (Sources) in case of arrest, it would involve some more extreme measures which are definitely OT.

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That’s a great idea! Added it to the video ideas list :heart_hands:

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some recommendations from: GrapheneOS for human rights defenders

  1. If you leave your phone at home, turn it off. BFU is much harder to crack.
  2. Use autoreboot. A rebooted phone is much more difficult to crack. After an arrest, the phone will be more likely to auto-reboot before it reaches the hands of a hostile IT team. from Settings > Security & privacy > Exploit protection > Auto Reboot - set the minimum time you are comfortable with. (phone is much harder to attack BFU)
  3. Enable: Settings > Security & privacy > Device unlock > Screen lock > Scramble pin input layout - this will make microscopic analysis of the screen surface more difficult. This is one of the reasons for not using a password and using a 6+ digitpin.
    • Settings > Security > Security & privacy > Exploit protection > USB-C port > charging only. If you need to use the USB-C for other uses choose the next option down with caution…
  4. if possible (available on GrapheneOS) enable a duress password, and store a copy on paper inside the phone case, It is a pin that when used, will immediately wipe the phone and all data.

I think, these two pages could also be of value for the guide @jonah

Mostly grapheneOS oriented
https://www.anarsec.guide/posts/grapheneos/

Encrypted massaging
https://www.anarsec.guide/posts/e2ee/

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I think he got this sense because there are recommended settings for iPhone i.e. Lock Down Mode, Disable AirDrop, etc. In this regard, I do feel the same, and I do feel that PG is treating all Android devices the same in this topic, which I strongly disagree. Imagine bringing a Chiese brand android phone with stock ROM to protest in China.

It seems like @nihilist assumed protesting as a VERY high risk activity, and many others here do not. PG’s guideline appears to be not written nor suitable for high risk situations. I think not everyone here are on the same page.

@nihilist I do appreciate your genuine concerns, they are mostly valid, and it seems that you are experienced in protesting / activism, toning down a little bit and bring more context in your message might help you deliver your ideas better. Again, this is the internet, people here are from many different countries, with different backgrounds.

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Yeah this is recommending ways to protect if the protester so happens to have an iPhone, This is not recommending an iPhone in any capacity, again why the argument here is pointless.
I disagree about PG treating Android equally not being a good thing but I do agree not bringing a Chinese phone to protest in China thing. So a agree to disagree.
of course if the protester so can avoid it, otherwise yes implement secure ways where you can with it or don’t bother bringing a phone simply put.

Appreciate it!

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The link provided have a lot of wrong and terrible recommendations that doesn’t align with PG’s recommendations.

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Not really. A motorist can take no precaution (laxist) as they’re driving super slowly but there’s zero guarantee a 2 tonne SUV won’t ram into them.

When stakes are high (life/death), regardless of the risk, safetyism is more pragmatic.


Edit: To quote Raphael Mimoun, a Human Rights activist (source):

People have no idea what the regulations are, what the rules are, what’s allowed, what’s not allowed. And when they abuse those powers, is there any recourse? Most places in the world, at least, where we are working, there is definitely no recourse. And so I think that connection between thinking you’re just taking a photo for social media but actually the repercussion is so real because you’re going to have someone take your phone, and maybe they’re going to delete the photo, or maybe they’re going to detain you. Or maybe they’re going to beat you up — like all of those different things.

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I would say some of the suggestions are outdated such as the use of shelter, but the rest seems not really deviating from PG’s general suggestions.

One thing that mentioned in the cryptpad page has potential usecase i.e. SIM lock, though it can be bypassed (reset) if LE really wanted to, but that would take some effort. With eSIM become more and more common, using eSIM could be a superior option as it is immune to physical extraction, also it could be remotely disabled if necessary.

I could be perfectly happy to share that I live in the Netherlands, while not comfortable with sharing my precise home address. As you see here: ite a spectrum, sharing some details does not mean i have no privacy at all.

Just because someone does not use graphene OS on their phone and Qubes OS on their computer does not mean that all other attempts at security are useless, these platforms may not even be needed for their threat model, also here you see a spectrum.

This black and white thinking that lots of people seem to have in the privacy community is a big reason why its hard to get privacy into the mainstream, and are completly counterproductive on what we are trying to do here.

Ofcourse on should error on the side of caution when its practical and reasonable to do so, but this extremist view that @nihilist is trying to push here only pushes folks away from improving themselves as they WILL become overwhelmed.

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I would say the minimum safety requirement should be set according to he risk of the protest (and your personal profile), treat it like hiking.

What you need for a short walk on the hill near your house is totally different from aiming at the top of mount everest.

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My points were solely on the topic of protestors, nothing more.

You’re right. What’s the saying about half knowledge is a dangerous thing? Ominous for those seeking solutions yet getting overwhelmed. For folks who write “guides” however, it beehoves them to be thorough.

If “extremists” are not welcome, consider putting it up in community’s guidelines, so they’ll know to shut up.

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It’s not they aren’t welcome, it’s when they’re pushing their views as “facts” is the problem, not something PG wants to add in code of conduct if they can. It’s why they also never get reported, just downvoted and pushed from a different more rational perspective.

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Or one can simply clarify. If after, they still want to push their agenda, that’s their issue, since one already did their part in trying to reach a solution.

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