For those who prefer a video format, there are two videos by The Hated One on both digital and physical aspects of attending a protest, and both are covered in a lot of detail.
The goal is extreme anonymity, with no compromises allowed.
The threat model is:
Achieving privacy-thus-plausible deniability that you did !not attend a protest, having left your phone at home, some hours after liking a post on insta (or *literally anything) about the protest. Sandboxing.
By definition, protestors are vulnerable (almost always regardless of where they are), whether or not they know how âmodel threatsâ.
The law enforcement wonât hesitate to throw the book at you, if you happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, which has a high chance of happening if youâre at protests (think: the US Capitol riots) that unexpectedly (out of your control!) go high-octane. Canât model that.
In short, regardless of threat models, imo folks reading such guides would rather be safe than sorry.
That would be anonymity technically, not privacy. Anyhow, its not a black and white, its on a spectrum. For some it might be fine to be known that you were at at protest, but not everything thats on your phone?
Lots of different models for lots of different people.
Welcome to PG and your website seems very informative, will have a look in a bit.
Just took a brief look, I really like your idea of incorporating different protest stages and roles in your checklists, I think it is a very good approach as the tasks and risks associated in each stage and role varies a lot.
However, to keep this thread on track, I will be focusing on part of âsecurity essentialsâ and âprepare for a protestâ, as PGâs guideline seems targeting casual protesters that participate mostly peaceful and well organised protests, not activists, meaning âprotest planningâ, âR&Râ, âscoutingâ, âlogistic supportâ, etc. are out of scope. Many of the ideas below are also relevant to the PG Protester guide so hope PG Team will also consider.
(A) Security Essentials
Baseline security: Assuming it is for casual protesters, I would suggest adding
(i) (Browser) Always use forgetful / incognito browsing,
(ii) (Browser) Avoid using Browsersâ built-in autologin / autofill / password manager features
(iii) (Signal) Get a secondary account using burner numbers for protesting related matters, with all security and privacy enhancements settings esp. hiding phone numbers and username enabled.
(iv) (In general) Do not keep protest related materials on your devices.
(v) (In general) Do not use real social media accounts to browse, share, like or publish protest related contents.
(vi) (In general) Only use browser with VPN turned on to log in secondary social media accounts mentioned in (v) and always log off immediately after use.
(vii) Do not install / keep unnecessary applications on your devices
(viii) (In general) Incorporate other PG recommendations.
Enhanced security: Assuming it is for Entry Level Activists (Experienced people know what to do already), I would suggest
(ix) VPN, 2FA, sign in with Google, Click bait should be moved to baseline security
(x) Change âInstall a VPNâ to âAlways on VPNâ
(xi) (In General) Add APP profile compartmentalization for protest related apps and usages
(xii) (Phones) Add Apple iphone with lockdown mode enabled / pixel with GOS with duress password/ PIN enabled (please do point out additional risks discussed in this thread)
(xiii) (Computers) Add For all protest related files, keep them in an encrypted drive, and only use portable apps which stored in the encrypted drive to open.
(xiv) (Computers) Add Disable file history, set up Ram Drive as as OS Temp Folder
(xv) (Computers) Add computer security hardening
(xvi) (Computers) Add Software Firewall section
(xvii) (Computers) Add Home Router section
(xviii) (Phones) Add Phone number rotation and phone number compartmentalisation section (preferably activism related numbers should be a number outside your country)
I personally donât think TOR is commonly required here unless the community coordinate through dark web, or they need to obtain / distribute intel or âmaterialâ through dark web.
(B) Prepare for a Protest
Add Sections
(i) âDonât Get Caughtâ Section, keep checking with news and be vigilant, leave protest zone ASAP if you feel something not right or too risky
(ii) âWork not Talkâ Section i.e. Do not talk unless necessary, and DO NOT EVER share any personal information, not even remotely personal
(iii) âBring your trash with youâ section i.e. whatever food or drinks you consumed, take the packaging or bottle with you and bin it after you are far away from protest zone.
Secure your phone (baseline): I assume it is for casual protesters, I would suggest
(iv) Signal is terrible for real time protest coordination and info update as it lacks channel feature, and prob. protesters will create their own map type info platform for info sharing. Moreover, they usually have no control over communication platform.
(v) Some recommendation seems over kill for peaceful and well organised protests. For heated protests (e.g. On highly controversial e.g. Pro/Anti Palestine, BLM) , they should use enhanced section just like activists.
(vi) Add disable NFC, BT, AirDrop, Nearby share
(vii) Add remove emergency contact (if applicable)
(viii) Change Disable SIgnal Notification to Hide notifications from lock screen.
(ix) Add keep screen locked whenever not using the phone
Secure your phone (enhanced)
(x) Move Signal configuration checklist, Disable voice assistant, Backup your phone to Security Essentials - Baseline security
(xi) Add use a Protest Only burner SIM and burner phone
(xii) Add Set phone to vibrate mode
(xiii) Add use walkie talkie apps rather than actual walkie talkie
(xiv) Add âDelegated emergency digital power of attorneyâ i.e. delegate someone you can trust to kick all loged in sessions from all your accounts if you fail to report in after certain time.
Other protest safety tips
(xv) For Plan your trip with surveillance in mind, add avoid direct commute from and to protest zone
(xvi) Add bring extra outfit and pre-plan safe changing locations before and after protest, dispose them if necessary
(xvii) Add beware of covert cops
It became much longer than I originally thought, hope you donât mind.
Being an Activist / Journalist, it is more important to protect the Team / Asset (Sources) in case of arrest, it would involve some more extreme measures which are definitely OT.
If you leave your phone at home, turn it off. BFU is much harder to crack.
Use autoreboot. A rebooted phone is much more difficult to crack. After an arrest, the phone will be more likely to auto-reboot before it reaches the hands of a hostile IT team. from Settings > Security & privacy > Exploit protection > Auto Reboot - set the minimum time you are comfortable with. (phone is much harder to attack BFU)
Enable: Settings > Security & privacy > Device unlock > Screen lock > Scramble pin input layout - this will make microscopic analysis of the screen surface more difficult. This is one of the reasons for not using a password and using a 6+ digitpin.
Settings > Security > Security & privacy > Exploit protection > USB-C port > charging only. If you need to use the USB-C for other uses choose the next option down with cautionâŚ
if possible (available on GrapheneOS) enable a duress password, and store a copy on paper inside the phone case, It is a pin that when used, will immediately wipe the phone and all data.
I think he got this sense because there are recommended settings for iPhone i.e. Lock Down Mode, Disable AirDrop, etc. In this regard, I do feel the same, and I do feel that PG is treating all Android devices the same in this topic, which I strongly disagree. Imagine bringing a Chiese brand android phone with stock ROM to protest in China.
It seems like @nihilist assumed protesting as a VERY high risk activity, and many others here do not. PGâs guideline appears to be not written nor suitable for high risk situations. I think not everyone here are on the same page.
@nihilist I do appreciate your genuine concerns, they are mostly valid, and it seems that you are experienced in protesting / activism, toning down a little bit and bring more context in your message might help you deliver your ideas better. Again, this is the internet, people here are from many different countries, with different backgrounds.
Yeah this is recommending ways to protect if the protester so happens to have an iPhone, This is not recommending an iPhone in any capacity, again why the argument here is pointless.
I disagree about PG treating Android equally not being a good thing but I do agree not bringing a Chinese phone to protest in China thing. So a agree to disagree.
of course if the protester so can avoid it, otherwise yes implement secure ways where you can with it or donât bother bringing a phone simply put.
Not really. A motorist can take no precaution (laxist) as theyâre driving super slowly but thereâs zero guarantee a 2 tonne SUV wonât ram into them.
When stakes are high (life/death), regardless of the risk, safetyism is more pragmatic.
Edit: To quote Raphael Mimoun, a Human Rights activist (source):
People have no idea what the regulations are, what the rules are, whatâs allowed, whatâs not allowed. And when they abuse those powers, is there any recourse? Most places in the world, at least, where we are working, there is definitely no recourse. And so I think that connection between thinking youâre just taking a photo for social media but actually the repercussion is so real because youâre going to have someone take your phone, and maybe theyâre going to delete the photo, or maybe theyâre going to detain you. Or maybe theyâre going to beat you up â like all of those different things.
I would say some of the suggestions are outdated such as the use of shelter, but the rest seems not really deviating from PGâs general suggestions.
One thing that mentioned in the cryptpad page has potential usecase i.e. SIM lock, though it can be bypassed (reset) if LE really wanted to, but that would take some effort. With eSIM become more and more common, using eSIM could be a superior option as it is immune to physical extraction, also it could be remotely disabled if necessary.
I could be perfectly happy to share that I live in the Netherlands, while not comfortable with sharing my precise home address. As you see here: ite a spectrum, sharing some details does not mean i have no privacy at all.
Just because someone does not use graphene OS on their phone and Qubes OS on their computer does not mean that all other attempts at security are useless, these platforms may not even be needed for their threat model, also here you see a spectrum.
This black and white thinking that lots of people seem to have in the privacy community is a big reason why its hard to get privacy into the mainstream, and are completly counterproductive on what we are trying to do here.
Ofcourse on should error on the side of caution when its practical and reasonable to do so, but this extremist view that @nihilist is trying to push here only pushes folks away from improving themselves as they WILL become overwhelmed.
My points were solely on the topic of protestors, nothing more.
Youâre right. Whatâs the saying about half knowledge is a dangerous thing? Ominous for those seeking solutions yet getting overwhelmed. For folks who write âguidesâ however, it beehoves them to be thorough.
If âextremistsâ are not welcome, consider putting it up in communityâs guidelines, so theyâll know to shut up.
Itâs not they arenât welcome, itâs when theyâre pushing their views as âfactsâ is the problem, not something PG wants to add in code of conduct if they can. Itâs why they also never get reported, just downvoted and pushed from a different more rational perspective.
Or one can simply clarify. If after, they still want to push their agenda, thatâs their issue, since one already did their part in trying to reach a solution.