# Testing the fingerprintablility of a few different browsers in a few different standard configurations

**URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/testing-the-fingerprintablility-of-a-few-different-browsers-in-a-few-different-standard-configurations/15044
**Category:** General
**Tags:** browsers
**Created:** 2023-11-16T02:31:11Z
**Posts:** 7
**Showing post:** 4 of 7

## Post 4 by @jerm — 2024-03-23T00:07:21Z

btw, it is not an [accurate metric](https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting) to measure fingerprinting

> The [Panopticlick study done](https://panopticlick.eff.org/about) by the EFF uses the [Shannon entropy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_%28information_theory%29) - the number of identifying bits of information encoded in browser properties - as this metric. Their [result data](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Fingerprinting#Data) is definitely useful, and the metric is probably the appropriate one for determining how identifying a particular browser property is. However, some quirks of their study means that they do not extract as much information as they could from display information: they only use desktop resolution and do not attempt to infer the size of toolbars. In the other direction, they may be over-counting in some areas, as they did not compute joint entropy over multiple attributes that may exhibit a high degree of correlation. Also, new browser features are added regularly, so the data should not be taken as final.

> **[Firefox RFP and Brave's Fingerprint randomization. · privacyguides ·...](https://github.com/orgs/privacyguides/discussions/7#discussioncomment-3721547)**
>
> After looking at pages like coveryourtracks by the EFF, they do mention that randomizing one's fingerprint each session, tab or window can thwart some of what arkenfox would call naive scripts. But...

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