# Mullvad is working on adding QUIC obfuscation in their VPN clients **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/mullvad-is-working-on-adding-quic-obfuscation-in-their-vpn-clients/27461 **Category:** General **Tags:** website **Created:** 2025-05-10T12:08:13Z **Posts:** 44 ## Post 1 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-10T12:08:14Z Mullvad is adding QUIC, a UDP-based network protocol that keep the speed of UDP while adding the reliability of TCP, as an obfuscation technique. A year ago, Mullvad only supported _UDP over TCP_ obfuscation, which while working - in advanced censorship such as the GFW - was quite slow and unreliable, especially in mobile connections. The addition of Shadowsocks - a censorship evasion protocol that hides in https traffic- was a great addition for both stability and the strength of the circumvention. Adding QUIC will enhance speed compared to Shadowsocks and stability compared to _UDP over TCP_. Sources: > > > This will be gated behind `window.env.development` (GUI) and `debug_assertions` …(CLI) until it's complete. > > > - - - > This change is [Reviewable](https://reviewable.io/reviews/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/8107) > > > - - - > This change is [Reviewable](https://reviewable.io/reviews/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/8104) > > > This PR adds the ability to select QUIC obfuscation in the UI. > Since there is n…o QUIC obfuscator available yet, Shadowsocks obfuscation over 443 will be used behind the scenes as a placeholder. > > This also takes care of IOS-1129, since it didn't really make sense to just add the option and not use it. > A UITest was added to this effect, it should run green, we can expand on it later using the packet capture functionalities of the E2E framework to actually verify that the traffic being sent is QUIC when we have QUIC obfuscation available. > > > - - - > This change is [Reviewable](https://reviewable.io/reviews/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/7998) --- ## Post 2 by @nahme — 2025-05-10T13:29:26Z UPD? But anyway this sounds great. Wireguard inside of QUIC is literally quick, and hopefully strong enough of an obfuscation to easily circumvent lots of firewalls and the like. --- ## Post 4 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-10T14:15:07Z Meant UDP --- ## Post 5 by @anon57862721 — 2025-05-10T14:30:48Z Nice catch. Thanks for sharing and updating us on this. --- ## Post 6 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-10T14:56:53Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > The addition of Shadowsocks - a censorship evasion protocol that hides in https traffic- was a great addition for both stability and the strength of the circumvention. It wasn’t. Shadowsocks is detectable for a long time now, and it was back when they added it. There’s no reason to keep it. > [@anon80779245](#): > > Mullvad only supported _UDP over TCP_ obfuscation, which while working - in advanced censorship such as the GFW - was quite slow and unreliable It doesn’t work with GFW, Iran, Russia etc. Claiming that QUIC would help against advanced censors is stupid, since Iran, China and Russia all block QUIC. China doesn’t do this at scale since it breaks some things, but more harsh censors do. QUIC encapsulation helps in work networks in EU and US at best. --- ## Post 7 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-10T15:01:48Z I should add that Mullvad obfuscating connections to known, publicly listed, non-rotating servers is pure theatre. VPNs that work in China constantly rotate servers/hide behind CDNs. --- ## Post 8 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-10T15:24:56Z > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > It wasn’t. Shadowsocks is detectable for a long time now, and it was back when they added it. There’s no reason to keep it. Because ? > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > It doesn’t work with GFW, Iran, Russia etc. Claiming that QUIC would help against advanced censors is stupid, since Iran, China and Russia all block QUIC. I know from personal experience that UPD-over-TCP did work against GFW, about Quic I never claimed it will work against the GFW, it is best seen as a replacement for _UDP over TCP_ > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > I should add that Mullvad obfuscating connections to known, publicly listed, non-rotating servers is pure theatre. VPNs that work in China constantly rotate servers/hide behind CDNs. China doesn’t mass block IPs for now as they still need acces to the outside world, ie they don’t want to completely break connections with the outside. And I totally disagree with your caracterisation of “theatre”. VPNs that work in China often proxy your traffic to a Chinese server, then connect to the outside, so zero privacy here. Also, you don’t seem to know how Chinese censors operate. They do not work on IP blocking, as this can easily be bypassed by just rotating IPs (especially with IPv6) Instead they intercept your traffic and make a dummy request to a domain they control. If the server that you connect to complies with the request, they will block it. --- ## Post 9 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-10T15:48:25Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > Because ? I already said why. The development is abandoned and it doesn’t deliver on its promises. > [@anon80779245](#): > > China doesn’t mass block IPs for now as they still need acces to the outside world, ie they don’t want to completely break connections with the outside. And I totally disagree with your caracterisation of “theatre”. They do block IP addresses of detected VPN servers, you’re simply uninformed. They do in fact not block cloudflare CDNs which are used for censorship circumvention, but i specifically mentioned that Mullvad doesn’t implement such measures, and that their servers are publicly visible. Their servers are IP blocked in China. There’s no point in wasting DPI throughput on enumerated servers. This is true for all censored countries. > [@anon80779245](#): > > Also, you don’t seem to know how Chinese censors operate. They do not work on IP blocking, as this can easily be bypassed by just rotating IPs (especially with IPv6) Instead they intercept your traffic and make a dummy request to a domain they control. If the server that you connect to complies with the request, they will block it. Kek --- ## Post 10 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-10T19:29:33Z > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > I already said why. The development is abandoned and it doesn’t deliver on its promises. Both the Android and the Rust Shadowsocks client saw [commits](https://github.com/shadowsocks) this week, with the Rust client even getting a [release](https://github.com/shadowsocks/shadowsocks-rust/releases/tag/v1.23.2) two weeks ago. > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > They do block IP addresses of detected VPN servers, you’re simply uninformed. They do in fact not block cloudflare CDNs which are used for censorship circumvention, but i specifically mentioned that Mullvad doesn’t implement such measures, and that their servers are publicly visible. Their servers are IP blocked in China. They probably do, but that’s not their main way of blocking VPNs, it mainly relies on DPI and other more “flexible” techniques. I can only speak from experience when I went to china for more than two weeks, in the province I was mullvad servers weren’t IP blocked. > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > . There’s no point in wasting DPI throughput on enumerated servers. Yes, I agree, but generally speaking I would say China prefers to make it cumbersome and unreliable to access VPNs, not impossible. Because some still need to access outside for “legitimate” reasons (scientific research, business, etc.). Completely banning IPs mean you lose that + if IPs rotate there is some chance you block a legitimate service on this adress. They do probably block some IPs, all I am saying is that it isn’t their primary method of firewalling. > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > Kek That’s a proven technique, see [The predictable IP address sequences of one type of GFW DNS injector · Issue #466 · net4people/bbs · GitHub](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/466) --- ## Post 11 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-17T12:40:58Z There’s no beef, i just want you to agree Mullvad doesn’t help censored countries in any meaningful way. > [@anon80779245](#): > > Both the Android and the Rust Shadowsocks client saw [commits](https://github.com/shadowsocks) this week, with the Rust client even getting a [release](https://github.com/shadowsocks/shadowsocks-rust/releases/tag/v1.23.2) two weeks ago. The development of censorship resistant solutions has moved elsewhere (V2Ray) long time ago since shadowsocks was architecturally flawed. Shadowsocks Development stalled in a sense of the developers not fixing the inherent problems of the protocol. > [@anon80779245](#): > > but that’s not their main way of blocking VPNs, it mainly relies on DPI and other more “flexible” techniques. Once again, there are multiple ways of enumerating servers. While some VPN providers have lots of rotating servers users can switch from, with obfs4-like mailing list control group distribution (i.e censor has to create a ton of accounts to enumerate all the servers since 1 user can’t get the whole list easily), Mullvad publicly lists their servers for everyone. As for the IP blocking part - once the GFW has caught a server to censor, it IP blocks it instead of stupidly analyzing its traffic pipe. > [@anon80779245](#): > > in the province I was mullvad servers weren’t IP blocked. Infrastructure isn’t uniform. When we speak of GFW capabilities, we refer to GFW at its peak. > [@anon80779245](#): > > They do probably block some IPs, all I am saying is that it isn’t their primary method of firewalling. --- ## Post 12 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-17T14:46:22Z > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > The development of censorship resistant solutions has moved elsewhere (V2Ray) long time ago since shadowsocks was architecturally flawed. Shadowsocks Development stalled in a sense of the developers not fixing the inherent problems of the protocol. Shadowsocks isn’t flawed, as it never was sucesfully blocked AFAIK. This doesn’t mean it couldn’t be in the future, but it’s still working great. V2Ray and VMess is definitely a stronger (but more complex) protocol. It definitely would be great if they implemented it, no question about that. But saying all their obfuscation is useless is a stretch. > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > Once again, there are multiple ways of enumerating servers. While some VPN providers have lots of rotating servers users can switch from, with obfs4-like mailing list control group distribution (i.e censor has to create a ton of accounts to enumerate all the servers since 1 user can’t get the whole list easily), Mullvad publicly lists their servers for everyone. That’s true (although honestly it would be trivial for them to make accounts). But you can also privately ask Mullvad for [non-public IPs](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#anti-censorship_2). > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > As for the IP blocking part - once the GFW has caught a server to censor, it IP blocks it instead of stupidly analyzing its traffic pipe. Source ? > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > peak > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > Infrastructure isn’t uniform. When we speak of GFW capabilities, we refer to GFW at its peak. Again, I said this because you talk and say a lot of things without proof, so I would like you to provide evidence or testimony. --- ## Post 13 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-17T15:34:09Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > Shadowsocks isn’t flawed, as it never was sucesfully blocked AFAIK IRGFW report: Shadowsocks (old and new encryptions and methods): Mostly blocked, occasionally graylisted. Some modifications allow connectivity but with high packet loss and jitter. (Graylist) • ShadowSocks + Cloak: Partially functional. Detected by IRGFW with minimal UL/DL speeds and high jitter (Graylist). QUIC (Hysteria in this example: Hysteria2: Requires a QUIC-enabled destination IP (Page 8 - UDP section). • Hysteria2 + Obfs (Salamander): QUIC may be completely disabled to some IPs, but Salamander Obfs can sometimes bypass this restriction if UDP works appropriately. • TUIC/JUICITY: Similar to plain Hysteria2. Gray-listed with limited UL/DL bandwidth and high jitter. • Obfs4 (for any protocols like OpenVPN/ShadowSocks/Tor): Mostly blocked but can work on some ISPs. Gray-listed and has exceptionally high jitter and UL limitations. GFW report, various usenix presentations: Shadowsocks blocked since 2021, QUIC works, VMESS can be discovered, VLESS can be discovered. Russia via ntc: Shadowsocks blocked since 2022, QUIC fully blocked. > [@anon80779245](#): > > But saying all their obfuscation is useless is a stretch. That’s not what i said. > [@anon80779245](#): > > I said this because you talk and say a lot of things without proof, so I would like you to provide evidence or testimony. You made various stupid claims without knowing anything about the scene to begin with. --- ## Post 14 by @obscuracarl — 2025-05-17T18:09:51Z Still reading this thread, but one thing that’s really interesting about this is that they’ve actually implemented [MASQUE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/masque/about/) and are using it for the QUIC-based obfuscation ([GitHub diff](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/pull/8104/files#diff-fd6cf9fa2aeada80f94e7bf5ad3cba484becb473ec5179e0343c324301bb9cd0R4)) --- ## Post 15 by @phnx — 2025-05-17T18:12:25Z You are welcome to disagree but there is no need to be disrespectful. --- ## Post 16 by @obscuracarl — 2025-05-17T18:47:51Z We [partnered with Mullvad as our exit node](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/mullvad-has-partnered-with-obscura-vpn/24860) and [launched with QUIC-based obfuscation](https://obscura.net/blog/bootstrapping-trust/), so you bet I’m happy to see more of this! :blush: It’s great seeing more QUIC-based protocols getting launched, the VPN industry needs to invest in more core innovation and less in FUD-y marketing. A few points on TCP obfuscation (“the old way”): - TCP obfuscation when done over a reliable/vanilla TCP socket suffers from the [TCP-over-TCP meltdown problem](https://blog.carldong.me/2023/05/03/why-do-vpns.html) (bad performance, jittery-ness) - TCP obfuscation when done by _not_ actually running TCP, but sending IP packets that look like TCP won’t work on networks like airlines where they do TCP re-termination (a la [Performance-enhancing Proxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Performance-enhancing_proxy)) This is why QUIC-based is great, it _looks_ like an HTTP/3 connection and doens’t suffer from the TCP-over-TCP meltdown problem because the application dictates the congestion control rules (more [here](https://obscura.net/blog/bootstrapping-trust/)). It doesn’t mean that it’ll get around IP blocks or port blocks (it’s not magic), it simply makes it: - Far less likely for a network admin to block your access by collateral damage with overly-zealous firewall rules (e.g. “we’re blocking all ports other than 80, 443, and 53!”, unfortunately far more common than you’d expect) - Far trickier for nation-state censors to implement a fine-tuned DPI system (especially with [Chaos Protection](https://quiche.googlesource.com/quiche/+/cb6b51054274cb2c939264faf34a1776e0a5bab7)) Any VPN that has to work in various network environments need a variety of obfuscation _strategies_ to get around network blocks, and each _strategy_ comes with its tradeoffs. Having QUIC obfuscation in the toolbelt makes it far more likely that you’re successfully connecting in the first place, and that your connection is reliable and non-jittery. Sidenote: One of our engineers did recently come up with a way to do TCP obfuscation without suffering from the TCP-over-TCP meltdown _and_ work even when being re-terminated. We’re researching this method internally now :technologist: _typed and sent over Obscura’s QUIC-obfuscated tunnel with a Mullvad exit node :laughing:_ --- ## Post 17 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-17T20:07:23Z > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > Shadowsocks (old and new encryptions and methods): Mostly blocked, occasionally graylisted. Some modifications allow connectivity but with high packet loss and jitter. (Graylist) • ShadowSocks + Cloak: Partially functional. Detected by IRGFW with minimal UL/DL speeds and high jitter (Graylist). Interresting [report](https://web.archive.org/web/20250114192331/https://raw.githubusercontent.com/irgfw/irgfw-website/ad91766f62b8b666eb705a5d90136bba0f72fc42/static/files/project1/IRGFW-Report1-English.pdf) ![IFGW-report-conclusion2](//forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/2X/f/f6344ddf6859dd5ce8050dc78c1a339608b70013.png) ![IRGFW-conclusions3](//forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/2X/b/b09cf47162fe00d37ee40d6a6d0be4c58e440a94.png) Shadowsocks plain seems to be blocked, I am not sure if that’s also the case with Wireguard over Shadowsocks. > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > GFW report, various usenix presentations: Shadowsocks blocked since 2021, QUIC works, VMESS can be discovered, VLESS can be discovered. > > Russia via ntc: Shadowsocks blocked since 2022, QUIC fully blocked. In Russia, it seems to be because of the HTTP traffic not the protocol as Shadowsocks and V2Ray seems affected [Blocking of fully encrypted protocols (Shadowsocks, VMess) in Russia, targeting HTTPS traffic fingerprints · Issue #363 · net4people/bbs · GitHub](https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/363) At the end of the day, it is a game of cat and mouse on modifying the fingerprint. * * * --- ## Post 18 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-17T20:17:09Z > [@obscuracarl](#): > > Still reading this thread, but one thing that’s really interesting about this is that they’ve actually implemented [MASQUE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/masque/about/) and are using it for the QUIC-based obfuscation ([GitHub diff](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/pull/8104/files#diff-fd6cf9fa2aeada80f94e7bf5ad3cba484becb473ec5179e0343c324301bb9cd0R4)) Right, they aren’t starting from stratch and it seem quite promising > [@obscuracarl](#): > > Far trickier for nation-state censors to implement a fine-tuned DPI system (especially with [Chaos Protection](https://quiche.googlesource.com/quiche/+/cb6b51054274cb2c939264faf34a1776e0a5bab7)) How does this affects DPI ? --- ## Post 19 by @obscuracarl — 2025-05-17T20:23:24Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > How does this affects DPI ? One of the easiest ways to do “DPI” (all relative how “deep” it is) is just to look at the SNI hostname in the TLS Client Hello. In TLS and QUIC without Chaos Protection, middleboxes can sniff the SNI hostname by just reading a fixed offset into the stream. Chaos Protection for QUIC breaks up the Client Hello into multiple frames and shuffle them (perfectly valid from a real QUIC implementation’s perspective). So middleboxes would have to jump from “reading a fixed byte offset” to “fully implementing QUIC frame reconstruction logic and do that for every stream”, which is far tricker. --- ## Post 20 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-17T22:14:49Z > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > Shadowsocks blocked since 2021 Messed up the date, it was blocked since mid 2018 if i remember correctly. > [@obscuracarl](#): > > Far trickier for nation-state censors to implement a fine-tuned DPI system As it stands now, harsher censors simply block QUIC altogether due to its low adoption and the lack of repercussions due to fallbacks. While i admire Hysteria2, i think VPN providers should implement AmneziaWG as a starting point. I didn’t test your implementation, but I’m pretty sure AmneziaWG/Cloak are faster. It doesn’t disrupt their current infra and nor require any development. I started to dislike the usually praised Proton, Mullvad and even Tor after learning how useless their solutions are at combatting censorship. Its sad to see tier 2 vpn providers like ivpn carefully implementing V2Ray protocols (but most importantly financing the developers) while Proton doesn’t fix leaks in their Linux VPN client for years and Mullvad grifting misinformed EU&US users about their success in fighting censorship. > [@obscuracarl](#): > > So middleboxes would have to jump from “reading a fixed byte offset” to “fully implementing QUIC frame reconstruction logic and do that for every stream”, which is far tricker. opengfw covers both cases with their analyzer AFAIK --- ## Post 21 by @fiqiluvo.epileto — 2025-05-18T00:13:05Z > [@obscuracarl](#): > > need a variety of obfuscation _strategies_ Right. The IRGFW report was insightful to many of my friends who were just exploring the censorship scene just recently. It highlighted the need to constantly switch between many strategies and servers. In Russia, Iran and China Tier 2 and Tier 3 VPN providers provide VLESS (WS+TLS to be precise), Trojan (Both TLS and WS+TLS), VMESS (WS+TLS) and Amnezia **altogether** since it’s common to encounter a heavily censored segment of the internet while traveling for example. I hope Encounter5729 would finally understand how Mullvad adding QUIC obfuscation is certainly a path in the right direction, but nearly not enough to deal with censorship in any meaningful way. I forgot to mention i asked Mullvad whether they had plans to add V2Ray, AmneziaWG protocols and they said no. I don’t want to appear to be hating on them for no reason) > [@anon80779245](#): > > But you can also privately ask Mullvad for [non-public IPs](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/vpn/#anti-censorship_2). I saw no confirmation of this in their blogs. They simply email you back an unblocked server from the public list last time i emailed them. --- ## Post 22 by @anon80779245 — 2025-05-18T12:33:52Z > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > I saw no confirmation of this in their blogs. They simply email you back an unblocked server from the public list last time i emailed them. ![mullvad-ip-override](//forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/2X/0/0bcdb98ef3a2177d9c6e54dfbe7d1e8d69b5dce1.png) > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > Its sad to see tier 2 vpn providers like ivpn carefully implementing V2Ray protocols (but most importantly financing the developers) while Proton doesn’t fix leaks in their Linux VPN client for years and Mullvad grifting misinformed EU&US users about their success in fighting censorship. IVPN never worked for me while I was in China (Android, it just kept loading infinitely), while Mullvad did (Proton VPN almost never worked). Keep in mind this was **before** they introduce Shadowsocks. > [@fiqiluvo.epileto](#): > > I hope Encounter5729 would finally understand how Mullvad adding QUIC obfuscation is certainly a path in the right direction, but nearly not enough to deal with censorship in any meaningful way. You seem to have a black and white view of censorship. QUIC over HTTP obfuscation will help many people bypass light-to-medium censorship while keeping connection reliability. I never said it could bypass advanced censorship systems , despite you apparently interpreting it that way. * * * And again, I repeat that the GFW doesn’t, at least not universally, block all Mullvad VPN IPs. --- ## Post 24 by @klepto — 2025-08-28T22:57:35Z They have already added it for the beta channel: [Release 2025.9-beta1 · mullvad/mullvadvpn-app · GitHub](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases/tag/2025.9-beta1) I’m using it right now on Linux, they don’t have a lot of servers for it yet but its early days. I had been looking for a paid proxy service that used vless+reality or trojan tbh.. I don’t want to set it up myself then I would have to secure it :frowning: --- ## Post 25 by @123 — 2025-08-29T11:38:16Z To summarize the thread a little bit for lay people: are there any commercial/non commercial providers which lead the pack in terms of censorship resistance? Mullvad, IVPN, Nym, Amnezia, Tor, I2P? --- ## Post 26 by @mangomango — 2025-09-05T19:40:30Z Good question thanks. We should precise though that as @anon80779245 said that there are nuances in the effectiveness of censorship circumvention providers depending on the network. I would phrase it like this : what are the most reliable providers in the worst cases (Iran, Turkmenistan, China, Myanmar, Russia, Cuba etc) ? Or “if my country becomes a full digital authoritarian hell, which are the providers the most likely to save me? “ > [@123](#): > > Mullvad, IVPN, Nym, Amnezia, Tor, I2P? Plus Windscribe, Psiphon…? Reading the messages above, it seems that IVPN and Proton are less reliable than Mullvad in China. To answer my question, from what I have read, I have the impression that Mullvad, TOR and maybe Windscribe and Amnezia are the most reliable in heavy restricted countries. > [@anon80779245](#): > > this was **before** they introduce Shadowsocks Who they? Mullvad? --- ## Post 27 by @Tux — 2025-09-05T19:50:10Z Some people reportedly use satellite ISPs such as Starlink to avoid compromised networks (ISPs enforcing censorship) entirely. --- ## Post 28 by @iluvprivacy — 2025-09-06T05:25:51Z Good luck bringing a Starlink dish into China. --- ## Post 29 by @anon32162901 — 2025-09-06T12:27:09Z > [@klepto](#): > > I had been looking for a paid proxy service that used vless+reality or trojan tbh.. I don’t want to set it up myself then I would have to secure it :frowning: Not on PG’s list of recommendations, but you could have a look at Xeovo. > **[Features - Xeovo VPN](https://xeovo.com/features/#proxies)** > > Find out which advanced technologies we use to ensure your security and help bypass internet censorship. Disclaimer: I have never tried their service. Just sharing because an acquaintance used them on a trip to China around a year ago. --- ## Post 30 by @anon57862721 — 2025-09-06T12:30:59Z Hard to trust a VPN company that you don’t know enough about or that a company doesn’t share more about themselves or the people behind it. But the website is well made and does present itself one with legitimacy. But not knowing who or how many are behind it, it’s not ideal for me. PG recommended ones are different in this regard. --- ## Post 31 by @Tux — 2025-09-06T17:47:51Z I don’t think this would be particularly difficult. I read that people routinely do it in Turkey, Iran, and other places. If you can get service at all, it’s probably a much more reliable, albeit more expensive, method of accessing the Internet than VPNs engaged in a cat and mouse game with local ISPs. --- ## Post 32 by @anon57862721 — 2025-09-06T17:50:40Z The underground market is easy to access in Iran and Turkey, but you don’t fuck with China. They operate on another level and this sort of thing is not taken lightly. --- ## Post 33 by @iluvprivacy — 2025-09-06T19:56:10Z It doesn’t sound like you’ve been to China before. I’m not going to get into a debate about hypotheticals. What I will say is that no one sane will ever fuck around with the Chinese authorities, especially Customs! Good luck if you ever think about smuggling Starlink into China. --- ## Post 34 by @Encounter5729 — 2025-09-06T20:02:35Z Is it illegal though? --- ## Post 35 by @klepto — 2025-09-07T00:31:45Z Thanks for the recommendation!! I gave it a whirl, the setup was easy on Linux and the speed was very good.. That Trojan(WS+TLS) protocol in wireshark looks just like a regular https connection. I’m not trying to access any restrictive countries just like a bit more privacy :smiley: This works well for me, thanks again! --- ## Post 36 by @Tux — 2025-09-07T00:51:14Z I haven’t been, and never plan on going. This is purely hypothetical. You might not even need to smuggle anything into the country. I don’t know how Starlink works in detail, but you may be able to use locally sourced equipment. It is entirely plausible that some people are using it, but for obvious reasons they keep that information to themselves. --- ## Post 37 by @Encounter5729 — 2025-09-07T09:13:34Z I think it’s overkill for now. china still relies a bit om western tech and more importantly they want to export their tech abroad. for that reason China becoming a North Korea - like intranet is not likely in the near future. --- ## Post 38 by @123 — 2025-09-07T10:26:06Z A few years ago I read on Pine64 blog about [FemtoStar](https://femtostar.com/), an independent satellite communication infrastructure in development that doesn’t require ground infrastructure to operate. I wonder if there’s been any progress. --- ## Post 39 by @anon39391 — 2025-09-07T10:31:52Z Sorry I’m dumb, not technical at all, is QUIC/http3 any improvement to privacy or not? I see I can enable this option in my app, but I seen it uses udp, so I turned it off (I use Tor(tcp))? --- ## Post 40 by @iluvprivacy — 2025-09-16T13:15:59Z I was wondering the same thing myself. Does QUIC obfuscation have any benefit in a Western country? --- ## Post 41 by @anon57862721 — 2025-09-16T13:20:05Z > [@iluvprivacy](#): > > Does QUIC obfuscation have any benefit in a Western country? Obfuscations are for places where Wireguard is directly blocked. So no, not useful in the Western world. Perhaps soon in the UK seeing how things are going. --- ## Post 42 by @nym-product — 2025-09-18T11:36:08Z > [@123](#): > > To summarize the thread a little bit for lay people: are there any commercial/non commercial providers which lead the pack in terms of censorship resistance? Mullvad, IVPN, Nym, Amnezia, Tor, I2P? Thanks @123 for including Nym in the comparison. While the Nym network wasn’t originally designed specifically for censorship resistance, it’s become a key development focus for both our mixnet and NymVPN. Current status and roadmap: We published our [censorship resistance roadmap](https://nym.com/blog/NymVPN-Roadmap-for-censorship-resistance-2025) in January 2025: - “Dragon” phase completed - NymVPN “Fast” mode now uses client-side AmneziaWG (instead of the standard WireGuard) - “Ox” and “Monkey” phases - API improvements and first pluggable transport are launching for beta-testing end of September, with public release expected by mid-October - Future phases will add more pluggable transport options based on user needs and geographic requirements If you’re in a region with internet restrictions, we’d especially value your feedback and testing experience in the main NymVPN thread: [https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/nym-and-nymvpn-next-gen-privacy-with-mixnet-and-vpn-service/25072](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/nym-and-nymvpn-next-gen-privacy-with-mixnet-and-vpn-service/25072). --- ## Post 43 by @anon57862721 — 2025-09-23T12:06:30Z UPDATE: New Mullvad releases for Android and iOS add QUIC Obfuscation and other updates. Update your apps now! > **[Releases · mullvad/mullvadvpn-app](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases)** > > The Mullvad VPN client app for desktop and mobile. Contribute to mullvad/mullvadvpn-app development by creating an account on GitHub. --- ## Post 44 by @eatme — 2025-09-26T19:12:23Z I strongly suspect an issue with Mullvad’s QUIC implementation on Android. On the same Wi-Fi network, QUIC performance on Linux is significantly faster than on Android. Could someone test and compare QUIC performance between computer and Android/iOS device?