# Man Charged for Wiping Phone Before CBP Could Search It **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/man-charged-for-wiping-phone-before-cbp-could-search-it/33657 **Category:** News **Tags:** article **Created:** 2025-12-09T17:48:26Z **Posts:** 59 ## Post 1 by @KevPham — 2025-12-09T17:48:26Z > **[Man Charged for Wiping Phone Before CBP Could Search It](https://www.404media.co/man-charged-for-wiping-phone-before-cbp-could-search-it/)** > > The exact circumstances around the search are not known. But activist Samuel Tunick is charged with deleting data from a Google Pixel before CBP’s Tactical Terrorism Response Team could search it. Most likely (not confirmed) that this man was using a GOS device based on the features described in the article. I’m not a lawyer, but evidence tampering is still a crime in most jurisdictions. If you live somewhere where you aren’t forced to disclose your encryption keys (cough cough the UK), you’re better off not wiping your phone. Curious to hear your thoughts though. What is your solution for this problem? Edit: Readable link: [https://archive.ph/IeLKL](https://archive.ph/IeLKL) --- ## Post 2 by @anonymous484 — 2025-12-09T17:50:05Z Its good more people are made aware of this. The privacy community, especially on the GOS forums, have a lot of users who still think that if they erase their data they can avoid trouble. There seems to be a lot of confusion around the term “plausible deniability” and it is often conflated as a legal tactic when it is really a social tactic. The best practice is still to avoid traveling with data that you are not ok with being compelled to hand over. --- ## Post 3 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T17:53:36Z This exactly If I was traveling to a country like china, I would get a separate phone and a separate SIM card and make it always forward my number to go from the number family and friends know to the other number until I return --- ## Post 4 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T17:55:10Z Well, I can’t read the article given the paywall. But isn’t it only evidence when there has been an accusation of a crime for which they need something to search? Was that the case? > [@KevPham](#): > > What is your solution for this problem? You can always carry your standard iPhone with you with your other GOS device in your luggage switched off. So, at immigration at the port, you can share whatever is on your secondary device. Of course, this would only work if they don’t already suspect you’re a criminal. If they do, then you’re out of luck because you may also have your luggage searched. Real solution? Use Tails if you’re a journalist covering groundbreaking news/info or a person with a similar profession. This coupled with the right online private, secure, encrypted tools is how you should be operating - as much web based as possible. --- ## Post 5 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T17:57:12Z Great solution too yeah --- ## Post 7 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T17:59:38Z May be just my iPhone but link does not work, looping captcha or outright not loading --- ## Post 8 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:00:26Z Same. Not working for me either. The website fails to render in my case. --- ## Post 9 by @anonymous484 — 2025-12-09T18:01:56Z @anon39279085 @anon57862721 I think the archive sites may have started blocking VPN traffic as I run into the same issues when using my home network (which has VPN on). I would just copy the article and paste it but, not sure that appropriate. --- ## Post 10 by @ph00lt0 — 2025-12-09T18:02:23Z > [@KevPham](#): > > What is your solution for this problem? Not traveling to certain countries… --- ## Post 11 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:02:43Z > [@anonymous484](#): > > I would just copy the article and paste it but, not sure that appropriate. It’s not. It’s okay. Leave it be. Thanks though. --- ## Post 12 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:04:15Z I was going to say that but didn’t want to come off as a pompous wise guy with the response. But yeah.. that’s a legitimate way to avoid this as an issue. But if you’re a criminal, so many places along the Canadian border where security is not as high as airports, people can find a way. --- ## Post 13 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:05:57Z Peer pressure be like: you will go, family(or friends) said so ![image](https://forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/3X/2/4/24d43436bf63c427d1957f26f36a241d462cb541.gif) [Hence my solution] --- ## Post 14 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:06:52Z Someone who is serious about avoiding an issue if they are truly at risk and innocent, peer pressure will be the easiest problem to solve. --- ## Post 15 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:08:48Z If you are truly at risk and innocent and they go to countries like eg, China then yeah your friends and family have to know so that it becomes a valid reason to let you go. --- ## Post 16 by @KevPham — 2025-12-09T18:09:05Z Archived link to article: [https://archive.ph/IeLKL](https://archive.ph/IeLKL) --- ## Post 17 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:09:30Z I mean, even then. If its a no from you, then that no should be respected whether or not they know your reason. --- ## Post 18 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:10:36Z I actually once insisted on not going to Belgium especially for prior experience not related to this kind of risk but my parents insisted I come especially as they paid the ticket I could not say no at the time So it is a problem and in those cases they would need to know I’m an activist or high risk journalist to change the mind which I’m fortunately not but you get the idea --- ## Post 19 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:11:19Z Less “rights” as kids. More if one is an adult. --- ## Post 20 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:11:53Z I was and am literally an adult, so take that for what you will --- ## Post 21 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:12:52Z I thought you meant when you were younger. But alright.. I guess if its family they need to know. Either way, the solution for this is a pretty clear. Several ways to go about it. --- ## Post 22 by @KevPham — 2025-12-09T18:14:45Z > [@anon57862721](#): > > Real solution? Use Tails if you’re a journalist covering groundbreaking news/info or a person with a similar profession. This coupled with the right online private, secure, encrypted tools is how you should be operating - as much web based as possible. Good point. I doubt any officer would check for a random USB stick in a tech bag unless they’re guarding the CIA headquarters or something. I’m more worried that these people will still have incriminating evidence on their phones even if they carry around a Tails USB. Even if it is not content data of Signal messages per say, information such as where they were going or what sites they visited could reveal that they have a Tails USB --- ## Post 23 by @anon12918199 — 2025-12-09T18:15:16Z Which ones though? The people need a list. --- ## Post 24 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:15:38Z Depends on the type of risk one is at. But I see you’re being facetious. --- ## Post 25 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:15:55Z I use china as a prime example so it’s one of them Still not really a valid solution, at least in my experience What @anon57862721 said too --- ## Post 26 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:21:39Z > [@KevPham](#): > > ’m more worried that these people will still have incriminating evidence on their phones even if they carry around a Tails USB. I mean, this is where good OPSEC comes in. Keeping minimal info. Doing things in a vacuum on Tails only and following The Fight Club rule. --- ## Post 27 by @KevPham — 2025-12-09T18:24:21Z Archive link requires no VPN. Unfortunate, but I can give a brief summary. According the official [indictment](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/26363121-samuel-tunick-indictment/?ref=404media.co), an Atlanta-based activist named Samuel Tunick was arrested by the FBI after a CBP agent seized his phone and observed that is was wiped beforehand. All we know that he had a Google Pixel phone and he was searched by a CBP unit known as the “Tactical Terrorism Response Team”. Note that he is American. Or at least, an American resident. He probably came across CBP at an airport and got shaken down there. --- ## Post 28 by @TinFoilHat — 2025-12-09T18:24:36Z > [@KevPham](#): > > What is your solution for this problem? It depends on the information I hold on that device, but from my experience: 1. Never mix up personal and “work” devices & accounts. 2. Leave as less information as possible on “work” device. 3. Good OPSEC on storing and using “work” device and while “working”. 4. Whoever within that “working group” has public presence of any kind, that person(s) should not hold any important information and their access to any information should be remotely revocable by admin (who has no public presence i.e. extremely low profile). 5. If travel, check destination’s for any extradition agreements and history of extradition with your adversaries. TBH, if the information is so crucial that could lead to multiple persecutions, it makes sense just to wipe the device, even if it would leads to charges on the device owner. I think it is a basic quality of being an activist. --- ## Post 29 by @anon35758094 — 2025-12-09T18:30:49Z [@JG](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/JG) How is that facetious? --- ## Post 30 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:31:24Z Thanks for sharing. I wonder if this story is first of its kind. I would imagine this would have happened many times. I also wonder (though I am pretty sure) that FBI has a “black list” akin to that of the 50s during McCarthyism to keep track of those who are a problem to “national security”. The current US admin really wants to take us back. Too bad they don’t know how to bring Unions back with it at the same time. --- ## Post 31 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:31:38Z If you read it as such.. --- ## Post 32 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-09T18:41:23Z I imagine that if I gave a legal authority a duress code to punch in, it would still be tampering. Wbut what’s the case for when they punch in the duress code when trying to bruteforce it, without me giving them any info? Would it still be intent to tamper? --- ## Post 33 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:44:39Z Trying to brute force a phone that’s not encrypted is not considered tampering Tampering is when you’re modifying or removing evidence of the crime happening Or I guess “crime” if you wanna put it that way --- ## Post 34 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-09T18:47:27Z > [@anon36227541](#): > > duress code to punch in, it would still be tampering. I think technically the charge would be “obstruction of justice”. But I am no lawyer. --- ## Post 35 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-09T18:54:02Z > [@anon39279085](#): > > Trying to brute force a phone that’s not encrypted is not considered tampering Not talking about _me_ bruteforcing my own phone.. I’m saying if a legal authority like the police are brute forcing my phone by hand and they happen to punch in my GOS duress code, would that be tampering on my end, equivalent to me erasing my own data? Or maybe not tampering, but > [@anon57862721](#): > > “obstruction of justice” or some other kind of legal trouble? --- ## Post 36 by @anon39279085 — 2025-12-09T18:55:22Z If they happen to touch the duress pin upon bruteforcing and you were in sight, They have reasonable suspicion to charge with Tampering evidence Obligatory not a lawyer btw (always consult an actual lawyer for actual legal advice) --- ## Post 37 by @anon35758094 — 2025-12-09T19:27:55Z [@JG](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/JG) ? --- ## Post 38 by @beantaco — 2025-12-09T23:35:17Z > [@anon57862721](#): > > But isn’t it only evidence when there has been an accusation of a crime for which they need something to search? Was that the case? That was exactly my first impression. However, the pretext of the arrest seems unclear to me. From what I see it could possibly be obstruction of a border agent’s duties (lawful access to the phone’s contents?), not destruction of evidence. > The indictment says on January 24, Tunick “did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of, and otherwise take any action to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority to take said property into its custody and control.” About destruction of evidence, a lawyer discussed [plausible deniability and privacy tools](https://inv.nadeko.net/watch?v=0uValfnvLN0&t=740). They said there’s nothing _inherently_ illegal about using privacy tools (to their knowledge\*) and encourages their use, but _how they’re used_ can constitute a crime. The specific example given was Signal disappearing messages. On one hand, if Signal disappearing messages are used routinely then there’s nothing legally wrong. They add that they use Signal all the time and use disappearing messages to protect their communications from subpoenas. On the other hand, if something else is routinely used for communications but someone pivots to Signal disappearing messages for a specific purpose, that may be treated as suspicious. Amazon and some politicians have been accused of using Signal for destruction of evidence. > **\* Financial privacy** > > Tornado Cash, Samourai Wallet and other financial privacy tools have been criminalized. Even if the CBP Tactical Terror team’s arrest was unlawful (failed to establish suspicion/evidence that a crime occurred) and the arrested person is eventually acquitted, they still successfully repressed the arrested person (arrest, prosecution and other personal damages) and instill fear into society by demonstrating their aggressiveness at the border. I wouldn’t rely on legal technicalities for avoiding harassment/abuse. In case it helps, travel and border agents have been discussed elsewhere in this forum. - [Protecting Phone Data from Border Agents](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/protecting-phone-data-from-border-agents/25140) - [How do you approach travel (international or domestic)?](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/how-do-you-approach-travel-international-or-domestic/16431) One tip from there I like is this. > [@Protecting Phone Data from Border Agents](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/protecting-phone-data-from-border-agents/25140/7): > > I think its reasonable to say that i don’t want to be subjected to unreasonable searches and did not bring my phone. @GorujoCY Yah peer pressure sucks, and it isn’t a trivial/easy problem to solve if those “family” or “friends” have enough power over you. If you have good reasons not to go somewhere that those people have no knowledge of, and they won’t take no for an answer, one option may be to lie to them about why you cannot go. Create a cover story, for instance a clash with some important event or work, or fake an illness that would prevent you from traveling. Another option is to preemptively create personal or relationship boundaries that are clear and well known, for instance “I will never travel to country X, Y and Z for any reason.” If those people are toxic and you want them out of your life, consider building and executing a relationship termination plan. > [@GorujoCY](#): > > If they happen to touch the duress pin upon bruteforcing and you were in sight, They have reasonable suspicion to charge with Tampering evidence Doubtful the phone owner could be charged for this because they weren’t the one who did the act. But who knows? I’d say “seek legal advice” is a good tip for those thinking using duress code systems. --- ## Post 39 by @privacy.slouchy — 2025-12-10T02:15:49Z The GOS duress pin is unnecessary in almost any normal circumstance. Shut off your phone before passing through security - so long as you use a strong password, GOS is believed to be uncrackable in BFU state. Wiping it becomes a unnecessary crime IMO duress pin use case is extreme scenarios: wartime, torture, or autocratic regimes, where you may be _literally incapable_ of withholding the pin Extra credit: set a booby trap by keeping a note in your wallet with the duress pin clearly written down. A nosey adversary may mistake you for a moron & wipe the device for you, absolving you of sin --- ## Post 40 by @Treant — 2025-12-10T04:20:35Z I can definitely understand the logic behind wiping your phone before handing it to the authorities. Even with GOS’s security features, there are still ways for law enforcement to cause issues for you. If they get a warrant for your passwords, you are required to provide them or else you can be imprisoned until you comply with the warrant. If you haven’t wiped your phone before handing it over, that’ll be the most direct way for law enforcement to get your data, circumventing GOS’s protections. In this case, the man wiped his phone before it was taken into custody. It does mean he’s been charged with destruction/tampering of evidence. But he’s not being held in prison for the time being at least. But as others in this thread have stated, a much better solution to the problem is to not have traveled with sensitive data on his phone in the first place. --- ## Post 41 by @lyricism — 2025-12-10T04:36:57Z > [@Treant](#): > > If they get a warrant for your passwords, you are required to provide them or else you can be imprisoned until you comply with the warrant. Depends on the jurisdiction. In the US I believe at least one federal appeals circuit court has ruled that it is unconstitutional to compel disclosure of passwords for a criminal investigation. Another court at the same level I think has ruled the opposite though, so it will be varied within the US until someone appeals a case to the supreme court. I am personally of the opinion that the legally correct decision is that it is unconstitutional as providing something you know to help a prosecution against yourself is the same thing as testifying against yourself, so it should be protected by the fifth amendment. I’m not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. --- ## Post 42 by @Treant — 2025-12-10T04:52:17Z Fair point. I should have clarified that I am speaking from the experience of having devices (phone, laptops, computers) confiscated by police in Australia. It will definitely vary between state/country, but unless you are certain of your rights when and where you’re being arrested/having your devices taken into custody, wiping your devices out of caution is very understandable. I know airports are also a very serious risk for refusing to hand over passcodes, and depending on the country you’re in they can deny your entry if you refuse to give them access to your phone data. --- ## Post 43 by @Bumbashirovich — 2025-12-10T04:54:36Z By the way, that guy had the option of simply disabling the phone, after setting a strong password. But if he chose the delete option, he most likely planned to do so. I suspect he’s a real criminal. --- ## Post 44 by @TinFoilHat — 2025-12-10T05:32:01Z > [@Bumbashirovich](#): > > But if he chose the delete option, he most likely planned to do so. I suspect he’s a real criminal see my reply. > [@TinFoilHat](#): > > TBH, if the information is so crucial that could lead to multiple persecutions, it makes sense just to wipe the device, even if it would leads to charges on the device owner. I think it is a basic quality of being an activist. --- ## Post 45 by @Pedja — 2025-12-11T00:29:50Z But what if I forgot my passwords? Can they force me to remember with a court order? And is there a way for them to prove I didn’t forget? --- ## Post 46 by @Treant — 2025-12-11T03:49:19Z Certainly a question. Try it out and let us know how it goes :wink: --- ## Post 47 by @SwampTrainer — 2025-12-11T04:53:34Z For all the not-lawyers here and not-lawyerly advice, this is the most real. No evidence of a crime had to exist. Wiping a device that CBP wanted to see _is the crime._ There doesn’t need to be evidence of anything. He could have wiped a newly set up device with literally nothing on it and had the same result. Regardless of how they come out of this, likely banned from entering the US for a long time at best, they also have to incur legal expenses, lost wages from missing work, etc. If they were smart, they would have used the GOS duress pin and then gone berserk about all the personal photos of their kids that were lost and why did CBP ruin their phone and started to lawyer up first as of CBP did something to break their phone. At that point getting kicked out with a bricked device is a mild loss for everyone, but not worse off for the subject of the article. --- ## Post 48 by @anon64393658 — 2025-12-11T15:33:22Z In the United States, as of December 2025, no they cannot. This is a violation of the 5th Amendment as it effectively forces you to testify against yourself. **However** this is not the case for _biometrics_. They can make you look at a phone for face verification or use your fingerprint to unlock it. Again that is for the United States only. This varies widely from country to country. --- ## Post 49 by @beantaco — 2025-12-11T22:30:01Z FYI [this article](https://atlpresscollective.com/2025/12/05/samuel-tunick-atlanta-activist-arrest/) reports the person was arrested for _destruction of evidence_, it doesn’t mention any other charges. > [@SwampTrainer](#): > > No evidence of a crime had to exist. Wiping a device that CBP wanted to see _is the crime._ There doesn’t need to be evidence of anything. Sounds like you say this with a practical perspective, am I correct? Legally speaking, I don’t know the details of what amounts to “destruction of evidence” at the US border, but I would suspect whatever is destroyed must have been evidence of a crime in order for a criminal charge to result in conviction. Practically speaking, like you say, CBP will arrest anyone who does a factory reset, data wipe, duress activation or device breakage before their device is stolen. > [@privacy.slouchy](#): > > IMO duress pin use case is extreme scenarios: wartime, torture, or autocratic regimes, where you may be _literally incapable_ of withholding the pin Maybe this was the problem the arrested person faced. > [@Pedja](#): > > But what if I forgot my passwords? Can they force me to remember with a court order? And is there a way for them to prove I didn’t forget? You can prove (to yourself or to others) you _didn’t forget_ the password by using it to unlock your device. This means, if a border agent catches you unlocking your device, they will have evidence you didn’t forget your password. Conversely, there is no way to prove you _did forget_ a password. Depending on where you are, the border may just assume you know the password and are refusing to comply. At the United States border, where the arrest took place, there is the [5th Amendment of the US Constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution) which legally protects people from self incrimination. The government cannot lawfully compel people to disclose their passwords. However, they may pressure non-citizens into disclosing their passwords under threat of, for example, being denied entry. --- ## Post 50 by @lyricism — 2025-12-11T22:50:58Z > [@anon64393658](#): > > In the United States, as of December 2025, no they cannot. > > This is a violation of the 5th Amendment as it effectively forces you to testify against yourself. I agree it should be, but there is no national precedent either way yet. Courts in different jurisdictions have ruled differently so it will depend where you are in the US until someone takes a case to the Supreme Court. --- ## Post 51 by @SwampTrainer — 2025-12-12T06:42:39Z > [@beantaco](#): > > Sounds like you say this with a practical perspective, am I correct? I guess - this seems fairly straightforward through: At 12:34:56 a law enforcement officer with a right to search a device asks to see the device in its current state. 12:35:05 The device is wiped and state is changed. 12:35:35 The device is handed to the LEO with no data remaining from the point in time in which the LEO asked to see the phone. The LEO realizes this and sees an attempt to evade the legal request to see the phone in its state at 12:34:56. It has nothing to do with the 5th Amendment, either. That’s a right to not be compelled to implicate yourself in crimes during the process of unrelated but official whatever. If you’re in court because you witnessed a hit and run accident, and the prosecutor asks about your expired license you had while driving past the hit and run accident, you can plead the 5th instead of talking about you were driving all over town with an expired license under oath and admitting to a crime. --- ## Post 52 by @beantaco — 2025-12-12T22:13:05Z Even with the timeline you laid out, it’s unclear to me. Legally speaking, unless I’m wrong about what “destruction of evidence” means, and unless CBP has evidence that evidence of a crime was on the device, I don’t think they can make a successful destruction of evidence case. In other words, if CBP lacked knowledge of what data was stored on the device, it would have been wrong for them to arrest the person for destruction of evidence. I’m hoping the upcoming [TWIP #31](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/can-you-get-arrested-for-wiping-your-phone-this-week-in-privacy-31-dec-12-2025/33667) will discuss the legal aspects of this case. For clarification, my paragraph about the 5th Amendment was in response to someone’s question about disclosing passwords, not wiping data off devices. Further, I’m unsure how effective the 5th Amendment is at protecting against forced disclosure in practice. After my post, this was mentioned. > [@lyricism](#): > > I agree it should be, but there is no national precedent either way yet. Courts in different jurisdictions have ruled differently so it will depend where you are in the US until someone takes a case to the Supreme Court. --- ## Post 53 by @jonah — 2025-12-12T22:38:04Z > [@beantaco](#): > > I don’t think they can make a successful destruction of evidence case. The most important thing to remember is that this does not matter in the slightest when it comes to being arrested. You can just be arrested for any reason, which sucks. > [@beantaco](#): > > Even if the CBP Tactical Terror team’s arrest was unlawful (failed to establish suspicion/evidence that a crime occurred) and the arrested person is eventually acquitted, they still successfully repressed the arrested person (arrest, prosecution and other personal damages) and instill fear into society by demonstrating their aggressiveness at the border. I wouldn’t rely on legal technicalities for avoiding harassment/abuse. :100: --- ## Post 54 by @lyricism — 2025-12-12T22:41:12Z > [@SwampTrainer](#): > > LEO realizes this and sees an attempt to evade the legal request to see the phone in its state at 12:34:56. I mean I’m not a lawyer but I would argue they have a right to search the phone, not search the phone in any particular state. Unless they believe there is evidence of a crime it’s not destruction of evidence to wipe it first. In fact, their right to search the phone at the border without a warrant is inherently tied to the fact that there is no presumption of any wrongdoing, because it is a special exemption to the fourth amendment which allows them to do it at the border. If they had reasonable suspicion there was evidence of a crime, they wouldn’t need an exception to the fourth amendment, because they would have probably cause already. I think they have the right to search the phone in the state it will be in when it crosses the border, which if wiped, it was in, they can’t unwipe it after its been searched before crossing. However, it’s kind of like flipping off a cop, in that even if it’s your right, your really just poking a bear. Just have a strong passphrase, shutdown the phone, and argue your right to not disclose it, as the theory I laid out in this post is certainly much more shaky than that, even considering the potential issues with it I mentioned earlier in the thread. IMO the best thing to do as a US citizen really is bring a travel phone out of the country. Not even just for this purpose, it’s so easy to even just lose your phone while traveling, do you want to risk anything happening to your primary device? Again, not a lawyer, not legal advice. --- ## Post 55 by @SwampTrainer — 2025-12-15T05:33:25Z I am also not a lawyer, but I do work in policy. I agree that if one were to want to make a stand, shutting down the phone and riding out the situation to the point of getting a lawyer is the most “above board,” I guess we could say, way to do that. But you pretty much assure yourself of never getting that phone back. Though, CBP searches aren’t necessarily covered under the 4th Amendment, AFAIK. The Probable Cause is “you are entering the country” and CBP has the jurisdiction to do whatever they feel like within some relatively nebulous “protecting the homeland” statues. And that was before NSPM-7 criteria. Under NSPM-7, literally everything that isn’t being Stephen Miller can potentially be viewed as a crime, so short of a legal case going to SCOTUS, the 4th Amendment does not apply at the border and barely applies within our borders anymore. --- ## Post 56 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-15T06:57:02Z > [@KevPham](#): > > I’m not a lawyer > [@anon57862721](#): > > I am no lawyer > [@anon39279085](#): > > Obligatory not a lawyer btw > [@lyricism](#): > > I’m not a lawyer > [@lyricism](#): > > I mean I’m not a lawyer but > [@SwampTrainer](#): > > I am also not a lawyer I’m not a speedrunner, but here’s my pro speedrunning tip: Take this whole thread with less than a grain of salt. In fact, take no salt at all. Go flavorless. ![image](https://forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/3X/e/f/ef01439287cef81f90558afa6bc90c3262cf277b.jpeg) --- ## Post 57 by @lyricism — 2025-12-15T13:48:02Z > [@SwampTrainer](#): > > Though, CBP searches aren’t necessarily covered under the 4th Amendment, AFAIK. The Probable Cause is “you are entering the country” and CBP has the jurisdiction to do whatever they feel like within some relatively nebulous “protecting the homeland” statues. And that was before NSPM-7 criteria. Under NSPM-7, literally everything that isn’t being Stephen Miller can potentially be viewed as a crime, so short of a legal case going to SCOTUS, the 4th Amendment does not apply at the border and barely applies within our borders anymore. That’s what I was saying > [@lyricism](#): > > it is a special exemption to the fourth amendment which allows them to do it at the border. My non-lawyer understanding is they don’t have probably cause just because you’re crossing the border, it’s that they don’t _need_ probable cause when you’re crossing the border. > [@anon36227541](#): > > Take this whole thread with less than a grain of salt. In fact, take no salt at all. Go flavorless. I 100% agree with what you’re saying, but technically you add the salt when you otherwise wouldn’t if there’s reason to be skeptical. No salt would imply not being skeptical, if you want to be more skeptical you would take more than a grain of salt. Yes, I am extremely fun at parties. --- ## Post 58 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-15T14:16:20Z > [@lyricism](#): > > technically you add the salt when you otherwise wouldn’t if there’s reason to be skeptical Oh I see. Well in that case, I suppose we instead should take it with enough salt to salt the sea! :- P In all seriousness tho, I hope I didn’t offend anyone who was trying to contribute their knowledge, or discourage discussion. If someone were to recommend Tor even though they weren’t a cybersecurity expert, I wouldnt bat an eye. But in this case, law is confusing and we aren’t a law forum lol, so it’s just another factor to consider overdosing on the salt, so to speak. --- ## Post 59 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-17T12:15:46Z Relevant from 404 Media: new podcast video > **[Is Wiping a Phone a Crime?](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tOpIpReZPoM)** > > We start this week talking about a very unusual case: someone is being charged for allegedly wiping a phone before CBP could search it. There are a lot of qu...