How much of VPN Servers and Tor nodes are just on some VPS/Hosting provider and how many are actually self hosted?
what exactly do you want to know? I don’t understand your question
I guess the question is how safe VPN providers are if they don’t control the hardware and infrastructure. Like how strong is a “zero log” policy if the VPN provider uses a host that can log anything. Same question applies to security, a hosted system can’t be fully independent from the host: What is Secure Core? | Proton VPN
How much of VPN Servers
IDK but we can take Proton as the example: there is minority of of Secure Core machines, more rented ones, no VPS. Same for Mulvad About our servers.
and Tor nodes?
A lot of middle nodes are VPS, but minority of exit nodes:
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Yes, that’s what I mean
What is the point of having them on a VPS by some provider that probably logs all connections and sells them to anyone?
The Tor team has stressed that the idea behind Tor’s design is that middle nodes can be untrusted and even obviously malicious. So that’s not quite the same issue as with a VPN on a VPS.
There are some issues with middle nodes: concentration of multiple node with the same owner or host can be harmful: Tor Project | Technical considerations
Performance could also be better with dedicated servers. But generally, from what I’ve seen, Tor doesn’t consider VPS an issue
Any single node in the chain cam be untrusted, if its only a single node.
But if its one a VPS, what does it even add to the anonymity of Tor?
Signal messenger doesn’t operate on self owned bare metal servers located on some abandoned drilling platform somewhere in the ocean, but on AWS. Do you think they’re completely unsafe to use? Just because something is hosted on a VPS doesn’t mean its insecure.
It doesnt mean its insecure, but that you always need to not only trust Signal that the delete metadata, but also Amazon (in this case).
And I view this as a strong argument against trusting the Signal servers.
Even if you blindly trust the Signal Foundation, do you also blindly trust Amazon?
Because unless you view AWS as an entity worth of blind trust, then you must assume it will do anything to spy on you as long as its not visible from the outside.
I would prefer it if more organization would self host their infrastructure or at least not all use the same few hosting providers.
you can’t fully escape the fact that the root trust - physical layer, hypervisor etc.- lies with Amazon AWS. However, I think this argument relies on a legacy view of cloud security and doesn’t take into consideration that signal is actively designed so you don’t have to trust Amazon AWS with your (meta) data (zero knowledge proofs, sealed sender, etc.). With features like Nitro Enclaves (TEE, with NitroTPM, keys are isolated from hypervisor), Signal can cryptographically verify that code that is run hasn’t been tampered with.
Exit/entry nodes are a bit different and can be more harmful — they can attack traffic, know the real destination, etc.
Could you explain what kind of risk you see here? As I understand it, ruining anonymity means knowing who accessed which resource. A single node doesn’t know both.
Another simple way to think about it: if compromising a node ruins anonymity, you don’t need to be the host or attack a VPS to attack a Tor node, you can just run your own middle nodes and control it from the start. So if you don’t trust the Tor model, VPS isn’t the issue — the Tor architecture itself is.
Concentration of nodes on the same host is another issues, but it is not about vps itself.
This doesnt mean that they dont matter.
Its a probalistic game, and every node in the chain reeuces the probality of a full compromisation
For VPNs, it’s unrealistic to own all the data centers they host their servers; too many countries. Reputable providers use:
- Co-located servers – owns hardware but housed in third-party data centers.
- Leased servers – rent dedicated hardware from third-party data centers.
An article published a few months ago noted the consolidation of VPN hosting infrastructure by a few large data center companies.
There is some vetting VPN providers must do before hosting their servers with a third-party data center. NordVPN was hacked in 2018 because the third-party data center had installed a remote management system without NordVPN’s knowledge. Hackers exploited the misconfigured remote management system and got access to NordVPN’s leased server. TorGuard and VikingVPN hosted with the same provider and were impacted too.
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It would be good to have an option that says “only connect to servers in physical control of the VPN provider”
I think this is what secure core in ProtonVPN is.
Yes, Proton owns those servers but not the high-security data centers they’re located in. So Co-located servers. But it’s good they have that option.
Azire claims to fully own all their servers (not the data centers; Co-located).
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" AzireVPN’s Owned Servers
- Diskless (no disks/drives; no storage)
- Portless (no USB or other ports for malicious actors to plug in devices)
- 100% Owned & Operated (no one else owns or has a legal right to access, augment, or otherwise interfere with AzireVPN servers)
- No Access Control (physical and digital security measures to prevent unauthorized access)"
Does “No Access Control” that they control or dont control who can access their server