# Geofencing, surveillance and SIM-based tracking in 2026 **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/geofencing-surveillance-and-sim-based-tracking-in-2026/35239 **Category:** Questions **Created:** 2026-02-06T15:00:40Z **Posts:** 22 ## Post 1 by @bss — 2026-02-06T15:00:40Z In the context of the US is 2026, ICE, protests and Minneapolis, it seems like a safe assumption that many people in the US will be increasingly active at protests or even just in their neighborhoods attempting to protect one another. I have questions about how to best avoid SIM-based location tracking. - Does airplane mode protect one from SIM-based location tracking? - If a smartphone is only using eSIMS does deactivating an eSIM in settings protect one from SIM-based location tracking? - Does using a third party-data only eSIM provide more obfuscation over a standard carrier connection? So, for example, if I’m doing ICE observations in a neighborhood using Signal to coordinate as I’ve read is being done, would I be better off to be using a third party eSIM instead of my phone number-based eSIM. Underlying this is, a more general question of, is it helpful for users concerned about SIM based location tracking to switch to VOIP and avoid using an active SIM unless absolutely needed? --- ## Post 2 by @anon80329175 — 2026-02-06T15:04:32Z Its One Battle After Another… --- ## Post 3 by @notwithstanding — 2026-02-06T15:07:01Z Would love a comprehensive guide on this kind of thing. I feel pretty trapped as far as privacy is concerned in regards to using the Internet on a mobile device. --- ## Post 4 by @anon80329175 — 2026-02-06T15:10:06Z > [@bss](#): > > Does using a third party-data only eSIM provide more obfuscation over a standard carrier connection? What are you trying to obfuscate exactly? The government can always know if phones are connected to cell towers. They can’t know what you’re communicating over encrypted apps. > [@bss](#): > > would I be better off to be using a third party eSIM instead of my phone number-based eSIM. Wouldn’t matter. All they can know is that you/others are connected and how much data is being used by each device. Using a VPN and Signal would absolutely be okay and is likely the best way to go about it anyway. --- ## Post 5 by @fria — 2026-02-06T15:27:03Z > [@bss](#): > > Does airplane mode protect one from SIM-based location tracking? On a Google pixel yes, I assume on most devices as well it properly disables the cellular radio so you won’t be tracked that way. > [@bss](#): > > If a smartphone is only using eSIMS does deactivating an eSIM in settings protect one from SIM-based location tracking? SIM-based isn’t really accurate, your phone has identifiers not related to the SIM like the IMEI that get transmitted. SIM or no SIM doesn’t matter so much as Airplane mode on vs off. > [@bss](#): > > Does using a third party-data only eSIM provide more obfuscation over a standard carrier connection? No > [@bss](#): > > So, for example, if I’m doing ICE observations in a neighborhood using Signal to coordinate as I’ve read is being done, would I be better off to be using a third party eSIM instead of my phone number-based eSIM. You’re better off using airplane mode at all times and using public WiFi, making sure you turn on MAC address randomization. > [@bss](#): > > Underlying this is, a more general question of, is it helpful for users concerned about SIM based location tracking to switch to VOIP and avoid using an active SIM unless absolutely needed? The main problem is whether airplane mode is on, regular non-VoIP SIMs allow you to do calls and texting over WiFi if you want through WiFi calling. --- ## Post 6 by @bss — 2026-02-06T15:31:20Z > [@anon80329175](#): > > What are you trying to obfuscate exactly? > > The government can always know if phones are connected to cell towers. They can’t know what you’re communicating over encrypted apps. The focus here is my physical location. We’ll just stick with ICE. In 2025 the regime in power declared that anticapitalists/antifa/atheists/protesters are a problem that will be dealt with. Let’s say over the rest of 2026 the number of ICE agents on the streets continues to grow and their target expands to these other groups. They broaden their net and start seeking out a lot more folks… As I understand it ICE could go looking for Jimmy Smith the socialist in a variety of ways. - His phone number/carrier and home address. - His phone number carrier location logs to map his patterns, etc His phone number-based SIM seems key to tracking location patterns and where he might have been at a specific time/date. - If Jimmy has turned off that eSIM on his phone is it still providing tracking day-to-day? - If Jimmy has his phone in airplane mode is it still pinging cell towers and providing a daily list of locations? - If Jimmy has a third party eSIM that he uses with Signal or a MySudo line when he is away from home, how easy is it for ICE to track him down based on that usage? - How easy is it for ICE to connect a third party eSIM to Jimmy? --- ## Post 7 by @bss — 2026-02-06T15:38:47Z Thanks! That was exactly what I was looking for. - So, Airplane mode always on (which is what I’ve been doing) - Only turn off Airplane mode when I need to make a call away from home and turn it off again after the call I think that given our new situation in the US this should get more attention. Like, a LOT MORE ATTENTION. It’s a fairly simple step to take to disrupt location tracking as the default always on mode. --- ## Post 8 by @fria — 2026-02-06T15:40:43Z > [@bss](#): > > I think that given our new situation in the US this should get more attention. Like, a LOT MORE ATTENTION. It’s a fairly simple step to take to disrupt location tracking as the default always on mode. Definitely. I think people just don’t think about it much. I’m hoping at some point there will be some kind of IMEI and IMSI randomization by default. --- ## Post 9 by @iluvprivacy — 2026-02-07T08:02:15Z Here’s the problem and that is all postpaid plans in the US require an ID and credit check. So if you show up at a protest and your cellphone pings the tower, regardless of how much hardening or even using GrapheneOS, your carrier/gov/ICE will know you were there. --- ## Post 10 by @anonymous420 — 2026-02-07T08:08:37Z For any future guests stopping in on this post, remember the wonderful resources the website has. > **[The Protesters' Guide to Smartphone Security](https://www.privacyguides.org/articles/2025/01/23/activists-guide-securing-your-smartphone/)** > > Your phone is an essential tool, but it also represents a huge risk to your privacy and security. Understanding these best practices when it comes to securing your smartphone will help keep you and your data safe. --- ## Post 11 by @Man — 2026-02-07T09:36:37Z Leave your phone at home and let someone else incur the risk. Use a camera with telephoto lens on a tripod. That way you are less likely to make an impulsive decision or get shot at. Maintain a respectful distance from the men with guns. The majority of Minnesota residents support ICE. Be careful. Don’t drive (especially into law enforcement officers) and pay for your bus or taxi with cash. If audio is important there are directional microphones. Wear ear protection to avoid tinnitus from the idiots blowing whistles. You can apply a high pass filter to remove the screeching sounds from your footage. Wear a mask to cover up but choose an unintimidating and highly visible colour. Take a reflective vest so everyone can see you. Don’t stand in the road. --- ## Post 12 by @bss — 2026-02-07T12:51:23Z > [@iluvprivacy](#): > > Here’s the problem and that is all postpaid plans in the US require an ID and credit check. So if you show up at a protest and your cellphone pings the tower, regardless of how much hardening or even using GrapheneOS, your carrier/gov/ICE will know you were there. Right, this is why I was specifically asking about how to negate this risk and whether turning on Airplane mode would do this. @fria indicated that it would. Which would mean that I can show up at a protest with my phone in Airplane mode or generally travel with the phone in Airplane mode and know that it was not pinging. --- ## Post 13 by @iluvprivacy — 2026-02-07T13:22:50Z But you have no data in Airplane mode, so communication won’t be possible. I can’t prove it, but I think it would be foolish to assume Airplane mode will guarantee no possible cell tower pinging. Maybe a bad update or a bug will cause it to fail or whatnot. The better advice would be to leave the phone at home or use a non-connected device/camera at a protest. I don’t think you can negate the risks. You can only mitigate them. No one is going to promise you a foolproof solution, just like how no company will guarantee their products are unhackable or virus-free. --- ## Post 14 by @bss — 2026-02-07T13:50:52Z Agreed 100%. I’m good with no communication. Honestly, I think the idea that we must always be connected (or available) in communication is one of those norms that should be shattered. Certainly something that we in the privacy community should be more vocal about. And agreed that there is no guarantee that even Airplane mode is cutting all pinging. Perhaps the solution is simply a Faraday bag. Why not just leave the phone at home? My thought is that it’s still nice to have a phone while away from home in the case of emergency. It’s there if it is needed. Same for use of the carrier provided phone number. This would reduce our exposure to location pattern mapping by 99%. I suppose it’s a demotion of the phone from primary computing device as it seems to have become for so many. As you suggest, use a camera for photos, a computer for computing. For many that’ll be a no-go. --- ## Post 15 by @fria — 2026-02-07T14:58:29Z > [@iluvprivacy](#): > > I can’t prove it, but I think it would be foolish to assume Airplane mode will guarantee no possible cell tower pinging At least on a Google pixel it properly disables the cellular radio so there won’t be any communication with cell towers. > [@iluvprivacy](#): > > But you have no data in Airplane mode, so communication won’t be possible. You can use public wifi. Unlike cellular data, you can randomize the identifier and iOS and Android already do this by default. --- ## Post 16 by @iluvprivacy — 2026-02-07T15:06:02Z What about iOS and Airplane mode? --- ## Post 17 by @fria — 2026-02-07T15:09:22Z I’m not sure, I hadn’t seen it confirmed by a security researcher that it definitely disables the cellular modem but likely it does. iOS does have a problem with airplane mode being turned off after an update however. Edit: the [documentation](https://support.apple.com/en-us/108785#:~:text=Turning%20on%20Airplane%20Mode%20turns%20off%20all%20radios%20except%20for%20Bluetooth) seems to confirm that it disables the cellular radio. --- ## Post 18 by @iluvprivacy — 2026-02-07T15:10:46Z Like I said, I try not to look at things in absolute terms. If you do use a Faraday bag, you should be careful in where you take out your phone. Remember, that the cell towers will be able to pinpoint your location with relatively good accuracy. This is really the thing that scares me the most, and I wish there was a way to negate this privacy threat. Obviously cancelling my postpaid plan isn’t a good idea as it’s part of the modern lifestyle. Just be cognizant of the dangers and you can plan accordingly. --- ## Post 20 by @privacyisconsent — 2026-02-07T18:55:34Z > [@bss](#): > > Does using a third party-data only eSIM provide more obfuscation over a standard carrier connection? Maybe it’s not real obfuscation, but practically speaking a multi-network data eSIM does not need to connect to the mobile base station of one particular network operator. You can always actively/immediately locate a device if you have the IMEI/hardware identifiers to look for with varying resolution, but you may not be able to reconstruct a history of the device’s movements, and it would be more difficult with access to only one of the roamed mobile networks. Or so I think, anyway. --- ## Post 22 by @Man — 2026-02-11T14:55:17Z > [@bss](#): > > Perhaps the solution is simply a Faraday bag. This is my solution. Put it in the bag at random intervals, at least once a week. More often on weekends, as that’s when protests happen. Suddenly going dark the day of a protest will look like an anomaly. Be sure to test the Faraday product before use. It could be fake or not work for your wavelengths. Plausible deniability is key.