# EU Proposal for Chat Control for fighting CSAM **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/eu-proposal-for-chat-control-for-fighting-csam/11665 **Category:** General **Created:** 2023-02-01T10:45:30Z **Posts:** 63 ## Post 1 by @anon57307869 — 2023-02-01T10:45:30Z In the EU, there are discussions for a new law to fight CSAM, namely: “Proposal for a Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse” But I think, that it would be very harmful for the privacy of people in the EU and open source software with the arguments stated here: > **[Chat Control: The EU's CSAM scanner proposal](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/)** > > 🇫🇷 French: Traduction du dossier Chat Control 2.0 🇸🇪 Swedish: Chat Control 2.0🇳🇱 Dutch: Chatcontrole > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence > > > > Take action to stop Chat Control now! > > > > The Chat Control 2.0 proposal in... > **[EU chat control law will ban open source operating systems | Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2023/2/1/eu-chat-control-law-will-ban-open-source-operating-systems)** > > Update: Open source OSes might be saved from being covered depending on the interpretation of EU regulation 2019/1150 2.2.c. > **[Chatkontrolle STOPPEN! – Website zur Kampagne](https://chat-kontrolle.eu/)** (only in German👆) What are your thoughts on this topic? --- ## Post 2 by @dngray — 2023-02-01T10:52:29Z TLDR comes up every so often, yes it is an invasion of privacy because how do they hope to achieve that for conversations which are E2EE. You can’t without a backdoor, sidedoor, ghost door, whatever they want to call it. --- ## Post 3 by @NoOne — 2023-02-01T13:33:22Z I don’t think it matters that much, a lot of things are banned in China, but you can find a way how to keep using it relatively safely. So there will be “natural selection” of people that give up on privacy element, with slightest obstacle/friction, and won’t care, the rest that care more, will put more effort into it, and keep using it. As for businesses, that’s a different story. --- ## Post 4 by @sbeve — 2023-02-07T06:08:14Z > [@NoOne](#): > > So there will be “natural selection” of people that give up on privacy element, with slightest obstacle/friction, and won’t care, the rest that care more, will put more effort into it, and keep using it. The issue of privacy is complex and nuanced, and it’s not accurate to reduce it to a binary choice between those who care about it and those who don’t. People have different motivations, values, and circumstances that influence their stance on privacy, and it’s unlikely to be a straightforward decision for many individuals. Additionally, the level of effort required to maintain privacy can also vary greatly, and the “obstacles/friction” you mention may present different challenges for different people. --- ## Post 5 by @Nostradamus — 2023-02-08T00:37:18Z There are so many things wrong with that “natural selection” comment, but the one that makes more noice to me is that OP appears to underestimate the among it actually take to keep privacy now of days when you literally can’t search for a job without the internet. Or communicate without some messages/social media apps. --- ## Post 6 by @NoOne — 2023-03-12T15:17:41Z I agree, great insight. --- ## Post 7 by @NoOne — 2023-03-12T15:21:02Z You can search for jobs using Tor, not sure if it will rise an eyebrows, of the employer, if you will submit your application, from Tor node, most people wouldn’t care, unless the government, would make them to report, if someone does this, or if it’s in a field where your identity, and information about you should be as transparent, as possible, like if you would apply for a police man, for example. If that person protects their data, as much as possible, but it’s viewed by the employer, as a criminal who wants to hide something, then it becomes a problem, but if it’s not commanded by the government, to report this stuff, for most people it should be fine. --- ## Post 8 by @Nostradamus — 2023-03-15T03:58:26Z > [@NoOne](#): > > You can search for jobs using Tor, not sure if it will rise an eyebrows, of the employer, if you will submit your application, I wasn’t even thinking about that, there is nothing anonymous about job searching. Why bother using Tor to job search given that: - You are submitting a resume that as a minimum will have the city you live, your full name, where you studied, the last places/when you currently work - You are going to be asked about salary - Many places ask for your phone number, even full remote positions where 99% of the time they will contact you by email. - If remote, many places will use things like Teams, Google Meet, Zoom, etc for interview. - I had seen places asking to scan your ID for screenings - Even after you get rejected, they store that data, often by an undisclosed amount of time, and some places share that data with other companies. --- ## Post 9 by @NoOne — 2023-03-20T18:28:26Z Your points are valid for the most amount of privacy, but for someone who just wants to reduce the data shared, like IP address, and your Internet provider spying on your traffic, and what you are doing. Yeah, it’s not that much of a reduction, but I guess it’s better then to use Chrome, without VPN, or anything else. Also if you are in Europe, everyone has to comply with GDPR laws, and I request each time, I give away information to follow these laws, or to delete it within 30 days. If you are not in Europe, you can find some lawyer, get on a 10 min call for 20 $ ~ and send you some paper (PDF), that takes advantage of the laws that are in favor of your privacy, then you can just copy it in each email you send. --- ## Post 10 by @Reset0609 — 2023-11-09T05:57:09Z > [@NoOne](#): > > Also if you are in Europe, everyone has to comply with GDPR laws, and I request each time, I give away information to follow these laws, or to delete it within 30 days. yeah, at least here in Portugal no one gives a crap about GDPR. I mean, everyone will have cookie banners and great privacy and data retention policies but its just for show unless youre a huge company and thus a valuable target for prosecutors and regulatory agencies --- ## Post 11 by @ph00lt0 — 2023-11-09T16:39:34Z While I agree there is still a lot of battles to go through, I do not agree with the negativity of this comment. The GDPR has moved things massively. Europe has drawn a new line in the sand of what can and what can’t be done. The regulation has moved many companies to overthink their policies and made several provacy preserving changes for all citizens. We gotten more better defendable rights and this has put a stop to the increasing lack of privacy offered by big tech. The GDPR is also not a finished product and new regulations are in the pipeline as well as better policing. It is unreasonable and unfair think that something like this will be acted on immediately and always be implemented right. --- ## Post 12 by @Reset0609 — 2023-11-09T16:59:19Z > [@ph00lt0](#): > > The GDPR has moved things massively. Europe has drawn a new line in the sand of what can and what can’t be done. A new line on the sand, sure, by eroding the constitutional rights over our data that we had here in Portugal. How so? By introducing the concept of “legitimate interest”. Before GDPR anyone could request that their data be deleted and the recipient of the request would have to comply except for specific types of data under specific circumstances for which there was a law mandating a minimum retention period. The only “legitimate interest” that existed was the one codified in law. Now its open for interpretation, its open season on making up creative justifications as to why certain types of data are of “legitimate interest”. Having said that, it did greatly shorten the periods after which data is automatically deleted, a shame that it did so while curtailing the power of explicit data erasure requests. I can no longer, for example, change internet providers and tell the one I just changed from to erase all info they have on me. Why? Because they have a “legitimate interest” in keeping this for x amount of time and that for y amount of time --- ## Post 13 by @doctorrock — 2024-06-04T06:54:24Z There’s a new petition against chat control: > **[Joint Statement on the dangers of the May 2024 Council of the EU compromise...](https://www.globalencryption.org/2024/05/joint-statement-on-the-dangers-of-the-may-2024-council-of-the-eu-compromise-proposal-on-eu-csam/)** > > Child sexual abuse and its distribution online is a serious crime that can only be effectively addressed if EU member states take a measured approach that is informed by expert evidence. We are concerned by developments in the Council of the EU where... --- ## Post 14 by @crossroads — 2024-06-05T07:12:53Z Meredith Whittaker (from Signal) said they’ll stop their service in EU if this legislation is passed. --- ## Post 15 by @Tuta_Official — 2024-06-05T10:57:44Z We’ve teamed up with the Global Encryption Coalition to fight back against the latest version of Chat Control. You can find our [joint open letter here](https://tuta.com/blog/joint-statement-eu-compromise-csam-scanning). --- ## Post 16 by @Pragmatic — 2024-06-05T11:22:38Z If the law is passed, I hope Signal will find a solution so that quond can still access their services. --- ## Post 17 by @doctorrock — 2024-06-05T12:50:52Z This should be interesting, as well: > **[First insight: 42 key points of the secret #EUGoingDark surveillance plan for...](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/first-insight-42-key-points-of-the-secret-eugoingdark-surveillance-plan-for-the-new-eu-commission/)** > > After Sunday‘s European elections, the EU is planning to reintroduce indiscriminate communications data retention without suspicion and force manufacturers to allow law enforcement access to digital devices such as smartphones and cars. This is the... There’s absolutely no doubt anymore that there are EU folks who are pushed over the edge! --- ## Post 18 by @ph00lt0 — 2024-06-17T12:59:14Z New statement: > **[upload-moderation.pdf](https://signal.org/blog/pdfs/upload-moderation.pdf)** > > 101.70 KB --- ## Post 19 by @doctorrock — 2024-06-17T16:14:41Z People (especially from France) should write to their Permanent Representatives Committee: [Permanent Representatives Committee - EU Whoiswho - Publications Office of the EU](https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/COREPER/) --- ## Post 20 by @anon80779245 — 2024-06-17T18:48:34Z I phoned my country representative today, and I was basically told that I should call the Foreign Ministry instead. I will try again tomorrow. --- ## Post 21 by @doctorrock — 2024-06-18T08:41:04Z Foreign Ministry??? Hmmm… > **[Council to greenlight Chat Control - Take action now!](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/council-to-greenlight-chat-control-take-action-now/)** > > [Update: Vote has been postponed to Thursday, keep up the pressure!] > > > > The Belgian EU Council presidency seems set to have bulk Chat Control searches of our private communications greenlighted by EU governments on Wednesday 19 Thursday 20 June. This... --- ## Post 22 by @anon46412288 — 2024-06-18T13:19:22Z These laws are, maliciously or not, extremely poorly thought out because this kind of E2EE breakage is simply unenforceable without affecting literally every form of encryption - the best comparison I have heard about this is that it’s comparable to banning a branch of mathematics. --- ## Post 23 by @Tuta_Official — 2024-06-18T16:52:00Z Tuta sat down with Patrick Breyer MEP to discuss the details of this dangerous piece of legislation being pushed by the EU Council. :backhand_index_pointing_right: [https://youtu.be/wSEI-dg3Hpo](https://youtu.be/wSEI-dg3Hpo) ![eu-talk](//forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/2X/6/69c92e859061ca6aca34f3019d5588c743d7a373.jpeg) The vote has been moved from tomorrow to Thursday June 20th. If we stay active we can stop Chat Control. Get loud and let the EU Council know that we will not accept mass surveillance. :raised_fist: --- ## Post 24 by @Tuta_Official — 2024-06-19T06:53:07Z Anyone looking to take action and stand up against mass surveillance can learn more here: [Council to greenlight Chat Control – Take action now! – Patrick Breyer](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/council-to-greenlight-chat-control-take-action-now/) The vote has been postponed until Thursday. Let’s be loud, keep up the momentum, and together we can stop Chat Control! --- ## Post 25 by @anon80779245 — 2024-06-19T09:49:35Z @Tuta_Official thank you for the interview, very insightful @dngray @jonah could Privacy Guides sign the [petition](https://crm.edri.org/stop-scanning-me) ? --- ## Post 26 by @crossroads — 2024-06-19T21:00:36Z Latest news is that Sweden will vote in favour of chat control, so most likely there won’t be enough votes against it to stop it > **[Chat Control: The EU's CSAM scanner proposal](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/)** > > 🇫🇷 French: Traduction du dossier Chat Control 2.0 🇸🇪 Swedish: Chat Control 2.0🇳🇱 Dutch: Chatcontrole > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The End of the Privacy of Digital Correspondence > > > > Take action to stop Chat Control now! > > > > The Chat Control 2.0 proposal in... But I still don’t understand how this will be implemented in p2p and federated services (e.g. briar, xmpp), and client apps that can be downloaded from various sources? --- ## Post 27 by @jonah — 2024-06-19T21:08:17Z Nobody does, the EU Commission & Council seem to believe in magic. --- ## Post 28 by @crossroads — 2024-06-19T21:26:55Z And Signal will not follow it (i.e. will stop operating in EU) if it passes. So I suppose I will be switching to Briar, Jami or some xmpp/matrix solution Though there was the case when Google removed Element from playstore as some people used some servers for illegal stuff. So they might do the same as soon as enough reports are sent. Not to mention custom ROMs and that they might force providers to block them if they lack some “security” features. Similar as some banking apps are doing. I think I’ll buy bunch of old computers and phones to use them in following years --- ## Post 29 by @Pragmatic — 2024-06-19T21:33:22Z Signal will withdraw from the EU but will still be available by configuring a direct proxy from the application, like other countries where they are banned. --- ## Post 30 by @anon80779245 — 2024-06-19T23:59:31Z This is not about being able to use X, or download X . Your family&friends need to be able to use them to do so! Please call your reps, or at least contact them. I personnaly will be protesting at the Council, contact me if you want to join --- ## Post 31 by @Tuta_Official — 2024-06-20T05:26:38Z **The vote is today!** We need to be as loud as possible to signal to these politicians that we do not support mass surveillance. We cannot stop fighting. Please take action: [Council to greenlight Chat Control – Take action now! – Patrick Breyer](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/council-to-greenlight-chat-control-take-action-now/) --- ## Post 32 by @Tuta_Official — 2024-06-20T11:43:33Z The vote on Chat Control has been removed from the agenda and will not be voted upon. Thank you everyone who voiced their concerns! Let’s not fall complacent, the debate is not over. --- ## Post 33 by @jonah — 2024-06-20T11:48:18Z > **[Privacy Guides (@privacyguides@neat.computer)](https://mastodon.neat.computer/@privacyguides/112648637413703479)** > > 🎉 EU Council has withdrawn the vote on Chat Control: "Lack of majority thanks to severe pushback puts the proposal on hold." > > Discussion: https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/eu-council-has-withdrawn-the-vote-on-chat-control/19021 > > Source:... > [@Thread about EU Council Chat Control votes](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/eu-council-has-withdrawn-the-vote-on-chat-control/19021): > > [https://stackdiary.com/eu-council-has-withdrawn-the-vote-on-chat-control/](https://stackdiary.com/eu-council-has-withdrawn-the-vote-on-chat-control/) Lack of majority thanks to severe pushback puts the proposal on hold. According to [Netzpolitik](https://netzpolitik.org/2024/etappensieg-belgien-scheitert-mit-abstimmung-zur-chatkontrolle/) (German), “The EU Council did not make a decision on chat control today, as the agenda item was removed due to the lack of a majority, confirmed by Council and member state spokespersons”. --- ## Post 34 by @jonah — 2024-06-20T12:13:02Z 2 posts were merged into an existing topic: [EU Council has withdrawn the vote on Chat Control](/t/eu-council-has-withdrawn-the-vote-on-chat-control/19021/3) --- ## Post 35 by @doctorrock — 2024-06-20T14:45:48Z The EU Commission FINALLY admits _on record_ that its CSARegulation proposal would break encryption, as Vera Jourova’s comments at EDPS Summit. This contradicts 3 years of YlvaJohansson’s : “CSAR doesn’t break encryption.” > **[EDRi (@edri@eupolicy.social)](https://eupolicy.social/@edri/112649154559299996)** > > Attached: 1 video > > The EU Commission FINALLY admits *on record* that its #CSARegulation proposal would 👏break 👏 encryption, as Vera Jourova's comments at @EDPS@social.network.europa.eu Summit. This contradicts 3 years of... --- ## Post 36 by @anon46412288 — 2024-06-21T15:27:19Z I hate how terrifying the prospect of breaking encryption is, yet every year a bill is forwarded through governments to break encryption, and we all have to suffer through the question of “What if it gets passed?”. --- ## Post 37 by @doctorrock — 2024-09-03T16:54:50Z > **[Chat control blitz decision? Hungary wants to push through unprecedented EU...](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chat-control-blitz-decision-hungary-wants-to-push-through-unprecedented-eu-plans-for-messenger-mass-surveillance-after-all/)** > > As early as tomorrow morning, a majority of EU governments could endorse the controversial draft law on chat control, which had been removed from the agenda in June after massive protests. According to a report by the news service Contexte, the new... --- ## Post 38 by @Pragmatic — 2024-09-03T18:01:14Z China, Russia, Iran, the EU, what difference does it make now, this time the law will pass and if not tomorrow then the next time and again and again until it does, I’ve given up hope a long time ago already, I just hope that Signal, Threema etc won’t let us down completely and that they’ll put in place a way of getting round it. --- ## Post 39 by @asanyan — 2024-09-03T21:11:55Z What does this mean exactly? If they vote tomorrow and it passes, it will immediately become law? --- ## Post 40 by @anon80779245 — 2024-09-04T00:02:33Z We are in the EU still living in a democracy -, and that’s why we need to fight for it. And we have the chances that dissent isn’t a crimen unlike the i-others countries mentionned, so let’s speak up. --- ## Post 41 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-04T09:11:28Z Things are moving along a [fairly predictable vector](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/telegram-ceo-pavel-durov-arrested-at-french-airport/20301/54). I have already mentioned an example scenario that began after the arrest of Pavel Durov. Fighting is a stretch. The real struggle begins where you are not afraid to show who you are, your face - and at the same time have real arguments and evidence of why you are right. In my humble opinion, it is very important to position yourself immediately as a compromise seeker and concerned about understanding the truly justified needs for access to cryptographic communication channels from the State. Because if you try to chop from the shoulder…in general, don’t become a nail under the ready made hammers in the master’s box. Try to become a tool. You know, as they usually say - if you want to achieve something outstanding or at least make money - solve the problem, or better, solve the problem of rich (powerful) people. --- ## Post 42 by @Pragmatic — 2024-09-04T09:35:37Z The European Union is slowly but surely drifting towards a mass surveillance system that could resemble what happens in certain authoritarian regimes. I will focus on France, but I am convinced that the situation is not fundamentally different in other EU countries. In France, we observe: -Growing pressure on the media, with journalists hesitating to tackle sensitive topics such as the Covid-19 pandemic, conflicts in the Middle East, or the war in Ukraine. The fear of repercussions sometimes seems to outweigh the duty to report the truth. -The government’s refusal to pass laws protecting journalists and whistleblowers, some of whom have been subjected to surveillance. -Striking workers being monitored, placed under surveillance, with heavy-handed interventions by the GIGN at their homes at unreasonable hours, followed by prolonged custody. -Peaceful protesters, particularly those opposing environmentally destructive projects like the destruction of a forest to extend a highway, being labeled as terrorists (marked as S files) simply for expressing their dissent—labeled as ecoterrorists by the government. -The massive deployment of facial recognition cameras in public spaces, a measure that raises serious concerns about individual liberties. -The recent attempt to legislate against the use of VPNs, which would greatly restrict online anonymity and freedom of expression. At the European level, the regulation of social media platforms, although it may seem justified on paper, appears in practice to be a means of controlling information. During the Covid-19 crisis, for example, platforms like X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, Google, and Meta were urged to combat “disinformation,” often by removing any content that contradicted the dominant pro-vaccine narrative. The upcoming Chat Control law might follow this same logic, under the guise of security, but in reality, it could lead to increased mass surveillance. --- ## Post 43 by @doctorrock — 2024-09-07T12:08:46Z > [@Pragmatic](#): > > I’ve given up hope a long time ago already, Well, if more and more people think like this we all will lose one day! It may help to remember that there are people who can give us tips on what we can and SHOULD do! It’s not really difficult: [Take action to stop chat control now! – Patrick Breyer](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/) --- ## Post 44 by @dngray — 2024-09-09T09:24:10Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > began after the arrest of Pavel Durov Chatcontrol was discussed long before the Telegram problem, and tbh i don’t think is really relevant because Telegram largely isn’t E2EE anyway. There is always the expectation to comply when you have data. I think all this will do is encourage larger companies to move towards federated/decentralized design as doing so is probably cheaper than the massive cost for compliance. It’s also what is required in separate laws like DMA. Backdoors means they know about it and have to “take action” which is difficult with any service of size. Meanwhile newer protocols eg Signal Protocol, MLS etc are being developed and no, there’s no magical backdoor feature. Politicians need to realize they can pass as many laws as they like, ultimately though if it is unpolicable due to size then it simply won’t be complied with. Smaller services will just operate from more friendly jurisdictions. Compliance requires enforcement, and that requires resources and prosecution. Make ridiculous laws and people won’t take any notice. --- ## Post 45 by @anon80779245 — 2024-09-09T11:13:21Z I think you miss the point. EU can’t ban E2EE messengers, we are not yet at a point where an EFW (European Firewall) is being even considered. But deplatforming will go to great length to reduce Signal’ appeal. It will be seen as a “criminal platform”. As said in [Google Photos dilemma](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/google-photos-dilemma/20584), Privacy is collective. I can always find Signal apks and download it. Now good luck if I want to communicate with iPhone users, and good luck to explain how to install apks to my grandparents. --- ## Post 46 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-09T11:34:59Z Hello. I believe I understand your point. Indeed, the agenda of controlling the means of communication is a well-known discussion vector, and we see no new information here. If I may, I would like to suggest that we consider the situation in a sandbox together. I think it would be beneficial to reflect on the possible options in the same way that modern ‘collectives’ do before the actual battlefield. While it is not accurate to say that Telegram was the cause of the chatcontrol, it is likely that it was one of the few platforms with a large user base that prompted it to be taken to such aggressive steps. Telegram is not currently E2EE by default. However, it might be worth considering whether it could be made so by default in the next version. Do you think that would be a realistic possibility? I would suggest that we consider the additional factor of the numerous, often routine, requests from law enforcement that are often ignored. In light of the upcoming election, it is worth noting that a significant proportion of both voters and those who can influence their opinion or promote the content of someone who can do so are on a platform that does not respond to letters and can hire teams to implement E2EE in bulk. This may create a situation where the opposing side’s intentions and strategies remain unknown. It’s a significant potential challenge with the ability to result in unfavorable outcomes if a decisive action isn’t taken. Pavel could consider spending time in the UAE to invest in the development of a new version, with the goal of implementing encryption by default. This could even involve dividing the platform into a social network and chat tool. This is a realistic possibility, particularly given the potential support from capital in the Middle East. --- ## Post 47 by @dngray — 2024-09-09T13:34:22Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > While it is not accurate to say that Telegram was the cause of the chatcontrol, it is likely that it was one of the few platforms with a large user base that prompted it to be taken to such aggressive steps. Doubtful, because chatcontrol is about E2EE and telegram was never that at least for most users. > [@anon80779245](#): > > As said in [Google Photos dilemma](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/google-photos-dilemma/20584), Privacy is collective. I can always find Signal apks and download it. Now good luck if I want to communicate with iPhone users, and good luck to explain how to install apks to my grandparents. I guess it really depends if this functionality extends to deplatforming from certain countries. I was thinking more of a mastodon/matrix style where you could use a different client that may not have those restrictions. > [@anon23293884](#): > > Telegram is not currently E2EE by default. However, it might be worth considering whether it could be made so by default in the next version. > Do you think that would be a realistic possibility? Doubtful, because a lot of their features haven’t been designed around that possibility. It is possible they could expand it to other places like desktop (not just mobile), but even then there limitations. --- ## Post 48 by @anon80779245 — 2024-09-09T20:34:59Z > [@dngray](#): > > I guess it really depends if this functionality extends to deplatforming from certain countries. I was thinking more of a mastodon/matrix style where you could use a different client that may not have those restrictions. If this law passes, then App Stores will be required to remove any app that doesn’t have this backdoor. --- ## Post 49 by @crossroads — 2024-09-10T05:00:26Z No one knows how it will/could be implemented, but that’s probably the easiest way. Though Signal will withdraw from EU market in that case, and Meredith’s move to France for a few months to talk about Signal future operations in EU, gives me hope this Chat Control will not pass, at least not as its proponents would like to. Facebook also mentioned earlier they don’t want to break encryption. And if they threaten to wihdraw from EU market in case such request becoms reality, and leavi half a billion users without their everyday social and im platforms, that could actually prevent EU from doing this. And the last thing, there are so many EU legislations implemented so poorly, that it makes no difference after all. Bu I do agree that this battle must be fought, otherwise we might come to the point when people will vote for this in their own countries, at nationial elections --- ## Post 50 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-10T05:27:49Z Good morning. It seems to me Meredith’s acumen and foresight would consider exiting the European market only in the most extreme cases. She seems like the kind of woman who believes that even one is a warrior. She has a clear ideology and a strong defense of confidentiality of correspondence with no tolerance for its use for criminal purposes. One of her endgame against a total ban on E2EE in the EU should be something like E2EE but with KYC. Europe is not only a big market, it is also a very developed and intellectually rich in the context of ready specialists and educational institutions, a springboard for other (even more promising) markets of the future. I can’t get my head around the idea that Meredith could give up and just leave the market, even in the case of aggressive chatcontrol. An important factor here is the current instability of the region, the continent itself. There’s serious fighting going on. Communication and logistics are the arteries of war and national security. The EU national leaders realize this. --- ## Post 51 by @anon80779245 — 2024-09-10T22:07:43Z > [@crossroads](#): > > Facebook also mentioned earlier they don’t want to break encryption. And if they threaten to wihdraw from EU market They did for UK’S ban on E2EE.But will they for this ? You would think they would already have spoken out. > [@crossroads](#): > > And the last thing, there are so many EU legislations implemented so poorly, that it makes no difference after all. Unfortunately, authoritarian-leaning countries like Hungary might force the hand in enforcement. --- ## Post 52 by @IksNorTen — 2024-09-12T19:00:08Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > One of her endgame against a total ban on E2EE in the EU should be **something like E2EE but with KYC**. Can something like this be implemented on a legal basis in Europe ? --- ## Post 53 by @anon55464882 — 2024-09-13T04:42:16Z I believe it will inevitably result in the CJEU having to address this question definitively, should the relevant law be adopted by the EU Parliament. In particular, it will need to be examined whether the law in question is in compliance with the principles of existing EU law. --- ## Post 54 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-14T12:37:43Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > One of her endgame against a total ban on E2EE in the EU should be **something like E2EE but with KYC**. > [@IksNorTen](#): > > Can something like this be implemented on a legal basis in Europe ? From the perspective of existing mechanisms in the world, it is possible to draw a parallel between KYC, the use of private communication services and a precious metals exchange, where transactions are conducted only with the necessary identification. Perhaps the key point here is that we, as consumers of private communication products will only have to find out…whether people in power are comfortable with this as a compromise. It is not out of the question, authorities have realised that without monitoring all communications globally, they will not be unable to fulfil their duties. This, by the way, can also be understood… --- ## Post 55 by @anon80779245 — 2024-09-14T19:03:16Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > One of her endgame against a total ban on E2EE in the EU should be something like E2EE but with KYC. This doesn’t make any sense whatsoever. Unless you want to stop children from communication freely, then any other goal of KYC is nonexistent. And Signal will never want to ask users to share their sensitive ids numbers to them or 3rd parties. --- ## Post 56 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-14T21:29:12Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > This doesn’t make any sense whatsoever. I understand that this may not be immediately apparent, but I hope that with a little explanation, it will become clearer. > [@anon23293884](#): > > From the perspective of existing mechanisms in the world, it is possible to draw a parallel between KYC, the use of private communication services and a precious metals exchange, where transactions are conducted only with the necessary identification. > [@anon80779245](#): > > Unless you want to stop children from communication freely, then any other goal of KYC is nonexistent. Why don’t you think the option for KYC for a minor should require an ID document to register a E2EE chat, rather than the age of majority itself. In the event of an individual’s violation of the law and perpetration of illicit activities, their personal account, which has been duly authenticated on the aforementioned exchange, shall be subject to immediate closure. Furthermore, the funds associated with this account will be confiscated. In the event that this occurs with regard to your private E2EE chat, and provided there are legal grounds for doing so, the platform will take the necessary steps to revoke your access to it. The chat will be confiscated and the relevant authorities will be granted access to it, along with the keys it contains. Prior to this juncture, all communication was encrypted and stored within a Know Your Customer (KYC) account, thus ensuring absolute confidentiality until the designated time. --- ## Post 57 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-14T21:48:06Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > Signal will never want to ask users to share their sensitive ids numbers to them or 3rd parties. You share your data when you register somewhere that requires it. I am certain that the main department of the Ministry of the Interior of each European state, together with the World Organization for the Protection of Children’s Rights, will provide servers to process such data. The expression “third parties” is an underestimation of the seriousness of these structures. Or let’s ban E2EE in Europe. People will complain, social polls will drop, and there’ll be a few water cannons and flag-waving. But that’s what it’ll look like. --- ## Post 58 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-14T22:00:03Z It is imperative that we consider the following method in parallel with this: **Absence of abuse of authority** **Absence of corruption** **Transparency and publicity of the prosecution processes where the decision to seize a means of communication is taken.** **Controlling judges and jurors by an incorruptible body.** **Intelligence, agents who identify lousy sheep, infiltrate those who try to bribe, provoke abuse.** * * * Those who violate the law specifically with regard to human rights by making false accusations and seizing private communications will face very serious penalties, like for treason or grievous harm. * * * --- ## Post 59 by @anon80779245 — 2024-09-15T08:18:48Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > Why don’t you think the option for KYC for a minor should require an ID document to register a E2EE chat, rather than the age of majority itself. Because E2EE encrypted chats are an important tool for safe communication. Sexual violence victims say they valued “Safe Spaces” including private chats. It is also useful to protect young protesters again zealous LE. > [@anon23293884](#): > > In the event that this occurs with regard to your private E2EE chat, and provided there are legal grounds for doing so, the platform will take the necessary steps to revoke your access to it. If there was an AI that could detect CSAM with a \<1% false positive, then it would be very difficult for me to oppose it. But current systems have high level of false positives. Both on the detection on wheter it’s a child (For example Asian woman can be identified as child by AI) and the intent (for.medical exam, or consensual sexting between minors). --- ## Post 60 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-15T09:56:18Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > Sexual violence victims say they valued “Safe Spaces” including private chats. > [@anon80779245](#): > > But current systems have high level of false positives. I sense that your perspective might be leaning towards a fatalistic outlook. If the victims of crime saw a safe harbor in E2EE, it will remain so, provided that it is disclosed. In such a case, if the competent Authorities (_which are designed to protect their rights_) revealed as a result of investigative actions that the law was violated in the **real world**. I believe that monitoring all conversations in real time may create psychological pressure for everyone. The idea is that the E2EE chat’s can be decrypted if necessary, not that they would decrypt 100% of them in real time detecting violations based on that. Why? It is a very big challenge for any investigation to present something to the accused without more data, and that data is often behind E2EE. --- ## Post 61 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-15T10:00:17Z > [@anon80779245](#): > > It is also useful to protect young protesters again zealous LE. I believe it would be beneficial for us to focus our efforts on fostering a more structured and engaged civil society, with the aim of creating a more positive perception of law enforcement among the public. I respect your approach, but I wonder if it is the most effective in addressing the complex challenges we face. I do agree that instances of oppression, abuse of power, and corruption have affected many nations around the world. --- ## Post 62 by @Rasta — 2024-09-15T16:16:56Z > [@anon23293884](#): > > The idea is that the E2EE chat’s can be decrypted if necessary, not that they would decrypt 100% of them in real time detecting violations based on that. The very concept of having a built in method to decrypt E2EE messaging services defeats the whole point of encryption. If the argument is that decrypting suspected illegal messages is a good thing but keep everything else secret, then you might as well argue for the use of a service thats not encrypted. Who decides the requirements to be deemed necessary, who determines when thos requirements are met, and then who decides when exceptions can be made for “National Security” arguments. This is why whatsapp is threatening to leave the UK and India and Signal is threatening to leave the UK. Backdooring encryption defeats the point and puts all users at risk. > [@anon23293884](#): > > It is imperative that we consider the following method in parallel with this: > > **Absence of abuse of authority** > > **Absence of corruption** > > **Transparency and publicity of the prosecution processes where the decision to seize a means of communication is taken.** > > **Controlling judges and jurors by an incorruptible body.** > > **Intelligence, agents who identify lousy sheep, infiltrate those who try to bribe, provoke abuse.** This is a very idealistic view of a possible future that is most likely not possible. Corruption always has and always will exist. There is no such thing as “an incorruptible body” as nice as one would be. --- ## Post 63 by @anon23293884 — 2024-09-16T01:39:36Z > [@Rasta](#): > > This is a very idealistic view of a possible future that is most likely not possible. I am ready to throw the dice > [@Governments impact on apps](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/governments-impact-on-apps/20537/18): > > Perfect should never be the enemy of the good