# Desktop Operating System with high security

**URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/desktop-operating-system-with-high-security/24435
**Category:** Questions
**Created:** 2025-01-28T09:41:29Z
**Posts:** 46

## Post 1 by @curie — 2025-01-28T09:41:29Z

Hi! I recently sold my old computer and got a “better” one. The problem is that this new computer is _not_ compatible with QubesOS virtualization technology.

What desktop operating system should I use then? I have a decently high threat model, and regularly communicate with people in heavily speech-restricted countries.

The obvious answer is tails, but I would strongly prefer not to use an amnesic system.

Specific traits I’m looking for are:

- Low as possible attack surface
- Damage minimization if penetrated.

Some OSs I was looking into:

1. OpenBSD. Not that big of a dev team (so bugs may go unpatched for a while), but incredibly secure defaults
2. Kicksecure. Don’t know too much about it, but may use it because tight integration with rest of Debian ecosystem
3. Whonix. Is it even possible to use it in this way? Not sure, but otherwise very experienced with it due to QubesOS usage.

Also, before @anon48875053 says “use secureblue!” I would prefer to use a bigger project with more than one backer. It does potentially sound nice though.

Thanks in advance!

---

## Post 2 by @jerm — 2025-01-28T10:19:20Z

> [@curie](#):
>
> - OpenBSD. Not that big of a dev team (so bugs may go unpatched for a while), but incredibly secure defaults

…

> [@curie](#):
>
> - Kicksecure. Don’t know too much about it, but may use it because tight integration with rest of Debian ecosystem
> - Whonix. Is it even possible to use it in this way? Not sure, but otherwise very experienced with it due to QubesOS usage.

Debian. Not very secure.

> [@curie](#):
>
> Also, before @Lukas says “use secureblue!” I would prefer to use a bigger project with more than one backer. It does potentially sound nice though.

You already know the answer, there isn’t a secret OS that takes security seriously.

---

## Post 3 by @curie — 2025-01-28T10:46:34Z

Is OpenBSD really that bad? Also you’re kind of right, I just didn’t want to concede into using secureblue.

---

## Post 4 by @SteelPirate1458 — 2025-01-28T11:03:34Z

> [@jerm](#):
>
> Debian. Not very secure.

Despite both Whonix and Kicksecure being Debian, they are both recommended in PrivacyGuides under Anonymity for Whonix and Security for Kicksecure. So there must be some merit or value for using them even though they are Debian based. And unlike Secureblue it is an already established Linux distribution.

> [@curie](#):
>
> “use secureblue!” I would prefer to use a bigger project with more than one backer. It does potentially sound nice though.

Secureblue is definitely a worthwhile project to keep a look at, especially since by default it uses GNOME or KDE Plasma which are Wayland based rather than X11. Since although Kicksecure can be merged into any Debian install with any desktop environment, it by default uses XFCE which is X11, and I believe it X11 is no longer maintained or at least is slower on updates, and it has some security issues. Though correct me if I’m wrong. And that’s not mentioning the Atomic/Immutable nature of Fedora Silverblue and Kinoite.

I can’t comment on OpenBSD. And I am not recommending anything, I don’t know your threat model, I don’t know if your or anyones lives depend on it. Qubes is obviously the best choice for this, so it’s unfortunate it’s not supported. I hope you can come to the next best answer.

---

## Post 5 by @jerm — 2025-01-28T11:08:00Z

I don’t have much opinion on OpenBSD, you can check this [thread](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/other-secure-operating-systems/18332).

> [@SteelPirate1458](#):
>
> Despite both Whonix and Kicksecure being Debian, they are both recommended in PrivacyGuides under Anonymity for Whonix and Security for Kicksecure. So there must be some merit or value for using them even though they are Debian based. And unlike Secureblue it is an already established Linux distribution.

With clear warnings about it being Debian-based.

---

## Post 6 by @anon73250778 — 2025-01-28T11:49:15Z

Buy a Pixel Tablet and use it as a desktop replacement?

As with the Linux OSes, the aphorism “Perfect is the Enemy of Good Enough” comes in to mind:

- Get a Dell Optiplex Micro 7010 with vPro
- Install Silverblue
- Modify the relevant BIOS settings to attain HS:4
- If you need the extra paranoia, Start a VM and run Tails or KickSecure.

---

## Post 7 by @Sectional2932 — 2025-01-28T11:53:59Z

Instead of trying to use Whonix as your full OS, Whonix inside a virtual machine on a mainstream Linux distro would be a good option. This would meet both of your points:

- Low as possible attack surface: The attack surface is a privacy/anonymity distro inside a virtual machine.
- Damage minimization if penetrated: If your Whonix install is penetrated, the penetration is limited to the virtual machine (in all but the most extreme cases). You can just delete the virtual machine and start over with a new Whonix install inside a new virtual machine.

I’d suggest a distro with either point releases or rolling releases, as you get the security updates faster than the LTS (long-term support) distros (like Debian).

Unfortunately, most Linux content creators don’t focus on security or privacy, but they still have some interesting information sometimes, so I follow a few anyway. The Linux Experiment is something to check out.

You haven’t mentioned how much experience you have with Linux apart from Qubes, or anything other than Windows or MacOS. If you can tell us your Linux experience, it would help us to give you better guidance.

---

## Post 8 by @hnry.townshend — 2025-01-28T12:02:05Z

first I wanna say that I love OpenBSD, and it is a great system to make your device is secure, i wouldnt advice you to use it though, simply because you might not always find the tools you need like you do on linux (OpenBSD is a bit different from Linux systems) and learning to use it might take time (again, because it is different to linux)

you can use Pop\_os and use virtual machines for separate tasks, but to be honest with you, if you can , buy another computer dedicated for your work that is compatible with Qubes os (simply because Qubes Os is unique)

Another great idea from [HauntSanctuary](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/u/HauntSanctuary) is to buy a pixel tablet, you can install grapheneos and create multiple profiles for your needs

i hope this helps

---

## Post 9 by @jerm — 2025-01-29T19:54:52Z

> [@anon73250778](#):
>
> Start a VM and run Tails

You shouldn’t use Tails in a VM [Tails - Running Tails in a virtual machine](https://tails.net/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/index.en.html)

> Traces of your Tails session are likely to be left on the local hard disk. For example, host operating systems usually use swapping (or paging) which copies part of the RAM to the hard disk.

> Only run Tails in a virtual machine if leaving traces on the hard disk is not a concern for you.

---

## Post 10 by @ignoramous — 2025-01-29T20:56:49Z

> [@curie](#):
>
> - Low as possible attack surface
> - Damage minimization if penetrated.

ChromiumOS has a pretty neat sandboxing model ([Crostini](https://chromeos.dev/en/linux/linux-on-chromeos-deep-dive)) for this. Though, I don’t imagine you are okay with Chromebooks?

---

## Post 11 by @anon73250778 — 2025-01-30T00:13:51Z

> [@jerm](#):
>
> Traces of your Tails session are likely to be left on the local hard disk. For example, host operating systems usually use swapping (or paging) which copies part of the RAM to the hard disk.

Last I checked default Fedora uses ZRAM (compressed RAM for paging) so a reboot should clear it up. This also shouldnt be a problem for systems with 32 GB RAM or more for a more normie use case (web browsing, media playback and games).

---

## Post 12 by @Astatine — 2025-01-30T00:45:10Z

> [@hnry.townshend](#):
>
> Pop\_os

I hope my response isn’t perceived as aggressive, but Pop!\_OS is a horrible choice from a security perspective. It lacks Wayland by default, is based on an old Ubuntu LTS release, and you’re trusting _not just Debian, and then Ubuntu_, but _also_ System76 as well to not do anything malicious.

---

## Post 13 by @Astatine — 2025-01-30T01:01:52Z

> [@Sectional2932](#):
>
> point releases(…)faster than the LTS (long-term support) distros (like Debian).

What one should (preferably) be avoiding is _point release_ distributions since _they_ receive far slower updates than those such as Arch or Fedora. AFAIK, all LTS distributions fall into the “point release category” and thus should be obviously avoided as well.

---

## Post 14 by @anon65804091 — 2025-01-30T03:39:22Z

> [@curie](#):
>
> What desktop operating system should I use then? I have a decently high threat model, and regularly communicate with people in heavily speech-restricted countries.

Some questions for yourself:

What are the capabilities of your adversary? Are they most likely going to try to phish you with infected files, are they a state-level adversary that can infect your computer with a 0-day through your browser? Would the adversary be willing to forcefully take your computer and compel you to reveal your disk encryption password?

Are you more concerned with being targeted with malware, leaving traces on your on hard disk, your communications not being attributed to you, communications not being decrypted? Are your priorities based on anonymity, security, both?

What else do you want to use your computer for? Gaming, blogging, internet surfing, programming? Or only for dangerous tasks?

I would personally lean into Kicksecure as a host and running Whonix in your scenario, if Qubes isn’t an option. To avoid compromising the host, it may be wise to never run risky software like browsers or anything that communicates with the internet, and running different amnesic KVM VMs for different activities. As a former Qubes user, you should be familiar with this compartmentalization mindset :slightly_smiling_face:

> [@jerm](#):
>
> Debian. Not very secure.

A choice of non-security-focused linux distro (i.e. fedora over debian) is incredibly unlikely to stop someone from getting infected with malware, especially targeted malware. If there’s a bug in a browser that gets exploited, you’re probably hosed, and you won’t know it, whether or not you have Linux Mint or Parrot, unless the browser was virtualized or sandboxed.

A user running Whonix (debian/kicksecure) on live-mode is far better off against an adversary that can deliver browser or media-file based 0 or 1-day exploits, than a user running Fedora and a raw-dogging Firefox or Chromium.

> [@curie](#):
>
> Specific traits I’m looking for are:
> 
> - Low as possible attack surface
> - Damage minimization if penetrated.

If you have a “decently high threat model”, the best ways to minimize damage if penetrated are with virtualization or preferably with an air-gapped or otherwise physically isolated machine. With the former you’re betting on your adversary not employing a vm-escape exploit, which is very unlikely. To my knowledge, there have been publicly known no reports of a VM-escape actually being used by any threat actor in the wild.

Having a low attack surface is largely dependent on you not installing extra unneeded applications, and uninstalling what you don’t need if you’re using Linux. That’s the beauty of Linux - you can make it and harden it as you want mostly.

> [@curie](#):
>
> - Whonix. Is it even possible to use it in this way? Not sure, but otherwise very experienced with it due to QubesOS usage.

Whonix can be used with most operating systems through virtualbox or QEMU/KVM (reccomended). You can even use physical isolation with Whonix if you’re worried about VM-escape exploits and have multiple computers to spare. Just head over to the Whonix wiki to find out more.

---

## Post 16 by @a_user — 2025-01-30T04:11:56Z

And your recommended alternative?

---

## Post 17 by @anon54160479 — 2025-01-30T05:46:38Z

Chrome OS

---

## Post 19 by @curie — 2025-01-30T06:39:01Z

> [@SteelPirate1458](#):
>
> Despite both Whonix and Kicksecure being Debian, they are both recommended in PrivacyGuides under Anonymity for Whonix and Security for Kicksecure. So there must be some merit or value for using them even though they are Debian based. And unlike Secureblue it is an already established Linux distribution.

Not an option for me. And even if it was, my use case is NOT even close to a Pixel Tablet.

---

## Post 20 by @curie — 2025-01-30T06:41:28Z

> [@anon54160479](#):
>
> Chrome OS

Sorry, no. The hardware on those things are way too crappy. I had a Chromebook for my job before they switched me to my mac, and it broke so easy.

---

## Post 21 by @curie — 2025-01-30T06:44:11Z

I use OpenBSD on the server very frequently for my job, so I know my way around it pretty well, except for virtualization. Is OpenBSD good for this at all? The tools I need are mainly a web browser and a VM, and that’s basically it.

Thank you so much for your help by the way, this summed up my issues perfectly!

---

## Post 22 by @curie — 2025-01-30T06:49:51Z

1. They are pretty good. They probably will be trying to phish me with infected files, and infect my browser. They don’t have jurisdiction where I live, nor are they friendly with my government, thank God.
2. I am pretty concerned with making sure my communications are attributed to me, because that would put my families life in jeopardy, so mainly anonymity.
3. Just blogging and internet surfing.

I already settled on QubesOS for this, which is something I am sure you would agree with. Thank you so much for you help, you have been nothing but helpful!

---

## Post 23 by @hnry.townshend — 2025-01-30T12:48:13Z

you are definitely not being aggressive mate :slight_smile:

I just wanna know, why is trusting System76 a bad idea? I mean, they are among the few companies that disabled intel ME, that to me means that they are pretty reliable.

System76 is working on their new Cosmic Os, until then I agree they are using ubuntu 22.04 version, but they are still issuing security updates regularly

---

## Post 24 by @Sectional2932 — 2025-01-30T14:32:04Z

I agree that rolling releases are better. I use Fedora myself.

Regarding the difference between an LTS and a point release, I was thinking of Ubuntu when I said that.

For example, here are the release notes for the December 2024 release which will be supported for 9 months.

> **[Oracular Oriole Release Notes](https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/oracular-oriole-release-notes/44878)**
>
> Oracular Oriole Release Notes Table of Contents Introduction New features in 24.10 Known Issues Official flavours More information Introduction These release notes for Ubuntu 24.10 (Oracular Oriole) provide an overview of the release and...

For Ubuntu, an LTS is a version that will be supported for a few years. The versions in between those LTS versions, which can include some security patches and bug fixes, are sometimes called point releases.

I think it’s just different terminology causing confusion, but we both agree that a distro with regular security updates is a good thing.

---

## Post 25 by @jerm — 2025-01-30T14:44:15Z

A copypasta from a troll account that got deleted. Shouldn’t be shared.

---

## Post 26 by @Astatine — 2025-01-31T00:18:15Z

> [@hnry.townshend](#):
>
> trusting System76 a bad idea?

It is to decrease one’s _attack surface._

---

## Post 27 by @sha123 — 2025-01-31T07:47:40Z

> [@Sectional2932](#):
>
> I agree that rolling releases are better. I use Fedora myself.

Fedora is not rolling release.

> [@hnry.townshend](#):
>
> I mean, they are among the few companies that disabled intel ME, that to me means that they are pretty reliable.

Disabling Intel ME is not a good idea, because it also disables security features.

---

## Post 28 by @Average_Joe — 2025-01-31T08:45:11Z

> [@curie](#):
>
> What desktop operating system should I use then? I have a decently high threat model, and regularly communicate with people in heavily speech-restricted countries.
> 
> The obvious answer is tails, but I would strongly prefer not to use an amnesic system.
> 
> Specific traits I’m looking for are:
> 
> - Low as possible attack surface
> - Damage minimization if penetrated.
> 
> Some OSs I was looking into:
> 
> 1. OpenBSD. Not that big of a dev team (so bugs may go unpatched for a while), but incredibly secure defaults
> 2. Kicksecure. Don’t know too much about it, but may use it because tight integration with rest of Debian ecosystem
> 3. Whonix. Is it even possible to use it in this way? Not sure, but otherwise very experienced with it due to QubesOS usage.

Welcome to the community!

I’ve been researching this exact issue and in general this is the problem I kept running into:

**The more secure the OS, the less Apps it will run and the less functionality it’ll have.**

Is there any reason why you chose OpenBSD instead of FreeBSD? I thought FreeBSD would have more Apps available and a much bigger community when you need support?

---

## Post 29 by @curie — 2025-01-31T09:20:16Z

Thanks for the interest! I’m more active in the matrix server, but I love the forums too!

I mainly chose OpenBSD because of my familiarity with it, and because of my relatively small use cases. As @anon65804091 pointed out, virtualization could suit my needs more, so that is basically the only thing I need an operating system to do. I was wondering if OpenBSD could do this task performant and securely, but I understand there are many other operating systems that could do it to a similar or more secure level. Thank you so much!

---

## Post 30 by @Average_Joe — 2025-01-31T11:01:17Z

> [@curie](#):
>
> I mainly chose OpenBSD because of my familiarity with it, and because of my relatively small use cases. As @Karlson pointed out, virtualization could suit my needs more, so that is basically the only thing I need an operating system to do. I was wondering if OpenBSD could do this task performant and securely, but I understand there are many other operating systems that could do it to a similar or more secure level. Thank you so much!

FreeBSD is awesome man. It’s even used by Netflix: [Netflix operates on FreeBSD servers equipped with AMD Epyc CPUs and achieves roughly 400 Gbit/s per server.](https://www.guru3d.com/story/netflix-operates-on-freebsd-servers-equipped-with-amd-epyc-cpus-and-achieves-roughly-400-gbits-per-server)

It’s such a shame Netflix doesn’t support customers running FreeBSD as their client!

---

## Post 31 by @anon48875053 — 2025-02-01T10:30:15Z

[Aeon](https://aeondesktop.org) or secureblue.

---

## Post 32 by @anon48875053 — 2025-02-01T10:34:12Z

> [@SteelPirate1458](#):
>
> Despite both Whonix and Kicksecure being Debian, they are both recommended in PrivacyGuides under Anonymity for Whonix and Security for Kicksecure. So there must be some merit or value for using them even though they are Debian based. And unlike Secureblue it is an already established Linux distribution.

I have no idea why Kicksecure is recommended, that recommendation shouldn’t be there in the first place. As for Whonix, it’s the best OS for anonymity, that’s why it’s recommended.

* * *

For people saying that secureblue is one guy’s project, go and actually take a look at their GitHub and Discord.

---

## Post 33 by @asanyan — 2025-02-01T12:45:30Z

Arch + apparmor and bubblejail

---

## Post 34 by @overdrawn98901 — 2025-02-01T17:55:02Z

> [@hnry.townshend](#):
>
> they are among the few companies that disabled intel ME, that to me means that they are pretty reliable.

Non-sequitor. Perhaps they are reliable at disabling Intel ME, but that does not mean they are reliably secure.

It’s been discussed on this forum, but disabling Intel ME likely compromises security and system stability of the overall machine to secure against Intel ME being rogue. For non-world class threat models, it’s not recommended. Even at that point, there are likely better steps to take before thinking at that level.

Several steps prior to even consider disabling Intel ME would be to install Coreboot, and I’m not sure if their systems explicitly support that.

---

## Post 35 by @curie — 2025-02-05T23:24:16Z

Why is Kicksecure not good?

---

## Post 36 by @anon48875053 — 2025-02-06T07:13:32Z

It’s based on Debian and recently downgraded its security by stopping using hardened\_malloc and pretending that this is somehow a good decision.

---

## Post 37 by @silverfinger — 2025-02-06T10:37:58Z

Whonix has given many reasons for deprecating hardened malloc by default for all users. They make a lot of sense to me.

```
http://www.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/wiki/Hardened_Malloc#Deprecation_in_Kicksecure
```

> Reasons:
> 
> - **Not stable enough:** Through testing and integration development in Kicksecure, the unresolveable [#Issues](http://www.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/wiki/Hardened_Malloc#Issues) being found, it has been determined that it will never be stable enough to be suitable for installation by default for all users.
> - **Unclear Benefit:** See chapter [#Tickets and Discussions](http://www.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/wiki/Hardened_Malloc#Tickets_and_Discussions). Whenever it has been suggested to other projects to port to Hardened Malloc (HM), it did not get favorable reviews from other developers.
> - **Lack of outreach by upstream:** Upstream mentioned that others do not understand HM but also does not have time to engage with them.
> - **Potential future deprecation by upstream:** [Upstream contemplated deprecation of Hardened Malloc support for usage outside of a Android / GrapheneOS context.](http://www.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/wiki/Hardened_Malloc#Upstream_Considerations_of_Hardened_Malloc_Deprecation_for_x86)
> - **Security issues?**  **No.** Users can keep using Hardened Malloc (Default) or Hardened Malloc Light until the next major release (Kicksecure version 18) but it will be [unsupported](http://www.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/wiki/Unsupported).
> - **Architecture support:**  **Limited.** (HM supports AMD64 architecture only, which makes Kicksecure progress towards multiple architecture support such as ARM64 and PPC harder.)
> - **Future:** Is there any chance this package will get unarchived, maintained again in Kicksecure? No.
> - **Forum discussion:** [Hardened Malloc - Hardened Memory Allocator - #231 by Patrick - Development - Whonix Forum](https://forums.whonix.org/t/hardened-malloc-hardened-memory-allocator/7474/231)

There is documentation on how to install it manually anyways if you still want it. It is free software with no user freedom restrictions, so you can make your own custom version if you want.

```
http://www.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/wiki/Hardened_Malloc/Manual_Installation
```

> [@curie](#):
>
> Why is Kicksecure not good?

It is good. Here is a relevant post from the lead developer.

```
http://forums.w5j6stm77zs6652pgsij4awcjeel3eco7kvipheu6mtr623eyyehj4yd.onion/t/grapheneos-attacks-kicksecure-what-should-the-response-be/739/6
```

Those of you that are downvoting this post can go to the kicksecure forum thread that I linked and argue about it with the maintainers themselves.

---

## Post 38 by @ignoramous — 2025-02-07T18:05:33Z

> [@anon48875053](#):
>
> [Aeon](https://aeondesktop.org) or secureblue.

Wow; secureblue looks neat ([just voted for its inclusion](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/secureblue-immutable-fedora-hardening/16086)). The only problem is, fighting the Kernel with Kernel-assisted virtualization (sandboxing with containers or jailing with namespaces, seccomp, ptrace, selinux etc) is a losing war (even if a few battles could be won here and there); but it _feels_ like an _amazing_ project for anyone with lightweight virt needs (as opposed to the approach in ChromeOS).

Re: Aeon: Doesn’t strike me as a particularly privacy/security project (like secureblue)?

---

## Post 39 by @anon39279085 — 2025-02-07T18:41:19Z

Tbh I wish Secureblue could be used with something like Fedora Server for example :frowning:

Yes you’re not gonna be making the most secure server for enterprise but it would sure help I hope.

---

## Post 40 by @faxe — 2025-02-07T18:52:45Z

Do you mean something like [this](https://secureblue.dev/images#server) ?

---

## Post 41 by @ignoramous — 2025-02-07T18:59:10Z

> [@silverfinger](#):
>
> Whonix has given many reasons for deprecating hardened malloc by default for all users. They make a lot of sense to me.

Also, if they aren’t already, _Whonix_ / _Kicksecure_ could opt to use other “hardened” mallocs like [Scudo](https://llvm.org/docs/ScudoHardenedAllocator.html) (originally developed by Chromium), which I believe, is the default on [AOSP (native code)](https://source.android.com/docs/security/test/scudo).

Regardless, like ARM’s memory-tagging extensions (MTE), “hardened” mallocs are at best _mitigations_ for memory exploits and not the _solution_ (likes of which come from safer specs/languages/“runtimes” like Rust).

---

## Post 42 by @anon39279085 — 2025-02-07T20:10:13Z

yes, Though CoreOS includes a GUI, there is no just TTY version outside of netboot

---

## Post 43 by @jerm — 2025-02-07T22:31:45Z

> [@ignoramous](#):
>
> “hardened” mallocs like [Scudo](https://llvm.org/docs/ScudoHardenedAllocator.html) (

> **[Hardened Malloc - Hardened Memory Allocator](https://forums.whonix.org/t/hardened-malloc-hardened-memory-allocator/7474/59)**
>
> Security researcher, Daniel Micay has created hardened_malloc which is a hardened memory allocator that protects against heap corruption vulnerabilities. 
> It isn’t available in the Debian repos but is very easy to build …

[https://github.com/thestinger/allocator/issues/27](https://github.com/thestinger/allocator/issues/27)

---

## Post 44 by @ignoramous — 2025-02-09T14:57:06Z

Thanks. Daniel Micay’s concerns (from 2017?) stand valid, but Scudo’s designed to be a _mitigation_ not a _solution_, and hence the trade-offs to _not_ cause untoward userspace performance regression. Though, HM’s philosophy is in line with Micay’s other work ([disabling optimization to share memory regions from Zygote among all user apps](https://copperhead.co/blog/aslr-android-zygote/), as one example).

That said, I reckon Micay would be the first to admit that memory safety _must_ come from the runtime/language (like Rust or Zig) instead of malloc libs (incl HM) and retrofitting safety features in the compiler toolchain (MSan, ASan, UBSan, IntSan, CFI, Stack Canaries, etc).

---

## Post 45 by @Average_Joe — 2025-03-05T18:46:46Z

> [@curie](#):
>
> I mainly chose OpenBSD because of my familiarity with it, and because of my relatively small use cases. Thank you so much!

I just downloaded the most recent version of OpenBSD and the full download is ONLY 697MB… less than 700MB for the full version.

With such a small download I’d be concerned with which Apps it comes with Curie… even if you can get OpenBSD running the way you want it may not have the Apps that you need.

**I’m just thinking it’ll just be a headache for you in the long term.**

---

## Post 46 by @curie — 2025-03-07T15:19:43Z

Can I not install more? And I have been using it short term, and its been kinda fine. What do you personally use?
