# Daniel Boctor: Apps REFUSE TO PATCH "Design Flaw" that tracks EVERYTHING you do

**URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/daniel-boctor-apps-refuse-to-patch-design-flaw-that-tracks-everything-you-do/33126
**Category:** General
**Tags:** video
**Created:** 2025-11-22T18:48:08Z
**Posts:** 14

## Post 1 by @susan — 2025-11-22T18:48:08Z

> **[Apps REFUSE TO PATCH "Design Flaw" that tracks EVERYTHING you do](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9Syj555RQc)**
>
> End to end encrypted messaging apps, such as WhatsApp and Signal, have a shocking, high severity unpatched side channel vulnerability, that can be exploited ...

TLDR: you can use delivery receipts to track active time (like is the device opened, is app opened or just in the background, what user the device is on)

Quite interesting, also linked bellow is the paper mentioned [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11194](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11194)

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## Post 2 by @TheDoc — 2025-11-23T00:45:42Z

The title seems clickbaity and lacks detail which is why i assume this isn’t getting the attention it deserves on this forum. I’d maybe change the title to something more descriptive or reflect the title of the paper: `Careless Whisper: Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Monitor Users on Mobile Instant Messengers`

To summarize his video, Signal and WhatsApp (potentially others?) are apparently vulnerable to a side-channel attack which allow anyone to determine:

- What devices you use
- How long you use them for (and by extension, your daily habits)
- Who you communicate with
- When you physically move
- When you’re on WiFi vs cellular data
- Times and durations of your phone calls

It’s important to note that:

- This can be done without indicating any suspicious activity to the user.
- This was reported to Signal and WhatsApp in September 2024. Signal has ignored it and WhatsApp released a questionable mitigation without comment.
- There are known solutions/mitigations to this issue Signal and WhatsApp could’ve implemented.

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## Post 3 by @beantaco — 2025-11-23T23:21:40Z

To begin with, I’ve always felt uncomfortable with Signal’s _intended use_ of delivery receipts. They show senders when their contacts are online and when they are not, even when read receipts are disabled. Unfortunately these delivery receipts are not just for telling senders that their messages have been successfully delivered (to the server and then the intended recipient) but also appear to be functionally depended upon by the Signal Protocol.

[The paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11194) suggests some mitigations to abuse of delivery receipts, listed below. The descriptions are my words based on my understanding. See the paper for full and accurate description.

- **Restricting delivery receipts** : Dropping messages from unknown Signal users and not sending delivery receipts to them.
- **Coarser receipt timings** : Adding a small randomized delay before delivery receipts are sent by a client.
- **Improving client-side validation** : Since messages are E2EE and thus cannot be validated by the Signal server, clients should perform validation and drop invalid messages (for instance deletions for messages that are already deleted).
- **Rate limiting** : The Signal server could tighten rate limiting. A client that receives a flood of messages could warn the user about it and perhaps temporarily block the contact.
- **Synchronized multi-clients** : Having all linked devices synchronize their state between each other and then send just one delivery receipt, instead of multiple delivery receipts (one from each device).
- **Harmonizing client behavior** : Unifying the client codebases across operating systems to help mitigate fingerprinting.

However, all the above are all client or server mitigations, none of which Signal users can implement by themselves :expressionless_face:

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## Post 4 by @anon29925348 — 2025-11-24T16:15:51Z

In Signal, you do not appear to get delivery receipts for “spooky strangers”. Only when a msg request is accepted by the stranger will you then get delivery receipts moving forward.

What am I missing?

 ![image](https://forum-uploads.privacyguidesusercontent.com/original/3X/5/4/54c0762867178253c551325407250b4b288ccb8c.png)

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## Post 5 by @beantaco — 2025-11-24T21:56:16Z

I’m not sure I understand your post. Did you mean receiving delivery receipts from strangers (non-approved contacts)?

The issue discussed in the paper is that strangers are capable of sending hidden or invalid messages to their targets in order to receive delivery receipts from those targets.

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## Post 6 by @anon29925348 — 2025-11-24T23:26:52Z

Correct, “spooky strangers” in the paper are contacts not in your address book. Regardless if valid, invalid, or hidden msg type - Signal does not appear to send delivery receipts to these strangers. Perhaps this behavior was changed by Signal since publication?

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## Post 7 by @beantaco — 2025-11-25T03:27:35Z

> [@anon29925348](#):
>
> Regardless if valid, invalid, or hidden msg type - Signal does not appear to send delivery receipts to these strangers. Perhaps this behavior was changed by Signal since publication?

I hope so, but what evidence do you have that supports your belief that Signal does not send delivery receipts to strangers? Unfortunately it appears Signal’s release notes are almost meaningless.

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## Post 8 by @anon29925348 — 2025-11-25T11:50:29Z

The whitepaper and YouTube video is making the claim that Signal user’s can be tracked by defined “Spooky Strangers”. As an end-user layman I am unable to reproduce the findings within the whitepaper for the issue that most concerned me (Spooky Strangers). I’m not necessarily presenting evidence - I’m encouraging other users to attempt to reproduce the **whitepaper’s claims** because I am not able to.

Here is another thread on the topic. In this thread it was helpful to learn:

1. Appears there has been a behavior change?
2. Delivery reports are sometimes sent by the server, not the recipients device.
3. Sealed Sender changes the behavior. This makes sense - If using sealed sender and the delivery receipt is handled by the device then the server cannot send a delivery report on the recipients behalf, right? The server does not know who sent the message to craft a delivery report to.

> **[[Security] Dont send delivery confirmations for incorrectly formatted messages](https://community.signalusers.org/t/security-dont-send-delivery-confirmations-for-incorrectly-formatted-messages/70980/18)**
>
> Since when? Maybe Signal than changed something since the researchers published their report? Because if that is the only thing a “stranger” recives the attacks in question wouldnt be possible. They are only possible if the client sents...

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## Post 9 by @TheDoc — 2025-11-25T14:11:40Z

That’s good to point out if it has changed since, but if Daniel Boctor’s summary is otherwise accurate, this is still a very serious issue to ignore. It can’t be too hard to become someone’s Signal contact, especially when nearly all users are unaware of the privacy implications of accepting a contact.

Also there are many people (including journalists) who share their Signal as a preferred means of communication to the open internet and thus it’s impossible for those users to protect themselves by rejecting unknown contacts.

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## Post 10 by @beantaco — 2025-11-25T23:28:00Z

Thank you for the link to the Signal community forum thread. However, unfortunately the discussion doesn’t show Signal has patched the vulnerability, in fact it appears that so far they are in denial about the issue :frowning:

On one hand, the researchers who wrote the paper and presented at DEF CON demonstrated that “spooky strangers” can extract delivery receipts from any target user as long as they have their phone number (or perhaps username).

On the other hand, the person in the Signal community forum [claims](https://community.signalusers.org/t/security-dont-send-delivery-confirmations-for-incorrectly-formatted-messages/70980/19)

> You can only receive delivery receipts from a user if they’ve shared a profile key with you, by accepting a message request or being part of the same group chat.

These two appear to be in contradiction with each other. Of course other people should independently verify the research findings, but to me it looks like a demonstrated exploit versus words from the Signal community. What am I missing?

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## Post 11 by @pine — 2025-12-17T22:33:16Z

For anyone curious about Signal’s further thoughts on this, here’s a Github exchange between one of the authors of the paper and a Signal dev, detailing some of the complexities involved with implementing mitigations:

> <https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/pull/14463#issuecomment-3601368061>
>
> Hey there,
> 
> I’m one of the authors of the [paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.1…1194) you referred to. We’re happy to see progress being made to mitigate the issue. We fully agree that having no solution is the worst option, but finding a “real fix” is also quite tricky.
> 
> As you already noted, there are things which can be done with relatively little effort, though:
> * Prevent sending receipts of any kind for actions that do not trigger observable notifications for the user. This prevents an attacker from gathering a large set of samples in a short amount of time.
> * Force a specific distribution of receipts on the client side (as discussed here). This will not be perfect, but it would have an immediate effect by making it much harder in practice to extract useful information from receipts.
> 
> Keep in mind, this will _not_ be a solution against the various "is online" side-channels, but make it harder for an attacker to extract more information from receipts.
> 
> In the long run, other solutions can be considered. These might also include a discussion about whether explicit delivery receipts are needed at all, or whether they could be disabled by privacy-sensitive users. From our current understanding, delivery receipts mainly serve the purpose of allowing the sender to clear their send queue and handle certain edge cases. But we would love to have a more detailed discussion about whether it might be possible to get rid of them completely. Maybe it is enough to implicitly acknowledge received messages only when an explicit reply is sent, for example?

Link starts from the author’s initial message; the discussion continues after the issue is closed.

As far as I can tell, this was the thread’s most actionable advice from Signal for concerned users:

> For people who want to restrict delivery receipts, Signal already supports disabling phone number discoverability (Settings \> Privacy \> Phone Number \> Who Can Find Me By Number). With this setting enabled, you can choose a random alphanumeric username and no one will be able to send you any messages (delivery receipts or otherwise) unless you share that username with them.

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## Post 12 by @beantaco — 2025-12-17T23:06:42Z

I don’t understand the technical details of delivery receipts well but I believe _improving client-side validation_ could be implemented in Signal clients without much difficulty and would go some way towards mitigating abuse of delivery receipts. Can anyone who knows the details of delivery receipts chime in?

> **Improve Client-side Validation.** When messages are not E2EE, they can be validated by the server and only forwarded to the receiver when passing the validation. However, this server-side validation is not possible with E2EE, requiring more rigorous validation by the receiving client. For example, many of the presented attacks are not possible when clients properly validate the referenced message IDs and thus discard invalid messages (instead of acknowledging them via a delivery receipt). While our primary focus is on privacy-related issues, the shift from server-validated input to E2EE content is particularly important from a security standpoint. Parsing unvalidated data can quickly introduce severe security vulnerabilities.

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## Post 13 by @beantaco — 2025-12-17T23:28:19Z

> For people who want to restrict delivery receipts, Signal already supports disabling phone number discoverability (Settings \> Privacy \> Phone Number \> Who Can Find Me By Number). With this setting enabled, you can choose a random alphanumeric username and no one will be able to send you any messages (delivery receipts or otherwise) unless you share that username with them.

[The suggested setting](https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/6829998083994-Phone-Number-Privacy-and-Usernames-Deeper-Dive) is intended to enable/disable contact discovery in the case someone already knows a Signal user’s phone number. Does disabling this really stop a stranger who already knows the target’s phone number (or username) from extracting delivery receipts from their target **using a custom client**?

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## Post 14 by @beantaco — 2026-04-23T23:01:51Z

I created a feature request for a switch to enable/disable delivery receipts on a per-contact basis and submitted it to Molly (fork of the Signal Android client).

> <https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/issues/721>
>
> ### Guidelines
> 
> - [x] Yes, I have searched the existing requests
> 
> ### Feature De…scription
> 
> A [research paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11194) called "Careless Whisper: Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Monitor Users on Mobile Instant Messengers" published October 2025 demonstrates an attacker can abuse instant messaging apps' delivery receipts to track users. Molly is aware of this security vulnerability and has opened [an analysis issue](mollyim/mollyim-android/issues/646) to address it. Details of this vulnerability and Signal's response can be found in the paper, [this Signal Android pull request](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/pull/14463) and [this Signal community forum thread](https://community.signalusers.org/t/better-security-against-sidechannel-and-protocol-attacks-defcon-2025-security-flaws/72289).
> 
> In light of this vulnerability and AFAIK no mitigations implemented by Signal to address it thus far, I propose a switch to enable/disable sending delivery receipts on a per-contact basis.
> 
> - When the switch is enabled, everything operates as normal.
> - When the switch is disabled, the user can receive messages from the contact without the contact being notified their messages are being delivered to the user; this would make the user appear offline to the contact whether or not the user is actually online or offline.
> - When the user attempts to send a message to the contact, either the user is prompted to re-enable sending delivery receipts or the switch will be automatically re-enabled (whichever is preferable to implement).
> - I suggest the switch be located at the same place in the UI adjacent to the "Block" switch.
> - When sending delivery receipts is disabled for a contact, the UI displays a small icon to that effect, exactly or adjacent to where the block icon would display when a contact is blocked.
> 
> One problem I see is, unlike the block setting, the switch will have effect only on the device the user sets/toggles the setting, and I don't know if there exists a mechanism to transmit the setting's state to the user's linked devices.
> 
> Otherwise I believe adding this switch would not interfere with the Signal Protocol or reliability. when the switch is enabled it will just make the user appear offline to the contact who will no longer receive delivery receipts.
> 
> I invite people to comment on this proposed feature and the technical and social pros/cons of it, corrections of my misunderstanding etc.
> 
> My thoughts on the vulnerability and its mitigations are outlined below.
> 
> ***
> 
> Users concerned about this vulnerability being exploited against them have the technical option to block suspected attackers, thus AFAIK disabling delivery receipts being sent from their client to the blocked contacts. However, recommending this action to users has some problems.
> 
> - Users have no way to find out via the Signal UI that delivery receipts are being sent from their client and to which contacts those are being sent to.
> - Users may lack liberty to block certain contacts because of social pressure or a need to communicate with the contacts.
> 
> Examples of users who may be concerned about this vulnerability and when blocking may be inappropriate include
> 
> - A worker and their nosy boss and nosy coworker.
> - A victim/survivor of ongoing domestic violence and their abuser.
> - An activist and their comrade who has had their device seized.
> 
> Temporary blocking would stop delivery receipts being sent to the blocked user while allowing communication, but the blocking user would fail to receive messages from the blocked user while the block is in place, thus an impractical mitigation.
> 
> As of now, users of the official Signal client have these mitigations.
> 
> - To limit the amount of information sent to potential attackers, disable read receipts and typing indicators.
> - To stop sending delivery receipts, close the Signal app while not in use. To be sure of this, turn off internet connectivity.
> - To read messages you have already received without sending delivery receipts, open and close the Signal app while internet connectivity is turned off.
> 
> Obviously these mitigations are all or nothing and cannot be tuned on a per-contact basis. Further, keeping the app closed and internet turned off severely affect people's ability to use the app and their own device properly, again impractical.
> 
> Edit to add: Delivery receipts are a privacy issue even as designed and intended, by indicating (the unfilled double tick icon) when contacts receive messages, leaking contacts' online status. This is something I have felt discomfort about as a long-time Signal user.
> 
> If a switch to enable/disable sending delivery receipts on a per-contact basis is added, users could disable sending delivery receipts to suspected contacts, while being able to use the app properly without shutting off internet and closing the app down, and while still being able to receive messages from suspected contacts.
> 
> References:
> - [The research paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.11194)
> - [mollyim/mollyim-android issue #646](https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/issues/646)
> - [signalapp/Signal-Android pull request #14463](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/pull/14463)
> - [Signal community forum thread](https://community.signalusers.org/t/better-security-against-sidechannel-and-protocol-attacks-defcon-2025-security-flaws/72289)

Extract of feature description

> In light of this vulnerability and AFAIK no mitigations implemented by Signal to address it thus far, I propose a switch to enable/disable sending delivery receipts on a per-contact basis.
> 
> - When the switch is enabled, everything operates as normal.
> - When the switch is disabled, the user can receive messages from the contact without the contact being notified their messages are being delivered to the user; this would make the user appear offline to the contact whether or not the user is actually online or offline.

This is meant to deny information from _creepy companions_ (attackers who are in the user’s contact list) and obviously won’t work against _spooky strangers_ (attackers who are not but know the user’s phone number).
