# BitLocker compromised? **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/bitlocker-compromised/20072 **Category:** General **Created:** 2024-08-15T11:22:11Z **Posts:** 4 ## Post 1 by @jerm — 2024-08-15T11:22:11Z > **[Why not BitLocker | Disk Cryptor](https://diskcryptor.org/why-not-bitlocker/)** Some excerpts from the article: > Microsoft did not care to audit the various Self-Encrypting Drives (SEDs) hence leaving millions of its users with practically no security what’s o ever. As at the CCC in December of 2018 during the talk [Self-encrypting deception](https://media.ccc.de/v/35c3-9671-self-encrypting_deception) independent security researchers have demonstrated live on stage how to bypass the hardware encryption of many SSD models using a ~20€ µC programmer/debugger. Demonstrating that for the past 6 years users of BitLocker and such drives were entirely compromised and did not even knew it. To alleviate this issue the user would have to know about it and use a Groupe Policy to disable this feature. It took Microsoft until late 2019 to change the preset and by default [no longer trust SEDs](https://borncity.com/win/2019/09/30/microsoft-setzt-bei-self-encrypting-drives-seds-auf-bitlocker-verschlsselung/). > > ## TPMs can’t be trusted > > By default, Microsoft BitLocker is using the [Trusted Platform Module (TPM)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module), to manage the keys, if one is present. Sound’s good until you realize that you can [sniff the LPC bus and extract the volume master key](https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing), now isn’t that handy… > > ## For your expedience BitLocker can be temporarily suspend > > BitLocker in Windows 10 can be configured to [store the encryption keys in “the clear”](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/bitlocker/suspend-bitlocker?view=win10-ps) this allows you among other things “Restarting the computer for maintenance without requiring user input”, “Turning off (disabling) or clearing the TPM…”, “Moving a BitLocker-protected drive to another computer…”, etc… so what this feature does is to store a encryption key in plaintext on the drive itself. > > **Yes, a secret key that is supposed to ensure your security is write in plaintext i.e. unencrypted to the very same disk drive it is supposed to protect, all for your expedience…** > > ## BitLocker uploades your recovery keys to the cloud without asking > > If you are using windows 10 with a Microsoft account windows will “save” your BitLocker recovery keys in your Microsoft account. This is done automatically and without an option to opt out, as described [here](https://theintercept.com/2015/12/28/recently-bought-a-windows-computer-microsoft-probably-has-your-encryption-key/) now granted if you care about your privacy you shouldn’t use a Microsoft account at all, but the mere existence of this option is a huge red flag and a threat in itself… There’s another great article explaining an implementation flaw in BitLocker that allows accessing data that is encrypted by Bitlocker during system updates. > **[Securitum. Leading european penetration testing company](https://www.securitum.com/how_to_access_data_secured_with_bitlocker_do_a_system_update.html)** Some excerpts from the article: > However, this is not very comforting, because if during the update someone managed to obtain the contents of the FVEK key, **they will still be able to decrypt our disk without the need for any password or other key**. > > At this point, it is very important to understand that the presented operation of the mechanism **is not a bug or a vulnerability. This is a design decision made by Microsoft. The way BitLocker works.** > > Microsoft’s solution creates situations that can cause problems and temporarily stop BitLocker from protecting our data. --- ## Post 2 by @jerm — 2024-08-18T18:52:54Z > **[Microsoft disables BitLocker security fix, advises manual mitigation](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-bitlocker-security-fix-advises-manual-mitigation/)** > > Microsoft has disabled a fix for a BitLocker security feature bypass vulnerability due to firmware incompatibility issues that were causing patched Windows devices to go into BitLocker recovery mode. --- ## Post 3 by @QWERTYWERTY11 — 2024-08-19T01:21:50Z NO!! WAY!! what, why and how??? --- ## Post 4 by @Snowmanonahoe — 2024-08-19T05:13:42Z I disagree with parts of this. Microsoft made some of these decisions because they wanted maximum usability instead of maximum security by default, which I find to respectable especially because device encryption is usually enabled by default on laptops and the like. [Microsoft acknowledges themselves](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/countermeasures#attacker-countermeasures) that default BitLocker without preboot authentication is only meant to defend against passive attackers. Edit 6 days later: and frankly, I agree with Microsoft that the average consumer can’t be trusted to properly store a 48-character recovery password.