Reviving this thread because I’m genuinely concerned how to proceed. With the uncertainty of custom roms and sideloading being potentially restricted Im afraid we may to restrict the debate between PixelOS and iOS for most normal users
Well, the GrapheneOS team is working hard and they have solved most of the issues they had regarding security patches and Android 16 QPR1. In fact, surely when Google starts requiring developer verification to install apps, GrapheneOS will be the only one that can install free apps without devs ID verification thanks to its Sandboxed Play Services.
Anyway, after GrapheneOS, I would say the most private and secure mobile OS is iOS.
Lille sad about GrapheneOS is forced to have a closed scoure version now but what can they do.
Is great news but if Sandboxed Play Services only support GOS, how many FOSS devs will there still be. I think GOS should try to make a Sandboxed Play Services works on every phones not just GOS that will probably safe a lot of FOSS projects. Do anyone know what is stopping other ROMs or stock OSs from using Sandboxed Play Services?
Do anyone know if the Accrescent Dev/devs have made any statements about Developer ID verification? I can’t find anything.
Did GrapheneOS write about this happening? I’ve heard some say this is happening but couldn’t find it being referenced on their website or forum.
Graphene OS is not going to require verification. Also, the verification for this will be a separated app than Google Play Protect.
Mainly privacy issues. It is sandboxed compared to other OEMs giving it every permission possible, but - as any other app - it can still fingerprint your device, and communicate freely (trough IPC) with other apps.
Yes, that’s what I meant to say, it’s just that English is not my native language and perhaps I didn’t express myself well. In GrapheneOS, in principle, you will be able to install applications freely just as you can do today.
For two applications to be able to communicate with each other, both have to grant permissions for it (not the user). So it depends on which applications are installed.
Correct. My point is that GOS saying Google Play Services are sandboxed is a bit misleading.
GOS were supposed to bring a feature to restrict IPC coms, but it hasn’t arrived yet.
The new security channel offers embargoed security patches, which must be kept proprietary until the embargo ends. The builds are otherwise identical to the regular channel.
I recommend you opt-in to this security channel as it currently offers 54 additional security fixes.
This change will not apply to GrapheneOS.
Sandboxing is the reason Google Play Services or any process for that matter can’t just use IPC without mutual consent. The fact that you would like to control that as a user has nothing to do with whether an app is sandboxed or not. That an app is sandboxed also says nothing about how granular that sandbox is, which makes all the difference.
I haven’t been reading to much about GrapheneOS closed source version or Developer ID verification. I would either be too mad or sad about it.
But to my understanding the new Settings > System > System update > Receive security preview releases. Is the closed source version? I could be wrong.
You are correct. The security preview releases contain security patches which are still under embargo and thus closed-source. The rest of the GrapheneOS code is of course still open-source and on GitHub.
I don’t think I could ever go back to iOS because the few open source apps I use on android that are actually available on iOS are crippled, and the iOS version of “privacy” is really just Apple monopolizing control of user data.
I could probably get by with the FLX1 at a huge convenience cost, poor security, and a hefty price tag. I’ll probably just try to hold out as long as GrapheneOS and F-Droid do and hope that a better option comes along in the meantime…
If I needed a phone now I’d probably just get a used Pixel for cheap and flash GrapheneOS to hold me over until then.
This still has Android junk under the hood via Hybris.
And it is highly insecure because it is running an end of life kernel:
- linux-furiphone-krypton/Makefile at ff386699e7325342ab0cafc9f42239b6e2002c03 · FuriLabs/linux-furiphone-krypton · GitHub
- Linux 4.19.325 [LWN.net]
-
Thu, 05 Dec 2024 12:41:59 +0100: It’s the last 4.19.y release, please move off to a newer kernel version. This one is finished, it is end-of-life as of right now.
-
Sandboxed makes it seems like it has a special isolation. In fact, it is the same as other Android apps.
Yes, you need mutual consent, and I never said you didn’t. Still many apps probably are glad to share info between each other.
On all GMS devices Play Services runs as a privileged component so the fact that it is fully sandboxed on GrapheneOS is notable.
I would just use the term “unprivileged” Google Play, not sandboxed. But it’s just a nitpick.
while gms itself was technically sandboxed like every other app on android, it did have many additional special exemptions even as far as in the selinux policy in addition to being a privileged system app.
- disablement: disable unused gmscore_app domain · GrapheneOS/platform_system_sepolicy@5111a54 · GitHub
- the (disabled) domain, has many comments you can read from aosp themself: platform_system_sepolicy/private/gmscore_app.te at b1fc1e9fd00399f56f79ffebc8985b49fa48d656 · GrapheneOS/platform_system_sepolicy · GitHub
FWIW it looks like that kernel was selected by CIP for continued maintenance civilinfrastructureplatform:start [Wiki]
yes, and FuriLabs does actually appear to be merging in from it, which is nice, but:
- it is still an ancient kernel, which lacks newer security or hardening features of the 36 newer major kernel versions
- CIP has a more limited focus in what they support, so some things may not get backported
edit: I’m actually not sure if they’re merging in CIP’s 4.19 into their main branch, they do appear to have other branches with actual CIP merges but those are from May. They do regardless appear to be pulling in many patches.
edit edit: seems you left out context @Anvil
so they do claim to be using CIP: Kernel 4.19.325 is EOL · Issue #198 · FuriLabs/issue-tracker · GitHub
one important thing that the CIP maintenance won’t cover is all the MediaTek specific components
They’re using a Mediatek Dimensity 900 which is over 4 years old, so it is unclear if MTK is even still providing security backports for it.
edit 3: the OnePlus Nord CE 2 uses that same MTK chip and went EOL back in March
But Samsung offers the M53 which still appears to be getting reduced security updates