# A New Anonymous Phone Carrier Lets You Sign Up With Nothing but a Zip Code **URL:** https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/a-new-anonymous-phone-carrier-lets-you-sign-up-with-nothing-but-a-zip-code/33561 **Category:** News **Tags:** article **Created:** 2025-12-04T18:27:53Z **Posts:** 82 ## Post 1 by @Carey — 2025-12-04T18:27:53Z > **[A New Anonymous Phone Carrier Lets You Sign Up With Nothing but a Zip Code](https://www.wired.com/story/new-anonymous-phone-carrier-sign-up-with-nothing-but-a-zip-code/)** > > Privacy stalwart Nicholas Merrill spent a decade fighting an FBI surveillance order. Now he wants to sell you phone service—without knowing almost anything about you. Well… this should be interesting. --- ## Post 2 by @anonymous484 — 2025-12-04T19:18:32Z I am a bit confused on what the threat model would be for this service. Its not really anonymous, Phreeli still collects all legally required information. This information would seemingly make it simple to identify the customer if Phreeli was compelled. --- ## Post 3 by @KevPham — 2025-12-04T19:19:54Z So this is what Merrill has been up to since Calyx…. Interested to see how this goes. I hope they don’t go the way of Cape Mobile where they just make up entirely misleading claims about their services. --- ## Post 4 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T20:18:09Z > Signing up a customer for phone service without knowing their name is, surprisingly, legal in all 50 states, Merrill says. Anonymously accepting money from users—with payment options other than envelopes of cash—presents more technical challenges. To that end, Phreeli has implemented a new encryption system it calls Double-Blind Armadillo, based on cutting-edge cryptographic protocols known as [zero-knowledge proofs](https://www.wired.com/story/zero-knowledge-proofs/). Through a kind of mathematical sleight of hand, those crypto functions are capable of tasks like confirming that a certain phone has had its monthly service paid for, but without keeping any record that links a specific credit card number to that phone. Phreeli users can also pay their bills (or rather, prepay them, since Phreeli has no way to track down anonymous users who owe them money) with tough-to-trace cryptocurrency like Zcash or Monero. How long before this becomes regulated and illegal? Governments are going to begin mandating more info. I guess people can still fake them if payment is private and in crypto as described but the regulation for this could also entail requirement to collect real names and addresses. I hope this never becomes the case but we’ll have to wait and see how popular this gets. Will also be interesting to see the rationale authorities are going to come up with blaming this service and their users for the crimes they can’t contain or mitigate - as a rationale for regulation on an anonymous service. --- ## Post 5 by @Carey — 2025-12-04T20:20:36Z > How long before this becomes regulated and illegal? Governments are going to begin mandating more info. Yep. One of the things I was thinking when I said “interesting”. --- ## Post 6 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T20:29:08Z Well, until governments mandate and amend their law to include asking and saving real IDs from customers, people should still be able to fake their names and addresses if payment is crypto based. But will certainly be interesting if this becomes a thing. Its not unprecedented to mandate accurate and real info so hard to say anything about it today. I’m sure he’s thought of this and so I wonder if there’s a solution for this. --- ## Post 7 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T20:31:36Z Anyone have a website to the start up? I couldn’t find it in the article. --- ## Post 8 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-04T20:39:41Z > **[Phreeli - Privacy By Design Wireless.](https://www.phreeli.com/)** > > Your privacy is Phreeli's priority. --- ## Post 9 by @Carey — 2025-12-04T20:44:16Z Yep… > **[Phreeli - Privacy By Design Wireless.](https://www.phreeli.com/)** > > Your privacy is Phreeli's priority. --- ## Post 10 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T21:13:02Z Okay, looking at the website. It looks like a fantastic option. It also has data roaming so you can buy it and use in your own country with roaming and no extra or hidden fees. It’s anonymous data and cellular service for non US residents in International markets too! This is more and more amazing as I continue to read and learn about it. --- ## Post 11 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-04T21:18:01Z > [@KevPham](#): > > Interested to see how this goes. I hope they don’t go the way of Cape Mobile where they just make up entirely misleading claims about their services. > [@anon57862721](#): > > This is more and more amazing as I continue to read and learn about it. I hope the service isn’t too good to be true. I’m gong to wait for it to mature and have people test it out before I personally use it. If I recall, I think PG used to recommend Mint Mobile before it was bought out by T Mobile or something. No idea who the founders of that are. But since the founder of Phreeli is a public figure in the privacy space (it seems, at least, based on Kevin’s statement) I hope that it doesn’t get bought out similarly to Mint Mobile. --- ## Post 12 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T21:19:56Z > [@anon36227541](#): > > I’m gong to wait for it to mature and have people test it out before I personally use it. I’ve just asked Privacy Guides to review it sooner than later on the This Week in Privacy thread that’s happening tomorrow. Let’s see if they decide to do it soon or not. Please comment and ask for the same. If more people ask for it, they may do it. --- ## Post 13 by @anon94117004 — 2025-12-04T21:45:44Z My thoughts: - It is still a MVNO so all that juicy location and traffic data will be available to the actual carriers and governments. - That pricing is a complete rip off. - Calyx themself literally [offers](https://calyxinstitute.org/membership/internet) a $500/year truly unlimited SIM, meanwhile Phrelli’s $1,020/year plan is capped to 40GB a month. - Visible has a stellar $25/month plan that is also truly unlimited, but hotspot is capped at 5Mbps. They take fake address & name without issue. - And the continued silence on the coup of Calyx is highly concerning. My advice: - Use Wi-Fi where possible. - Always use Mullvad or Tor. - If you do use a SIM card give them minimal information and keep it in airplane mode when possible. - Use a VOIP service for phone number that is detached from SIM. - Also please be aware that many hotspot devices are highly insecure and often years behind security patches. - For example the popular GL.iNet MUDI received a firmware [update](https://dl.gl-inet.com/router/e750/beta) on 2025-09-30, but is still running a Linux kernel [from](https://lwn.net/Articles/926874/) 2023-03-22. --- ## Post 14 by @jonah — 2025-12-04T22:06:21Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > And the contined silence on the coup of Calyx is highly concerning. It is strange. I wonder if he wanted to do this at Calyx and they decided it didn’t make sense. --- ## Post 15 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T22:24:37Z Pricing is subjective, to each their own for what they value and how much. So this notwithstanding, it doesn’t look like a bad service in the slightest for how you can begin and continue using it. > [@anon94117004](#): > > so all that juicy location and traffic data will be available to the actual carriers and governments. No PII is involved. What’s the problem if you use a trustworthy VPN too? > [@jonah](#): > > I wonder if he wanted to do this at Calyx and they decided it didn’t make sense. I imagine it would be too much to do both Calyx and this at the same time, But that’s just reasonable conjecture for the difficulties and busyness I am reading he has gone through thus far. Though I’m sure there has to be another reason. --- ## Post 16 by @anon94117004 — 2025-12-04T22:40:54Z > [@anon57862721](#): > > No PII is involved They have your location and paths you take every day. There are dozens of companies who specialize in such location tracking datasets, any of which can instantly deanoymize you. Not to mention that majority of users switching won’t be buying new phones with untained IMEIs. There are ZERO cell service companies that can be anonymous, no matter what BS they spew. I don’t understand why ~~people~~ the media keeps shilling them. Especially considering again, that ZERO of these “privacy” carriers are even running their own infrastructure. --- ## Post 17 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T22:46:14Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > I don’t understand why people keep shilling them. If you’re referring to me shilling them, that’s slander. I was genuinely asking. Choice of words in exposition/responses matter. Well, WIRED is labeling it as anonymous. It is however as private as a cellular service can be. Nothing wrong in that. I don’t see the service themselves claim they are anonymous on their website (thus far at-least). > [@anon94117004](#): > > Especially considering again, that ZERO of these “privacy” carriers are even running their own infrastructure. I think this is explained in the article if you didn’t read it. I don’t fully understand it but there is an explanation and I am still continuing to evaluate this service. I am commenting here as I continue to read and learn at the same time. --- ## Post 18 by @anon94117004 — 2025-12-04T22:47:04Z > [@anon57862721](#): > > If you’re referring to me shilling them, that’s slander. Not you. The media. > [@anon57862721](#): > > if you didn’t read it I read it. They decoupled payments from IMSIs. Big whoop. Completely irrelevant. Verizon and T-Mobile or whoever can still have a field day. --- ## Post 19 by @jonah — 2025-12-04T22:50:07Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > There are ZERO cell service companies that can be anonymous, no matter what BS they spew. I don’t understand why people keep shilling them. Cape is at least a theoretically interesting one **if** you buy their extra-special phone (which I don’t know whether it’s publicly available) with IMSI switching. Although I have not looked into them in detail. I am disappointed in Phreeli’s [privacy policy](https://www.phreeli.com/privacy/policy) though, because: > For purposes of this policy, any information collected from your use of the Services will be referred to as “ **Personal Information**.” Personal Information is collected either (a) voluntarily from you, or (b) automatically via technologies we employ to provide Services. > [From Section 1] … > **Network service providers**. We share your Personal Information with network service providers and partners to provide you with the Mobile Services. Once shared, your Personal Information will also be subject to the network service provider’s privacy policy. [You can view T-Mobile’s Privacy Policy here](https://www.t-mobile.com/privacy-center/privacy-notices/t-mobile-privacy-notice). > [From Section 3] * * * This is quite a backdoor. Phreeli deleting your personal information from their systems is all fine and dandy, but exactly like you pointed out if they are dealing with third-party infrastructure like they obviously have to without any technical protections then what can you really expect? I suppose obtaining a phone number without providing PII is a useful service, although it is certainly not a novel one and there are plenty of other providers with likely better pricing/terms than Phreeli, but when you have no privacy from cell tower tracking after the fact I’m not sure how much of a benefit this really is. --- ## Post 20 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T22:50:58Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > Big whoop. Well, it certainly is that considering the alternatives - as I see it. And many are going to. There can’t always only be all good reasons to use it. Every product has some cons. I’m not sure you’re being nuanced or accounting for the massive improvements to existing solution this service provides. That’s just my two cents at the moment. But thanks for clarifying. --- ## Post 21 by @jonah — 2025-12-04T22:54:29Z I also do not like how they _appear_ to my eyes to be working with [https://mvnoc.ai/](https://mvnoc.ai/) but they do not mention this in their privacy policy, and imply they are working directly with T-Mobile and that T-Mobile’s privacy policy is the only one which applies here. --- ## Post 22 by @anonymous496 — 2025-12-04T22:55:42Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > Calyx themself literally [offers](https://calyxinstitute.org/membership/internet) a $500/year truly unlimited SIM, meanwhile Phrelli’s $1,020/year plan is capped to 40GB a month. Yeah, I was wondering about this. I’m not familiar with phone plans since I don’t use phones, but does this mean something like anything before X GB has fast speeds, but anything after is capped at a lower speed? If so I wonder what it is capped at. --- ## Post 23 by @anonymous496 — 2025-12-04T22:55:43Z > [@anonymous484](#): > > I am a bit confused on what the threat model would be for this service. Its not really anonymous, > [@anon94117004](#): > > It is still a MVNO so all that juicy location and traffic data will be available to the actual carriers and governments. There would certainly be less digital footprints though right? compared the usual sign up process of other phone companies? --- ## Post 24 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T22:57:58Z Yeah, this itself may be a reason for some to consider it. As for others pointing out the problems. Sure.. I get it. But given the nature of the product/service, is there a better way this could have been done while keeping the costs in the realm of not laughably high? --- ## Post 25 by @anon94117004 — 2025-12-04T22:58:28Z @jonah Those are both nice finds. Thank you. > [@anonymous496](#): > > Yeah, I was wondering about this The Calyx unlimited SIM has a soft cap where it may throttle after 200GB. The Phrelli 40GB/unlimited SIM has a hard cap where it throttles after 40GB. > [@anon57862721](#): > > massive improvements There are none imo and it is a worse value. --- ## Post 26 by @jonah — 2025-12-04T22:58:56Z I would probably just not do something instead of doing something improperly, personally. --- ## Post 27 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T22:59:07Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > There are none imo and it is a worse value. No PII needed to sign up and use this service is a worse value than the alternatives? How do you rationalize this? --- ## Post 28 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T23:00:08Z I guess that’s where the debate is. Is it really improper enough to discount this service fully? I don’t know. --- ## Post 29 by @ph00lt0 — 2025-12-04T23:02:23Z Crazy expensive. It reminds me of [PGPP](https://invisv.com/pgpp/). --- ## Post 30 by @jonah — 2025-12-04T23:10:19Z I really hate to be put in this position where I have to be a downer about new companies which at the very least promote the idea that privacy is good to more people, but I would think of this in terms of: - What else could you do to improve your privacy with the $$$ difference between a regular carrier and this? - What else could Nick from Calyx have done with the money used to start Phreeli, if he wasn’t just seemingly infatuated with the concept of cellular connectivity? (Calyx hotspot was confusing to me from a privacy perspective as well) And IMO the answer to both of these questions is: quite a lot actually :innocent: --- ## Post 31 by @spacecdt — 2025-12-04T23:19:31Z > [@jonah](#): > > Cape is at least a theoretically interesting one **if** you buy their extra-special phone (which I don’t know whether it’s publicly available) with IMSI switching. Although I have not looked into them in detail. The CEO has ties to Palantir. I wouldn’t trust them for a second. --- ## Post 32 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-04T23:25:05Z So your view is of the opportunity cost. I don’t think you have invalid points but I don’t think I do either. It’s still a good option for the average Joe wanting more privacy and who can afford it to use this while still do the other things to better their OPSEC. A few ways to think about this for sure. --- ## Post 33 by @jonah — 2025-12-04T23:25:51Z Okay, now I’m reading the [white paper](https://www.phreeli.com/files/PhreeliDoubleBlindArmadilloWhitePaper.pdf), and what in the world? > 4. An Implementation Version for the Launch > > For the initial launch of Phreeli, the determination was made to implement a simpler version of the full solution, namely privacy pass with user commitments instead of double privacy pass with user commitments. In this simpler version, an adapted privacy pass protocol with user commitments is run between the user service and the mixing service. The second run of privacy pass protocol between the mixing service and phone service is eliminated. An acceptable level of security and privacy is still achieved through this simpler version, because of the following reasons: (1) the first run of adapted privacy pass protocol between user service and mixing service (2) trust assumptions on the mixing service that maintains a mapping of Commit(iduser) and idphone (3) communication of the client or the user service with the phone service through the mixing service. Are you telling me they designed “Double Blind Armadillo” and use “Double Blind Armadillo” in their marketing and at the very end of the text they reveal **Phreeli is not double blind?** It’s certainly not “Double _Privacy Pass_” like the rest of the paper describes, at the very least. I don’t know if “Double Blind” has some specific meaning that might still apply to the implemented version? --- ## Post 34 by @anon92357554 — 2025-12-07T16:52:49Z There’s a premium that is 2x my current MNVO. I cannot speak to how much of MNVO’s costs are typically subsidized w/ marketing/advertising/tracking to know what is acceptable here, but it is a steep ask. With that said, there is something to be said about Merrill’s journey/dedication to the cause that is unrivaled among most. Half the board are still on Windows while Merrill was the first person to stand up to a Patriot Act gag order. It might not be right for me in its current iteration, but as he is someone who _literally_ risked their freedom for the principles that this board believes in, I find the complete rejection of the carrier somewhat surprising/flippant. I am willing to keep an eye on the project to see how it grows over time and give the project room to evolve w/o instantly cutting it off at the knees. --- ## Post 35 by @jonah — 2025-12-07T17:41:40Z I believe it’s because most of this forum values evaluating products as they are instead of by who they’re made by. Nicholas Merrill is a pioneer in privacy rights in the US through his lawsuit, yes, and the impact it had on government exploitation shouldn’t be dismissed. But beyond that we should examine what he has _actually_ done to advance privacy. He strikes me as a guy who deeply interested in mobile devices/networking, and the technology behind the internet. And at Calyx he did a lot of cool stuff, from being an ISP for people of New York and later the whole US who may have few other internet options, to creating CalyxOS which extends the lifetime of phones and promotes the FOSS ecosystem far more than alternatives. But just supporting people doing _cool_ things isn’t the goal here. Calyx hotspots aren’t doing anything novel in terms of technical privacy, and if CalyxOS were truly privacy and security **first** they would have actually engaged with critical reviews of their work and improved the product long ago, instead of ghosting the community and isolating themselves. The fact that still nobody knows what’s going on over there is telling. The truth is that I think Calyx has always had other goals than solely privacy/security, and the privacy angle of Calyx and now Phreeli seems to me that it’s more to do with connecting these brands to his lawsuit’s reputation than their sole core value. Which is perfectly _fine_, to value cool FOSS tech and stuff as much or more than privacy/security. They fight for important issues, but as a result we do see the issue of privacy or security take a backseat on occasion. So while I respect the guy and personally share a lot of his same interests, I just don’t see him (or Calyx tbh) as an authority on privacy and security, and even if I did I don’t think an “appeal to authority” is a good argument anyways. The fact is that I see Phreeli as flat-out misleading consumers at the moment, and even if I certainly can imagine some theoretical legitimate use cases for the service, that doesn’t outweigh the poor marketing, and I just don’t think the fact that legitimate use-cases exist or his history in the space should give this company a pass here. I don’t want to evaluate Phreeli entirely in a vacuum and not recognize his past work, but I don’t think his past work makes Phreeli deserving of the _massive_ benefit of the doubt I’d have to be giving them right now :man_shrugging: TL;DR if Phreeli had just come out and said “hey here’s a new way to get a number without KYC” then they would have been well received by everyone. Unfortunately, they decided to heavily lean into an angle presenting them as thwarting surveillance and tracking, which is dangerous for them to be doing. --- ## Post 36 by @privacyisconsent — 2025-12-07T19:49:22Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > Visible has a stellar $25/month plan that is also truly unlimited, but hotspot is capped at 5Mbps. They take fake address & name without issue. Does this imply they do not have access to the billing details you need to use with a KYC payment method for the service? > [@anon94117004](#): > > Use a VOIP service for phone number that is detached from SIM. Is this a setup you run yourself? Do you happen to use a SIP client to manage phone calls? If this is on GrapheneOS how do you ensure you can receive calls AFU if you are also making use of the auto reboot feature? --- ## Post 37 by @Anvil — 2025-12-08T03:08:27Z > [@anon57862721](#): > > No PII needed to sign up and use this service is a worse value than the alternatives? How do you rationalize this? There are already loads of data only esim providers out there that require no PII and charge reasonable prices, and there are VOIP providers that do the same. What they’re offering simply isn’t new. --- ## Post 38 by @ignoramous — 2025-12-08T08:01:42Z > [@jonah](#): > > It’s certainly not “Double _Privacy Pass_” like the rest of the paper describes I’ve read it thrice and I am unsure what it is even they are disclosing in that paper. It is scant on technical details. In [the IETF’s version of Privacy Pass](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9576#name-deployment-models), a single entity being the _Attester_ (payments provider, probably in this case), the _Issuer_ (the mixer service, I imagine), & the _Origin_ (the phone service, I guess) means the main possible way to retain its unlinkability guarantees (Issuer-Client, Origin-Client, and Attester-Origin unlinkability) is for the _Client_ (the user, I take) to be virtually _anonymous_ on their own. And so, they’ve had to go “double blind” / “double Privacy Pass”… but how it technically has been architected is far from clear. And the fact that they haven’t actually done so probably means the use of “Privacy Pass” here is just a marketing thing ([not new](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/kagi-search-engine/14172/93)), at least for now. --- ## Post 40 by @anonymous515 — 2025-12-20T03:49:37Z > **[We started a phone company that doesn't collect personal data](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e8SnNNq6MaI)** > > phone company: https://www.phreeli.com/How it works: https://www.phreeli.com/files/PhreeliDoubleBlindArmadilloWhitePaper.pdforiginal video: https://www.youtu... This is news to me. I read the other article when it was first posted, but I did not know that @louis_rossmann was involved in it, let alone as a board member. --- ## Post 41 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T12:18:56Z I just checked this service out. The pricing is definitely on the higher side for sure, but it definitely does look interesting. Since I know that Nicholas Merril is the guy behind this and is a very big name in the privacy world for fighting the PATRIOT act and starting Calyx, I don’t see a huge reason not to trust him on this. --- ## Post 42 by @tiger-71483 — 2025-12-20T13:23:45Z Phreeli requires a Zip+4 code to be entered… not simply a five-digit zip code. And, if I understand the zip code system, a Zip+4 **provides them with your street name and a range of houses**. So while it isn’t your house, it is a limited range. A little less anonymous than simply a zip code. I randomly selected an Indiana zip+4 and put it in [this site](https://in.postcodebase.com/zipcode5-list) and got the following result. 4200 (EVEN FROM 4200 TO 4298) E SARATOGA DR, BLOOMINGTON, IN 47408-3195 --- ## Post 43 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T13:46:13Z I believe that you are right as of current, but the white paper says that the implementation that they are going with currently is when the service is “at launch”. I think the reason is because they are still working out the kinks of the full Double Blind Armadillo system, but eventually the full version will be employed once they are finished. It is a brand new cell service, it looks like, and the full version of the DBA architecture does look quite sophisticated from what I read in the whitepaper. So, it will take a bit of time to fully finish developing it before the full debut. The only couple of concerns that I personally have about Phreeli is the price premium of their plans over other competing carriers and the risk of getting ceased and shut down by the men in black (US Government) if the FCC finds an issue with it in the future. This is my own take after reading up further about them. It overall looks quite compelling and I may give them a try myself just to see what the sign-up process and experience using their service will be like (my wallet might hurt a bit though). --- ## Post 44 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T13:53:12Z I think they just simply use that for determining the phone number to assign and ensure that there is proper coverage from their backend cell phone network in the location the that people are signing up from, right? --- ## Post 45 by @Anvil — 2025-12-20T14:07:58Z Pretty sure mint mobile only requires a 5 digit code. There are others that don’t require any zip code. You could give a fake one though. --- ## Post 46 by @Aground0488 — 2025-12-20T14:43:34Z The towers still track you and the gov has access to all data. This is a money grab from the popularity of privacy. nothing to see here --- ## Post 47 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-20T14:45:48Z That’s such a broad statement that fear mongers and doesn’t say anything beyond it with a pedestrian response. Please explain what and how you mean. Otherwise, your comment may as well be misinformation. You can’t comment with broad statements without proper exposition on the same and the subject matter at large. --- ## Post 48 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T14:53:27Z I suppose that what he means by that is although they might not know who the person using the T-Mobile network under Phreeli is from observing the network itself, they could still theoretically deanonymize the user using their location and travel patterns via cell tower triangulation and geofencing, and use other data points from external sources to gather the name and info about the user. Unfortunately, that is just a native issue with cell towers and networks in general that almost no carrier can mitigate. --- ## Post 49 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-20T14:54:43Z If you throw enough resources at a problem, anyone can be de-anonymized if they at all are truly anonymized in the first place. This is not a new problem to think of or resolve. --- ## Post 50 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T14:56:08Z I know. I was just saying that was probably the point he was referring to. --- ## Post 51 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-20T14:56:39Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > Unfortunately, that is just a native issue with cell towers and networks in general that almost no carrier can mitigate. This is what people appear to not be accounting for it would seem. --- ## Post 52 by @Anvil — 2025-12-20T15:02:20Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > theoretically deanonymize the user using their location and travel patterns via cell tower triangulation and geofencing, and use other data points from external sources to gather the name and info about the user They would also have access to the user’s SMS messages and calls I believe since they go through the same carrier as the cell data unencrypted and attached to the same IMSI unless I’m missing something. --- ## Post 53 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T15:05:57Z Yeah. I think overall though Phreeli and the tech behind their service does look kind of cool, and I hope that the full version of DBA gets finished soon for full release. I still think the higher pricing is a little bit of a downside, but I am glad that it’s still cheaper than an alternative like Cape. I guess privacy does have a price tag I suppose, but I’ll still give it a try to see how I like it. --- ## Post 54 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-20T15:07:23Z True. --- ## Post 55 by @Anvil — 2025-12-20T15:07:45Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > I guess privacy does have a price tag I suppose, It doesn’t have to. You can have more privacy than what this offers for less money by combining a VOIP solution with a data only esim. I pay \< $100 /yr with my current setup and Phreeli would be a privacy downgrade for me. Plus I can use any cell provider I want, it works just as cheaply and easily internationally, and I can receive texts and calls on any device. --- ## Post 56 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-20T15:08:10Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > I guess privacy does have a price tag I suppose Only because you are not the product. This is how it should have always been but alas everyone is used to “free” or cheaper options that were hurting them but did not realize. > [@anon82422799](#): > > but I’ll still give it a try to see how I like it. Do share your views since you’re in the US when you try. --- ## Post 57 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-22T23:50:26Z Jonah… why…? :sob: [Jonah Aragon- Why I Don’t Like Nicholas Merril’s New Cell Carrier](https://youtu.be/zLOXsFmLayw?si=xabcVGlGWI2Kl4Eb) To be serious though, is Phreeli really not all that it’s cracked up to be and something like Cape is better, in terms of privacy-focused carriers? UPDATE: I just watched and I have to say that although I admittedly don’t know too much about telecom stuff, I will say that his points are very valid and seriously worth considering for people looking at Phreeli. Still was curious about Phreeli vs. Cape though, since I believe that Cape uses their own entire core. --- ## Post 58 by @jonah — 2025-12-23T02:47:46Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > To be serious though, is Phreeli really not all that it’s cracked up to be and something like Cape is better, in terms of privacy-focused carriers? I definitely do not “get” either one of these services. They are probably not worse than other carriers, but they don’t provide enough privacy value to justify their costs. --- ## Post 59 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-23T08:50:46Z I’m at-least glad you still made the video to add more context and info people are definitely not seeing or are aware about. Now people can decide for themselves for what is important to them and if they still want to or not use them. --- ## Post 60 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-23T17:24:52Z Louis Rossman Phreeli follow-up (Addresses Arbitration Clause ToS concern): [Louis Rossman- Let’s Talk Forced Arbitration](https://youtu.be/h_twkLJbc1c?si=gl0LD07TlHFttCCg) --- ## Post 61 by @jonah — 2025-12-23T19:13:09Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > I think the reason is because they are still working out the kinks of the full Double Blind Armadillo system, but eventually the full version will be employed once they are finished. It is a brand new cell service, it looks like, and the full version of the DBA architecture does look quite sophisticated from what I read in the whitepaper. I brought this up in my video but I didn’t make that video for this audience so I should repeat it here: It is very unclear to me what actual privacy benefits the system would provide even if implemented in its full capacity. Increased separation between T-Mobile and Phreeli is what is missing in the current implementation, and if more zero-knowledge proofs are used in _that_ context, that has no bearing on the fact that T-Mobile is directly getting your IMEI when you connect to their towers. Basically, I dislike the Double-Blind Armadillo marketing simply because it is not true and IMO further misleads consumers, but even if it were true it does not address the privacy concerns I have unfortunately. > [@anon82422799](#): > > and starting Calyx To be perfectly frank, what has Calyx done to advance privacy? Their ISP has certainly advanced internet connectivity in the US, and CalyxOS has certainly advanced free and open-source software in the Android ecosystem. And those are both certainly noble/laudable goals, but neither of these projects have a huge privacy impact. CalyxOS happens to be more private by virtue of being FOSS, most FOSS projects just inherently are because private software is user-friendly software. But when it comes to being privacy- **first** , they have consistently ignored obvious privacy improvements in favor of other priorities. I have nothing wrong with Calyx in a vacuum, and I personally like the things they value, but I just don’t see them as _privacy_ leaders. They are working on cool things that interest them, and taking advantage of privacy marketing in the process due to Merrill’s case noteriety. I think Phreeli is not much different. It’s my guess that Merrill just wants to be an MVNO operator because he seems to be most passionate about computer/cellular _networking_, and _privacy_ was simply the clear marketing play for him given his history. I wasn’t bothered by this when he did basically a similar thing with Calyx and their hotspots, but Phreeli IMO has gone **too far** with the privacy claims and is actually misrepresenting their product, which is **dangerous** for consumers. --- ## Post 62 by @ignoramous — 2025-12-23T19:56:10Z > [@jonah](#): > > wasn’t bothered by this when he did basically a similar thing with Calyx and their hotspots, but Phreeli IMO has gone **too far** with the privacy claims and is actually misrepresenting their product, which is **dangerous** for consumers Preach.[[1]](#footnote-129438-1) I’m sure there’s valid reasons… And I can’t speak on behalf of Nick Merrill here (though, I’ll take the liberty to forward your views to him; but if I were to guess, he won’t be bothered)… from the correspondence I’ve had with Calyx when Nick was running the place, nothing gave me the impression that Nick is a fraud. * * * 1. Some here have been bothered by claims made by VPN providers recommended by PG or when said providers don’t meet the minimum criteria ([very recent example](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/remove-protonvpn/33980/49)), and yet no corrections / comments from the “team”, [that can veto whatever it pleases](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/how-does-privacy-guides-make-recommendations/32774/6), are forthcoming (a “soft” veto); why? [↩︎](#footnote-ref-129438-1) --- ## Post 63 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-23T19:57:47Z > [@ignoramous](#): > > nothing gave me the impression that Nick is a fraud. To even think of a possibility of this is jumping to conclusions, no? At least I think so. --- ## Post 64 by @jonah — 2025-12-23T20:17:15Z I realize I just repeated what I said at [A New Anonymous Phone Carrier Lets You Sign Up With Nothing but a Zip Code - #35 by jonah](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/a-new-anonymous-phone-carrier-lets-you-sign-up-with-nothing-but-a-zip-code/33561/35) > [@ignoramous](#): > > I’m sure there’s valid reasons… IMO there is no valid reason to say something like “stay connected coast to coast, without tracking” on their homepage, when the service does **not** protect against cell tower tracking (obviously what is implied here), nor does it (to my knowledge) protect against T-Mobile monitoring your network traffic. The only privacy you are getting is from Phreeli themselves, which hardly qualifies as a value add at all, especially for $20-$40/month more than competitors with no unlimited data plan? If Merrill is going to improve Phreeli’s privacy protections in the future, then good for him, but it’s crazy to buy (or sell) a service based on future promises. --- ## Post 65 by @anon82422799 — 2025-12-23T23:32:10Z Those are all definitely good points, and I agree. Personally, I am still in consideration of at least trying it out as the concepts of it and privacy-focused carriers in general are still somewhat compelling to me. However, I do acknowledge your perspective and critiques, as I see where you are coming from in this regard. I am hoping that Nicholas Merrill will potentially settle for an interview with someone like Rossman or FUTO (or perhaps Techlore?) to talk about his newly founded company and further clarify/explain answers to the questions and concerns that you and others in the community have raised about his new endeavours. For instance, one thing I personally would like to know was what drove him to leave the Calyx Institute completely just to make a completely new startup instead of just creating a carrier service under the Calyx name, whether it was due to an internal dispute or something else. Nonetheless, I am also still curious on Phreeli because compared to Cape, I would rather trust someone with his reputation (although it could be correct that he is monetizing it), than someone who may still have potential ties to the State and intelligence community as far as a privacy-oriented carrier goes, and the Phreeli plans are cheaper than Cape’s single one at basically $100/month. If all else fails, then like Anvil previously has said, I’ll just throw in the towel, grab a Mint or US Mobile SIM, and use that with VoIP for calls and a E2EE messenger for texts (may still do that regardless). --- ## Post 66 by @Anvil — 2025-12-24T00:16:19Z > [@anon82422799](#): > > like Anvil previously has said, I’ll just throw in the towel, grab a Mint or US Mobile SIM, and use that with VoIP for calls and a E2EE messenger for texts (may still do that regardless). Alternatively if you’re planning to use VoIP for calls/texts anyway, save some money by checking out some of the data-only esim options mentioned in this thread: [Mobile Internet Options](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/mobile-internet-options/19080) --- ## Post 67 by @securitybrahh — 2025-12-24T11:45:38Z These solutions don’t solve anything really. according to me, this is it: [MudiV2](https://docs.gl-inet.com/router/en/4/user_guide/gl-e750/) with [blue-Merle](https://github.com/srlabs/blue-merle) : Change IMEI with AT command per EID (sim adapter - [9esim](https://www.9esim.com/?coupon=SECURITYBRAHH2)) per [silent.link](https://silent.link) eSim. If more people use this setup, there will be a bigger crowd to hide in. --- ## Post 68 by @anon94117004 — 2025-12-24T16:26:43Z > [@securitybrahh](#): > > according to me, this is it: please [read above](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/a-new-anonymous-phone-carrier-lets-you-sign-up-with-nothing-but-a-zip-code/33561/13), I already noted that this device is running a seriously outdated kernel and should be relegated to your local trash heap --- ## Post 69 by @ignoramous — 2025-12-25T00:51:24Z > [@jonah](#): > > IMO there is no valid reason to say something like “stay connected coast to coast, without tracking” on their homepage Over the top, okay; but … Phreeli claims, if one purchases their eSIM (with Monero or Zcash), the only personal information needed is the zip code. > [@jonah](#): > > Increased separation between T-Mobile and Phreeli is what is missing in the current implementation, and if more zero-knowledge proofs are used in _that_ context, that has no bearing on the fact that T-Mobile is directly getting your IMEI when you connect to their towers. Well, IMEI is tied to a physical device which Phreeli isn’t selling? I mean, it isn’t Tor’s fault if a website fingerprints you with how your GPU renders stuff. We’d instead ask folks to use Tails or Whonix etc. That said, I do get your point that there’s more than one static identity attached to the phone (including ICCID) and so you wonder what is the point of Phreeli anyway … This is the same question skeptics ask of public VPNs when all they do is hide just one of the many static identifiers (the IP address). PG sees values in them, anyway, no? > [@jonah](#): > > It is very unclear to me what actual privacy benefits the system would provide The benefit from what I can tell is, if you purchase Phreeli’s eSIM, there’s as little information as possible to tie IMSI / IMEI / MSISDN to a name. Even if you did divulge personal information, they will attempt to ensure cryptographically (in the future apparently) that their user service (enrollment & auth) is unlikable to their phone service (usage & accounting). --- ## Post 70 by @securitybrahh — 2025-12-25T10:22:40Z The situation is same on V2? --- ## Post 71 by @securitybrahh — 2025-12-25T10:25:41Z > [@anon94117004](#): > > Also please be aware that many hotspot devices are highly insecure and often years behind security patches. > > - For example the popular GL.iNet MUDI received a firmware [update](https://dl.gl-inet.com/router/e750/beta) on 2025-09-30, but is still running a Linux kernel [from](https://lwn.net/Articles/926874/) 2023-03-22. How exactly this entails a vulnerability that thwarts the privacy offered my mudiv2 rotating IMEI per EID per IMSI? --- ## Post 72 by @PrivateCitizen — 2025-12-27T22:32:32Z Cape has just started to use daily IMSI number rotation for my Pixel 8a Graphene phone. Also, Cape prevents Sim Swaps with a 24 word master phrase that Cape does not have access to. As Cape has their own tower software it’s my understanding the tower operators have no idea who they would be tracking. Would love for Privacy Guides to do a review of this service as not sure whether to switch to a service such as Phreeli. --- ## Post 73 by @ignoramous — 2025-12-28T02:20:23Z > [@PrivateCitizen](#): > > As Cape has their own tower software it’s my understanding the tower operators have no idea who they would be tracking. Have they published any papers? If so, will you link to it? From their summary of their own privacy policy: > We may disclose your personal information in the following ways: > (i) with our service providers, to help us operate the website or our cell phone service, for instance by sharing information like your IP address with web hosting companies or sharing necessary information, like your phone number, with our network partners who help us connect you to subscribers of other carriers, > (ii) to protect the safety, property, or rights of our company or of any third party (for instance, law enforcement authorities if we witness harmful behavior on our website or our cell phone service, > (iii) to prevent or stop any illegal, unethical or legally actionable activity (for instance, if we notice deceptive, fraudulent or illegal activity), > (iv) to comply with our legal obligations, such as responding to legal or regulatory inquiries * * * > Subscriber SIM number (IMSI) > … > Cape and our network service providers who help us connect you to subscribers of other networks … Required to ensure connectivity across networks and billing reconciliation … If you are no longer a subscriber of Cape, we will not retain records of your phone number’s activity longer than 60 days (see CDRs) > > Device number (IMEI) > … > When your phone connects to the network … Cape and our network service providers who help us connect you to subscribers of other networks … Our partners may capture this information to screen for stolen devices and fraud … 60 days (see Call Detail Records) Not all too different than Phreeli (except Phreeli has the “Double Privacy Pass” going for them to whatever extent, which Cape doesn’t). --- ## Post 74 by @jonah — 2025-12-29T17:37:00Z > [@ignoramous](#): > > Not all too different than Phreeli To be clear, the **only** thing Cape **potentially** has going for them is [Cape Obscura](https://www.cape.co/obscura) which **is not available for purchase yet.** There’s some details here though: > **[I Don't Own a Cellphone. Can This Privacy-Focused Network Change That?](https://www.404media.co/i-dont-own-a-cellphone-can-this-privacy-focused-network-change-that/)** > > A small tech company called Cape has been selling a privacy-focused cellphone service to the U.S. military. Now Cape will be offering its product to high-risk members of the public. There is no reason to purchase Cape’s regular plans, they’re no better than Phreeli _and_ they’re run by arguably less trustworthy people. --- ## Post 75 by @privacy.slouchy — 2025-12-29T18:04:52Z > [@jonah](#): > > they’re no better than Phreeli _and_ they’re run by arguably less trustworthy people. ELI5 how do you get less trustworthy than telling every CalyxOS user to drop dead, overnight --- ## Post 76 by @anon57862721 — 2025-12-29T18:20:48Z Exactly which announcement from Calyx implied that their user base should “drop dead” overnight, as you put it? --- ## Post 77 by @jonah — 2025-12-29T19:06:20Z what? --- ## Post 78 by @privacy.slouchy — 2025-12-29T19:09:00Z Excuse my excessive hyperbole lol. I’m really moreso asking why Cape leadership is untrusted, I’m only tangentially aware of the company but have no knowledge of any wrongdoing I’m under the impression the current head of Phreeli departed CalyxOS without notice or an orderly transition plan, taking the signing keys for security updates, effectively stonewalling the project’s ability to push updates & leaving all users with insecure devices. That is, to me, an egregious offense that breaks any trust in this team’s current privacy-focused tech efforts I think that’s pretty well documented, can go look for links if you’re genuinely curious. But again, I’m more interested in Cape here, and why they’d be considered less trustworthy than a leadership team I _think_ should be widely regarded as very untrustworthy --- ## Post 79 by @jonah — 2025-12-29T19:18:42Z I haven’t actually looked too much into Cape personally, but I know they were founded by a former mass surveillance company (Palantir) executive. --- ## Post 80 by @privacy.slouchy — 2025-12-29T19:19:47Z That’s a very, very good reason jonah :upside_down_face: Kinda crazy how often these palantir bros keep popping up on other projects… I dont _love_ it --- ## Post 81 by @anon36227541 — 2025-12-30T01:09:28Z > [@privacy.slouchy](#): > > I’m under the impression the current head of Phreeli departed CalyxOS without notice or an orderly transition plan, taking the signing keys for security updates, effectively stonewalling the project’s ability to push updates & leaving all users with insecure devices Can you at least provide a source? --- ## Post 82 by @privacy.slouchy — 2025-12-30T02:34:02Z sure man [Here’s](https://calyxos.org/news/2025/08/01/a-letter-to-our-community/) the CalyxOS statement about delayed security updates due to departing leadership. Notable excerpt: > we announced a recent leadership transition. When senior personnel have access to signing keys and leave a team, it is security best practice to update signing keys and conduct audits…for the time being, current CalyxOS users will not be able to receive further security software updates until our new security protocols are in place [Here’s](https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24791-departure-of-calyx-calyxos-leadership-and-discontinuation-of-calyxos-updates) a detailed assessment by the GrapheneOS team. I know their language style often tends to dissuade a lot of folks, but the two projects shared a lot of developers over the years, they have some insights to the situation that cant be dismissed outright. One of the departing CalyxOS leaders (not associated with Phreeli, so far as Im aware) created an account to leave some comments on the thread Notable excerpt from GOS dev team: > If Calyx had access to the signing keys, they could quickly make a release rotating nearly all of the OS keys including the ones for signing OS and app updates… Nicolas Merrill is the sole person who had access to the signing keys despite not being a developer involved in CalyxOS development and CalyxOS being entirely created and managed as part of Calyx. He appears to be refusing to turn over the signing keys to them, otherwise they could have continued doing updates and could have rotated everything other than the verified boot keys. Calyx is not being transparent about what’s happening and why they’re making these decisions. To date, neither party has been fully transparent with the sizeable CalyxOS user base, whose devices became worthless between 1Aug and 5Aug. I leave you to draw your own conclusions. I do not intend to badmouth any individuals or organizations involved. I endorse no opinions included in either publication, I am just sharing information. Personally, I need more transparency from Merrill before entrusting him with any kind of data. Same goes for Calyx Institute